ELEPHANT TO JUSTIN GLENN MARTY AND ROG:
Looks like you started something Justin. I'll take your reply to my message
first:
JUSTIN TO ELEPHANT: If we define Quality as 'the goal of every activity',
then that poses a new problem- that is the exact same definition used in the
Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle for happiness...which means a fixed set of
values and behavior to attain Quality...plus the entire dilemma of inserting
Quality into Aristotelian philosophy in a new way...
ELEPHANT: I'll just point out that simply because Prisig and Aristotle both
have a concept of something which is the goal of every activity, doesn't
mean that those two concepts are the same.
To digress, I think you will find in the Nicomachean Ethics a faint echo of
Aristotle's teacher (sometimes Aristotle's writings read like jumbled up
students lecture notes - it has always been assumed that this might be
because they were taken by Aristole's students, but it might, equally, be
because Aristotle *was* the strudent). Why not go straight to Plato's
Republic, which is a masterly extended treatment of individual happiness
through the metaphor of the state. You will find much to confuse, but I'd
recommend your thinking about the surprise rose - you'll know the passage
when you come to it. The key is that once the rose becomes just a set of
static patterns, the possibility of happiness and true enjoyment is gone.
Trapped in a set of propositions, the enjoyment of the rose must always be
connected to future pain at it's passing, and contrasted with displeasure at
other patterns. Propositionalised, patternised, the rose itself is never
present to us, and we are never present to it. Divided by grammatical
tense, we are never in the 'now'. Er, well, this is maybe mumbo-jumbo to
you now, and it probably will be as long as you stick with Aristotle.
That's why I'd recommend Plato. Aristotle never did really 'get' Zeno's
paradoxes. Plato did, I think. Aristotle never really understood
Heraclitus either (Aristotle seems always too cocksure to really listen,
demonstrating his own learning all the time). What you want is a
philosopher who really listens, one who doesn't just write philosophology.
One who writes novels, or dialogues, or something of the kind.
JUSTIN: to Marty- Exactly...What if we are seeing Quality as merely a new
way to organize our sense data in an a priori way. Kantian philosophy here
becomes an enemy of the MOQ- it can be reinterpreted as seeing Quality as
another mindset, another 'grid' (sorry there for bringing Discordianism into
a serious conversation :P). And remember, if we remove the a priori
modelling/the mythos, one becomes insane. Therefore, with Hegelian ethics, a
society of insane men has very poor Quality, so it can hardly be a blueprint
for a good way to live.
ELEPHANT: Quality isn't a way to organise 'sense data' because there is no
such thing as 'sense data'. Sensation isn't data. There are certain kinds
of empiricists who believe that it is, and they have too, because otherwise
their ridiculous tabula rasa concept won't hold, but these people are just
blinded by their own derranged metaphysics (which, they will tell you, isn't
a metaphysics: don't believe them). Sensation isn't data, but something
continuous. It's just not parceled out into 'information' or 'objects' or
'data' or 'simple impressions'. An observation of this continuity, often
expressed in the word 'flux', is something common to James' "radical
empiricism", Prisig's Dynamic Quality, and the tradition of Heraclitus and
Plato.
Re: Hegel. I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. Re:
Blueprint. Who needs a blueprint? Wouldn't it be a start to become less
selfish and self-obsessed? Wouldn't that be a better way to live? Re:
Soceity of the insane. This is a contradiction in terms. Prisig's remarks
on this in Lila (ch 26) are bang on.
MARTY WROTE: Mr. Elephant - Sure, we can define Quality as "our goal of
every activity", but that doesn't mean it has to exist - it just means that
we are able to conceive of its existence. Also, the fact that something like
mathematics can be modeled only says something about the way our brains see
the world. When we are looking at math, or Quality, or God, we are looking
at the way our brain organizes, sorts and interprets the world,; it doesn't
necessarily say anything about the world itself. marty j
ELEPHANT: Firstly, as I remarked in my original post, your argument that we
could conceive of quality without the conceived of Quality existing depends
upon treating Quality as an Object. The waters of the ontological proof are
deep and murky, marty, but this much is clear: Quality isn't an old man in
the sky with a white beard. Nor is it any pattern at all (patterns have
static quality, but are not the same as static quality, and they don't have
dynamic quality at all). Since Quality isn't a pattern or object, it
doesn't have attributes, it is an attribute. The old argument against the
ontological proof, namely that perfection can be an attribute of objects but
existence cannot, just doesn't apply where the proved existence isn't an
object to begin with. Maybe some new counter argument applies. I haven't
heard it from you here. You are arguing that something can be conceived of
without existing in the way that Unicorns do, ie, in the way that some
objects do. Quality isn't an object. QED.
Second, you are apparently supposing that there is such a thing as sense
data, which we then "organise". If there is no data to be organised, then
the activity of pattern making, and the resources with which we do it, take
on a new character. What we are talking about here is Creation with a
capital 'C'. Reading Plato's 'demiurge' for the old Hebrew 'God', and the
light of 'The Good' or 'Quality' for 'good', we have here the replacement of
watery flux with static patterns, order, firmament:
"And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the
face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.
And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from
the darkness.
And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the
evening and the morning were the first day.
And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let
it divide the waters from the waters.
And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under
the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament: and it
was so."
Amen.
'Interprets'? Yes, if you can 'interpret' what has no language
into language... maybe. But supposing that 'the brain' does this is
like saying that pawns play chess. 'The brain' is an object in language.
Also, I'd mostly second what Rog had to say (with a strategic exception):
ROG WROTE: Pardon me for saying so, Marty, but this seems like a kinda
dualistic way to define things. Our "brains" are other than "of the world?
