The only real requirement for a metaphysics is that it make some claim about
the nature of reality. There are certainly a number of metaphysical claims
made by Pirsig in his two books. One may choose not to accept these claims,
but it's hard to deny that they are at least made. The most essential claim
of the MOQ, of course, is that reality at its core is composed of neither
mind nor matter, but a third entity out of which mind and matter arise.
This is a metaphysical position. Specifically, it is a metaphysical
position known as neutral monism, which is not original to Pirsig, but which
has been held by various other philosophers, including William James and
Bertrand Russell.
But I suppose the main thing that differentiates Pirsig's system from other
metaphysics and even other neutral monisms is that he claims that the entity
of which reality is composed is value. This seems to me to be a pretty
original idea but also one that's completely nonsensical from a metaphysical
stance. For it is here that I think that Struan is on to something. Let me
see if I can explain the problem as I view it and see if it's the same thing
he's talking about.
It is traditional to say that value is an attribute that an object may or
may not have from any single person's perspective. That is, I could say,
"For me, this steak has value. It tastes good and it nourishes my body."
However, if you hold to the metaphysical position that value is a substance
rather than an attribute ("good" as a noun rather than an adjective), then
you would instead say, "This steak IS value." But since you would hold that
value is the basic building block of everything, you would also be forced to
say, "This knife sticking in my leg IS value." After all, what else could
it be? You couldn't say that the knife has less value than the steak,
because LESS isn't a word that applies to nouns. It only works with
adjectives. The concept of value completely losses meaning if it's turned
into a substance. This's why I could never understand why Pirsig decided to
turn a perfectly good theory of value into a nonsensical metaphysics. His
analysis of value (dividing it into classical and romantic; static and
dynamic; inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual) is brilliant.
Turning value into a substance rather than a quality (note the word),
however, is completely unnecessary.
- Matt
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