Another two cents on the subject of free-will.....to follow up on
Scott's post, Does it matter which we have? One of the issues
surrounding the free-will issue is that if people do not have free
will, then they can not be held accountable (responsible) for their
actions. However, if the person engaged in the action has no free
will, then likewise, the response to that action (i.e. - society
holdimng them accountable) is out of our control.
If we do have free will, then the opposite is true. BUT - in either
case, does it matter? The only difference seems to be the perception
of choice. I believe we have free will. I live my life as if I have
free will. And it appears to me like I have free will. So, if in the
end I discover I was wrong, does it matter?
Shalom
David Lind
Trickster@postmark.net
Sktea@aol.com wrote:
> Roger stated:
> > Scott, although not quoting you, I believe the above addresses your
> > post in entirity. I feel that you are following Struan's lead and
> > oversimplifying the free will issue onto the single dimension of
> > predictability.
>
> Scott expounds:
> Actually, in reviewing the recent articles in this thread, I believe
Struan's
> 'oversimplification' to be rather succinct.
>
> To review:
>
> Struan said: "I will stick with the realisation that free will lies in the
> fact that we cannot predict what we are going to do". I understood 'we' in
> that passage to refer to humanity in general.
>
> Roger retorted, "Unpredictableness is not sufficient for free will.... the
> concept of free will also requires self determinism." I agree that
> unpredictability is not sufficient, by the way.
>
> Pirsig (damn it, Lila should have an index) wrote: "To the extent that
one's
> behavior is controlled by static patterns [of Quality, or X, or whatever],
it
> is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality,
which
> is undefinable, one's behavior is free." (p. 156, 1st ed hardcover)
>
> Scott reiterates in his own way:
> To the extent that the pattern of self is influenced and created by
patterns
> of biology, society and intellect, sure, action of the self is generally
> predictable. (Predictability of the vectors and ergs of action - what I
> merrily refer to as the 'monads' of action - is limited by well-defined
> physical principles, 'discovered' by science.) Further, to the extent that
> the self responds to unknown, unmeasured, by definition undefinable stimuli
> ('Quality' or 'X' as you prefer), action of the self is not predictable.
All
> well and good.
>
> BUT how much of what is currently unknown will someday be measured, defined
> and incorporated into a theory of behavior (or 'action of the self')? We
> cannot know. It is reasonable to accept Godel's Theorem, chaos theory,
> quantum theory etc. and conclude that there will always be something 'we
know
> not what' to which one may ascribe free will, since these approach the
limits
> of our knowledge. But to conclude this to be universally true for all time
> is not reasonable to my mind. Does not Pirsig himself imply that truth is
a
> function of time? (Anyone want to find support for that? God, I want an
> electronic, _searchable_ version of Lila.)
>
> The jump from unpredictability to self-determination is a long one, I
agree.
> But when we define the self as a collection of patterns influenced by other
> entities, none of which is fully understood, the validity of the principle
of
> self-determination hinges on our ignorance. One can only say that if
> behavior is unpredictable, we cannot define the limits of its significance.
> If individual will appears to be free, for all extensive purposes, one can
> accept that it is free.
>
> Does that mean it really is free? As I understand the question, it asks
> whether free will is an absolute truth, an entity I've never seen hide nor
> hair of. Basically, if one looks for a Universal answer to this question,
I
> counter, "Universal Truth? Ain't no such animal," and go back to my
reading.
>
> ------
>
> Now, since I guess I've pitched my tent in Struan's camp on this issue, I'd
> like to go on to ask: of what utility is the answer to the question of free
> will?
>
> If I assume behavior is determinable, I may, like any psychologist, find
> interesting, useful and possibly enlightening relationships between the
self
> and other entities. If I assume behavior is free, I may, like any
> individual, pursue 'X' in my own actions and those of others to my own
> edification and delight. Which assumption I make will depend on
> circumstance, which is rather my point isn't it? Depending on the
> particulars, the answer changes.
>
> Looking forward to your comments,
>
> Scott
>
>
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