Our state-of-mind is other than of the world? Our knowledge is other than
of the world? (No comments please, Bo)
Certainly you are correct that our modeling says as much about us as about
"not us". But us and not us are both of the world. I would suggest that how
we organize, sort and interpret the world says bundles about the world, as
well as how we decide to sort out what is and isn't part of the us. After
all, who the Hell are WE ...really?
"The world may (or may not) be a figment of our imagination, but our
imagination is surely a figment of the world."
ELEPHANT: I think that's right Roger, except perhaps for a question of
emphasis. The trouble with pointing out correctly that we are part of the
world is that an empiricist interlocutor can then come back and say: 'right,
let's collect some data on the part of the world which is people!', which
means sticking them in laboratories, or writing down the way they use words,
or something of the kind. They then end up with a load of data, and the
fact that what is filtered through is data makes their observations entirely
besides the point. The point was about how data comes into being, and no
amount of data collection is going to be relevant to that.
So, as a result of this confusion we get empiricists who correctly treat
mind as part of the world, but then use their studies to come up with sets
of 'data' about the mind/world that contradict each other. E.G.:
Wittgenstein collects a lot of linguistic data to show that we are tabula
rasa on which language games are written ('trained'), whereas Chomsky
collects lingustic data to show that we have innate language skills
(something some empiricists find threatening, as they damm well should).
ELEPHANT TO GLENN: Liked what you wrote on Maths as invention vs. discovery.
Do you think the axioms are analogous to linguistic conventions, like where
we just agree to treat a certain part of the spectrum as "red", so that only
after these agreements and axioms does any actuall describing and
discovering/inventing get done? Or do you think that, besides this analogy,
there is something special about mathematic axioms? Because for 'red' there
are always going to be borderline cases - that's not what happens with
mathematical/geometric axioms is it? Maybe that's what makes maths more
like discovery than invention: the fact that what the descriptions build
upon is really clear and immutable. Maybe, too, this accounts for Physics
being a higher science than Chemistry: the maths quotient.
---------- The original exchange:
ELEPHANT HAD WRITTEN TO JUSTIN (spork): I guess the answer to your question
is that if math is our own modeling, then we are modelling it to some
purpose, and so the motivation has to be a reality here. The same is true
of a modelling of the metaphysics of Quality. Since Quality, by definition,
is our goal in every activity, it is in the case of MOQ both the motivation
and the thing we are motivated to model. So, O.K., this looks a little like
the infamous Ontological Proof for the existence of God: Quality is the
perfect object of all our desires, therefore it cannot but exist (supposing
perfection involves existence). There are a number of things wrong with the
ontological argument in so far as it is applied to God (Struan might like to
fill in all the tedious details), mainly connected with the fact that the
perfection of objects is a matter of the object's attributes, and existence
isn't an attribute. However, when we apply the Ontological Proof to The
Good, or Quality, which is itself generally conceived of as an attribute
rather than an object, these points against the ontological proof do not
apply. If these circuitous manouvers around the Ontological Proof interest
you, check out Iris Murdoch: Metaphysics as a guide to morals ISBN
0140172327, CHAPTER 13. That thing you most trully desire must exist -
Murdoch makes a case for this not being self indulgent fantasy, since good
hard thinking about what it is you most trully desire leads to contemplation
of a quite austere reality of satisfaction, the stuff which nirvana is made
of. That help at all?
BTW: I guess I would myself treat math as instrumental, but instrumental in
a particularly rigid and compelling way... There are other 'maths', yet, at
the same time, all 'maths' represent the one same 'maths', if you see what I
mean: this being why Plato thought geometry such a good training: one is
modelling, but one cannot model in an idle or self indulgent way: one will
be quickly found out.
JUSTIN WROTE: I got this problem from reading about interpretations of
mathematics. It's called Conceptualism, and I think it poses a serious
problem to the MOQ. Any help here or answers would be appreciated. Thanks.
-As far as mathematics, Conceptualism states that we invent math, not
discover it- it is our own modelling of reality in a way that we can
intellectually understand. Math seems to fit nature so well (as per a
Neo-Platonist claim) because we have designed it to do so.
The same could be said of Quality. The idea of Quality can seem like it
works to us now simply because Pirsig has designed the MOQ to work based off
reality. With all our analogues we have built up to reality, how can we ever
know we are truly seeing Quality?
The problem, therefore, is the possibility that Quality does not exist in
and of itself, but only as a model for our experiences. Every person will
have their own definition of Quality, even w/out the analogues, because it
is their own modelling of what they perceive they see because Pirsig has
said it's out there.
Again, thanks for any answers.
ELEPHANT: My pleasure. Now, I wonder where Struan has gotten too....
CHRIS LOFTING [DDIAMOND (from Australia)] WROTE: everything was fine until
the last question
...the deed poll office is closed over the holidays so the name change will
have to wait -- sorry :-)
> -----Original Message-----
> Subject: MD Wanted: High Class
Philosophologist Interlocutor
>
>
> Qualifications required:
>
> -Must have an interest in the work of R.M.Prisig
> -Must cite reading in
the history of philosophy (esp. Iris Murdoch)
> -Must not be afraid of
questions
> -Must rise above rhetorical flak
> -Must be able to define
'metaphysics'
> -Must be called 'Struan Hellier'
>
> Is there anyone out
there who can take this job?
>
ELEPHANT: I've had a word with the board of ****Pseudonymous _Pachydermous
_Pzeph.com**** , and I think we might be able to drop the last requirement
for the right candidate. The way we would do this, within our existing
administrative arrangements, would be to create an entirely new position, to
work in parrallel with that remaining held open for Mr. S. Hellier. Might
this suit Chris?
Regards to all,
Pzeph
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