Re: MD Riff's Moral Dilemmas

From: PzEph (etinarcardia@lineone.net)
Date: Sun Nov 26 2000 - 23:00:05 GMT


ELEPHANT TO ROG:

- an answer to a question to a reply... to a reply to a reply to:

ROG:
> BTW,  one additional moral concern that you should know is that the MOQ
> explains that men are more evolved than animals, which are more evolved than
> plants.  Biologically speaking, this is not correct in modern evolutionary
> theory. Every species alive today is considered equally evolved. The MOQ is
> using nontraditional definitions of "evolved."  I don't see a problem with
> this if it is clearly recognized and explained.

ELEPHANT:
You're definitely right about modern evolutionary theory, and it's more or
less the 'Ronald Regan' point I made earlier.  Well, while I go back and
read some more Prisig, could you perhaps say just a bit more (for the
puzzled) to clearly explain how the MOQ's non-traditional concept of
'evolved' differs from both modern (non-evaluative) evolutionary theory and
the 'survival of the fittest' travesty of biology, and in what sense it
remains a notion of evolution?  Is it best to think of our difference from
plants in terms of Evolution, or standing towards Quality?

ROG:
In standard evolutionary theory, everything alive today is considered as
evolved from its common original ancestor.. Men are not viewed as more
evolved than apes. For example, both chimps and men are viewed as equally
evolved from their common proto-chimp/man ancestor.

ELEPHANT:
Quite. Continue.

ROG:
In the MOQ, Pirsig evaluates evolutionary advancement by the freedom and
versatility of a species to not be controlled by static patterns. Pirsig
equates biological patterns with more complexity and versatility as more
moral than those with less complexity and versatility.

The point is that though some patterns evolve toward more versatility and
complexity, not all do. There is nothing inherently wrong with the MOQ's
version of evolution, but it requires explaining.

ELEPHANT:
My previous confusions are somewhat clarified. You saying that evolution
is, for Prisig, something which can have a direction. That direction can be
determined with respect to the capacity of an organism to escape "static
patterns" through the invention of new answers to technological questions,
which capacity is the "versatility" of a species. Am I warm?
    Now, does this return us to a hierarchy of evolution, in which Man
stands at the top because of the 747, or does this return us to a flat plain
of equality, because the 747 is no more of an innovative answer to a
technological problem than, say, the baleen of a whale? You might say the
former, because the rate of technological change is obviously superior in
the airline industry. But, against that, I ask: from what point of veiw is
the staying-the-same-ness of "static patterns" to be judged? From a whale's
point of veiw, the 747 isn't an answer to any real problem, so not to be
counted on the credit side of human evolution. Do you follow? I want to be
clear about the *decision procedure* a claim that such and such is more
evolved, if such a claim can be made. Otherwise, we simply get the result
that silicon valley is entitled to a high opinion of it's "versatility" at
the expense, say, of jainist monks in India, while the same also holds in
reverse. We don't want 'being evolved' to just amount to 'being the sort of
thing I approve of', do we? Do you recall the bit about the Dolphins in
HitchHikers' Guide to the Galaxy?

ROG:
BTW, why are you so set against Darwinian theory? Why is it a travesty? Is
it because it is a bad idea? Or because it is a good idea about a
discomforting situation? Or is it because it gets applied inappropriately?
(ie the vapid travesty of Social Darwinism.)

ELEPHANT:
It's certainly a very good idea, and I don't find the situation it describes
discomforting, if i correctly understand the description. But I do think
that it gets applied very inappropiately, and the "vapid travesty of social
darwinism" isn't the only form this takes by any means. There are still
people who think that the world is the totality of facts (excluding values),
and Darwinism is often a big part of their anti-metaphysical repetoire. In
their hands, it is a proof that traditional approaches to subjects like
psychology, linguistics, sociology, -morality even- , which have assumed
that each has some special existent subject matter, are wrong headed from
the start, and that the selfish gene (with suitable help from book sales)
can sweep all before it. This is a kind of mirror-image of Social
Darwinsim, whose mistake was to think evolution an evaluative concept
(survival of the "FITTEST"), where nowadays by contrast Darwinsm is used to
GET RID OF any remaining values, by reducing them to the mechanical products
of accident and selection. This extends even to Consciousness. In the UK
at least, the moment anyone so much as mentions Darwin, you can tell
immediately what their ontology is, which works of philosophy they wouldn't
bother reading, and what chat shows they will be likely to appear on in the
near future.
    None of this takes away from the fact that Darwin's picture of how the
diversity of life on this planet came about is fundamentally correct. But
that correctness is a scientific correctness, a technological correctness,
like putting the proper threaded bolt onto a screw. And I think that there
is another kind of correctness, another kind of truth. Think about this via
James, if you please. James says: a statement is only really meaningful if
it makes some concrete difference. Well, what about that statement then?
The answer here is bound up in the distinction between analytic statements
and synthetic ones. Darwinism is true, but it is true as a bit of
synthesis, and there can be analytic truths, necessary truths, philosophical
truths, if you like (such as James's), which can take precedence. A
discussion of consciousness would be a good example. One might argue
(synthetically) that consciousness is an evolved phenomena which is a
technological fix for the given technological problems of an
organism/species in the world. On the other hand, one might argue
(analytically) that the whole meaning of 'technological' is dependant on the
distinction between user and the use, which necessarily implies free will
and consciousness, and hence that talk of consciousness as an evolved
technological fix is quite meaningless. Generally, I find Darwinism is used
to avoid facing up to the second, hard, philosophical, kind of thinking
(which I warmly attribute to Prisig). The scientific point of veiw has it's
limits, that is my point. And I think that applies whether your science is
an MOQ cogniscant science or an old fashioned classical rationalism.

I do apologise to the long posting, to those hardy souls who made it
through.

Elephant

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