hi all: I took Roger's advice and looked at chapter eight again. This might
be of interest to Platt and Diana too. It might even interest Jonathan,
Matt, Rick and others who've been in on their conversation. Lots of the
issues discussed here recently are covered in that chapter.
The quote about "more than one set of truths" came from chapter 8 and it was
good to see it in context. In fact, I think it was practically a mistake to
exclude the first sentence of that paragraph, which goes like this...
"This may sound as though a purpose of the MOQ is to trash all
subject-object thought but that's not true." then all the stuff you already
heard and then "The MOQ can explain subject-object relationships
beautifully..."
On the next page he starts to get more specific...
"When you ..define substance in terms of value the mystery disappears:
substance is a 'stable pattern of inorganic values'. The problem then
disappears. The world of objects and the world of values is unified."
And a few pages after that he elaborates on the same notion...
"Strike out the word 'substance' whenever it appears and substitute the
expression 'stable inorganic pattern of value'. Again the difference is
linguistic. It doesn't make a whit of difference in the laboratory which
term is used. No dials change their readings. The observed laboratory data
are exactly the same."
And since we're getting toward the end now, we get this teaser of a
conclusion...
"Phaedrus saw that the 'value' which directed subatomic particles is not
identical with the 'value' a human being gives to a painting. But he saw
that they were cousins, and that the exact relationship between them can be
defined with great precision."
Perhaps the "great precision" he refers to is the yet to be disclosed
hierarchy of values and the moral codes that go with them? I think so, but
you can re-read it for yourself and draw your own conclusions. A few things
seem much clearer though. Pirsig says explicitly that the MOQ does not trash
subjects and objects altogether. I really don't think we have to pretend
that the world doesn't exist, we don't have to deny the existence of
thinkers or rocks. The MOQ dramatically re-arranges and re-imagines all the
old ontological categories, but it doesn't make the "things" in those
categories disappear. Trust me. I live in the Rockies and know about stable
inorganic patterns. ba dump bump?
And clearly there is a difference between inorganic patterns and
intellectual patterns that are ABOUT rocks and such. But they are "cousins"
whose exact relationship can be worked out with "great precision". We're
talking about the nature of subatomic particles, a complete metaphysical
system and lots of long-standing philosophical puzzles. I suppose we can
afford to be interpetive, insightful and imaginative to some extent, but
surely the MOQ is like that motorcyle. You gotta respect the presicion of it
too. Obviously, the MOQ is an intellectual construct and it takes
intellectual tools to work on it.
Thanks for your thyme, DMB
PS How about this Johathan; TIME itself is a static pattern of inorganic
values.
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