Hi Struan and Jonathan
On 9 Jan 00, at 13:17, Struan Hellier wrote:
> X is perfectly sufficient, more concise, less confusing and very elegant.
And says nothing! - X has no content, no context, and certainly provides no information. X is
a variable of type c. It has yet to be instantiated.
The type fundamental constructor of reality (FCR - I like TLA's) is the set of labels that are
used to describe the most basic item from which reality can be constructed. Some
instances, such as water, fire, air etc. are redundant (although not removed from the set for
historical or sentimental reasons) whilst others, such as mind, matter, subjects, objects and
Quality still persist.
The best instantiation of X is that which provides the most comprehensive means of reality
building - at the moment this is Quality/Value.
> It totally accords with my experience and, more importantly, if 'dq' is indefinable
> (as Pirsig claims it is) then why try to define it in the first place with terms like quality
> and dynamic which have all sorts of definite connotations. If it is indefinable
> then leave it undefined for goodness sake.
As has been pointed out (by David Lind most recently), description is not definition. Along
with the label Quality are certain attributes which are characteristic of Quality. To say what
Quality is like is not to say what Quality is. If you have experienced something then you
may be able to say what it is like but not necessarily precisely what it is. It is the "what-it-is-
likeness" that is worthwhile discussing. Anyway, as with all metaphysical fundamental
reality constructors, if they are the primary how can they be defined - this would require
some form of pre-primary constructor!!!!
> X. Pirsig answers this by claiming that a word with value subtracted is unrecognisable, but
> his reasoning rests upon the same conflation of a utilitarian use of quality and a moral use of
> quality that Roger presents above.
But anything with Value subtracted becomes meaningless whatever form of reasoning one
uses. This goes not only for Value in the MoQ sense but also in the more traditional sense.
It is in the more traditional sense that there are greater problems with the term Value as can
be seen in the whole Intrinsic/Instrumental Value debate. There are those who insist that
Value is purely instrumental, is subjective and cannot exist outside of the confines of the
human mind - one such creature ( a philosophy lecturer whose name escapes me) spent the
best part of 2 hours attempting to disabuse myself and others of the existence of Intrinsic
Value - insisting that Value without a human Valuer is a fiction.
> Along the same lines, and partly for these reasons, there is no doubt that Horse is right to
> point out that a distinction needs to be made between good and morality, but can the moq
> really survive that or is it so far removed from Pirsig's moq that it then becomes
> something else?
Good and Moral are not identical (as are Quality and Value) but, as I've said before, are co-
dependent. As far as I can see this damages the MoQ not one iota. What this says is that
where reality is necessarily moral it is not the case that what exists is good. The major
problem here is getting past the traditional meaning of what is and is not moral and
understanding what the MoQ detemines as moral - THEY ARE NOT THE SAME THING.
On 11 Jan 00, at 23:54, Jonathan B. Marder wrote:
> HORSE:
> > I agree that Good is co-existent with the morality of the universe
> > because the morality of the universe is the existence of the
> > universe or reality itself....
>
> This theme of a "moral" universe (one of Ken's favourites too) that
> Pirsig presents could be rephrased "everything that happens is God's
> will". There's not much one can say about it, and it certainly doesn't
> provide any basis for ethical human behaviour. One can easily dismiss
> Pirsig's Inorganic and Biological levels as God's will (or nature), but
> HUMAN ethics is a question of human behaviour and human will.
There's quite a lot that can and has been said about a moral universe in the MoQ sense.
You seem to be considering that human ethics have no connection to the inorganic or
biological level. I'm really not sure why one should dismiss a significant part of human nature
as 'God's Will' (whatever that is) and still expect to find a coherent ethical system.
> The free-will argument is a red herring because humans clearly DO make
> decisions and can be held responsibile for the outcomes. For humans to
> act morally involves both individual decisions and collective decisions
> (society). The individual decisions are conscious and seem to accord
> with individual responsibility - no real ethical problems here. However,
> social decisions are patterns arrived at with no no real individual
> consciousness.
To be more accurate, humans appear to make conscious decisions and are held responsible
for those decisions because it appears that we are responsible for the decisions we make. A
bit of a circular argument really. I'm fairly sure that I do make conscious decisions but
collective decisions are another matter. I can only take part in a collective decision as an
individual, surely. If it is the case that some part of my behaviour is strongly influenced by
genetic patterns and some by social patterns and that I have little control over these on an
individual basis then what part of my intellectual nature is free and which part determined (or
at least strongly influenced). Please note that I am NOT denying Free Will.
> If several thousand individuals decide to sell their shares on the same
> day, causing a market collapse, one can't easily find a conscious entity
> RESPONSIBLE for that collapse.
What! Are the several thousand individuals not conscious entities. Why should you even
consider conflating these conscious (Intellectual) entities back into a lower form (Social).
The conscious entities are the individuals.
> Games theorists have great fun with this sort of stuff.
> What Pirsig offers in Lila is the idea that the behaviour
> of individuals and the behaviour of societies is a complex interplay
> with significant moral implications. Unfortunately, Pirsig didn't do
> very much to develop this.
Again you are missing out biological and inorganic value which provide the basis for social
value. In the past you've said that there is little or no distinction between society and intellect
and now you seem to be saying that biology and the inorganic are also irrelevant. So which
part of the MoQ is it that you feel might be relevant?
On 13 Jan 00, at 18:46, Struan Hellier wrote:
> Absolutely right and the point I was trying to make. So, good, bad, morality and value all
> come after experience and are evaluations of it. (again - the words present the case) Once
> again morality, good and value are not equivalent to X (the primary metaphysical entity).
A basic principle of the MoQ is Quality=Value=Morality. So if (fundamental constructor of
reality) X = Quality then obviously X also = Value and Morality. Hence reality is Moral. Good
and bad are evaluations (not necessarily human evaluations - remembering the idea of
intrinsic value).
> So. Quality is not synonymous with morality, good, bad or value. Good is nothing more
> than (as you put it) a 'classification of (an) experience.' and, furthermore ethics depend
> almost exclusively upon intuition. So far you have established nothing whatsoever about X.
> Therefore to call it Quality is entirely fanciful, and ethics, once more, is reduced to an
> emotivist or intuitionist position.
>From the MoQ ethics becomes what is Good. This is obviously not an absolute, so anyone
looking for an absolute definition of what constiutes ethical behaviour or wants to be
spoonfed a concoction of what to do and when to do it should notlook to the MoQ. In the
same vein they should also not bother with any of the other major ethical systems of this or
any other century as all they will find are guidelines to behaviour in one form or another
which are often cotradictory and always at odds with all other systems. Let's face it, there is
no such animal as a perfect ethical system and anyone who believes otherwise is fooling
themselves. The MoQ does provide for other possibilities which I shan't go into right now as
this post is long enough already.
> May I ask what is left of the moq?
Plenty. In fact exactly what we started with Morality and Good. And still in perfectly good
shape.
Horse
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