Okay, my 8th grade English teacher will spin in her grave for the
following question (but is probably pleased that I remembered to
capitalize the "E" because it's a proper noun) - please explain the
subject predicate object pattern. Is this just "The Cat (subject) saw
(predicate) the mouse (object)"? The reason I ask is that American
Sign Language doesn't follow the usual grammar rules - it's a spatial
conceptual language - different than any other language i have
studied. I don't know if it follows the subject predicate object
pattern (SOP-P) - but if the SOP-P is what I I think it is, ASL
doesn't seem to follow it.
Shalom
David Lind
Trickster@postmark.net
diana@hongkong.com wrote:
> Peter
>
> >just a couple of thoughts on "computational theory of mind" - this is
still
> >a current, viable hypothesis, but you are right that it is not proposed
that
> >the edifice is completely re-programmable; it is, as you say, proposed
that
> >there are computational 'centres' which deal with specific types of
> >information, communicate laterally and so on. Certainly, the human brain
is
> >the most behaviourally-flexible brain that we know of, but not infinitely
> >so. You can't actually decide not to see the colour 'red' for arguments
> >sake, and this does of course have implications for the notion of
'freewill'
> >, 'absolute' freewill, and so on.
> >A good reference, and certainly readable for anyone on this list, would be
> >Stephen Pinker, "How the Mind Works". 1997. - brilliantly indexed, a bit
> >long.
>
> I've read Pinker's book, and his earlier one "The Language Instinct". In
fact it
> was his work plus Chomsky's ideas about a Universal Grammar,
> and Steven Mithen's "Prehistory of Mind" that made me see
> these errors in Pirsig's work.
>
> The argument for the software theory of social and intellectual patterns
only
> works if it can be shown that not all people have the same ones. To an
extent
> that's true, I just don't think it's true to the extent that Pirsig is
proposing.
>
> Pirsig points to research that says that the Hopi have no concept of Time.
> I suppose this is to show that the concept is some kind of social or
intellectual
> pattern. But Pinker finds that isn't actually true, it's just a popular
misconception
> created by a poor anthropologist. Pirsig also cites what I believe is now
known
> as "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax", ie the 16 different words for snow.
> Allowing for the fact that there are at least ten words for snow in
English, it
> sill proves nothing except that it's snowy where they live. We all know
> jargon relating to our areas of expertise, Americans have 16 different
words for
> fried eggs, it isn't evidence for a different metaphysical structure and it
doesn't
> prove that people who don't know these words won't also see differences in
the
> forms.
>
> Maybe those two examples aren't that bad. It worries me more when he
> says that Western languages follow the pattern subject predicate object.
> (Sorry I can't find the reference at the moment.) The implication is that
> other languages don't. If that was true then it would prove that the
> subject-object metaphysics is a kind of software pattern. But I don't think
> it is true. Chinese follows that pattern as well, and from what Pinker
> says I'm led to believe that all languages have these elements.
>
>
> >On Causation: Karl Popper, who, as a brilliant philosopher-of-science, has
> >severe doubts about the notion that the universe runs according to what he
> >calls 'push causality'. A short, readable book would be : "A World of
> >Propensities" 1990
> >
> >
> >On "substance" : well, everyone's written on this, from Democritus
onwards.
> >Whether the basic 'stuff' of the universe is matter, energy, space and
time,
> >seems extraordinarily hard to pin down. My own way of dealing with this is
> >to propose, as a methodological convenience, the notion that "information"
> >is not a 'property' of matter, energy flows and so on, but quite the other
> >way round. That is, the basic 'stuff' of the universe is actually
> >information, and all else is 'properties' thereof.
> >I'm not sure if this is what Pirsig is proposing with Quality,...?
>
> Yes, there's plenty written on these subjects. But my real concern is to
> establish precisely what Pirsig is saying and what the implications are.
> It's just all a bit sketchy.
>
>
> Diana
>
>
>
>
>
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