Hi Struan and all,
STRUAN
<<<Your initial posting which sparked off your
accusations of hypocrisy and of ignoring you, didn't even ask me a
question, so I am a tad surprised that you are continuing to chastise me
for it. But, perhaps I misunderstand.
>>>
Strictly you are correct - there was no question mark, and grammatically
it was not a question. It was a request: " ... if you completely reject
every aspect of Pirsig's philosophy, please explain why . . . "
STRUAN
<<< In order for me to clarify whether I have or not,
could you explain to me exactly what 'tool' Pirsig's framework provides?
Is it simply that more complex patterns are more moral because they
'encompass a wider viewpoint than less complex patterns'? If so, could
you explain how one would use this tool to come to a moral conclusion
about anything without encountering the same terminal problems Pirsig
did in Lila? Bearing in mind the following objections (and these
constitute reasons why I reject your exposition of one small part of
Pirsig's framework):
>>>
Maybe I am being presumptuous, but I think I can improve on Pirsig's
examples:
Let's consider the disease Rubella (German Measles) - a minor childhood
disease with very mild symptoms and nearly always free of complications.
Although vaccination for this disease has been around for quite a while,
there are strong reasons against its use because the risk the
vaccination - mainly that the risks of the complications of the
vaccination itself outweigh the risks of the disease.
However, Rubella has disastrous effects on the development of the unborn
foetus, and it is considered extremely dangerous to expose a pregnant
woman to the disease. In the 1970's, in many countries it was already
common practice to vaccinate all teenage girls (but not boys
pre-adolescent girls - since neither tend to become pregnant).
During the 1980's, policy changed, and many countries started to
vaccinate ALL babies against Rubella. It had been noticed that the
vaccine was only ~80% effective, so a significant fraction of vaccinated
pregnant mothers were at risk from picking up Rubella e.g. from a sick
boy. The vaccination campaign slogan in the UK at that time was "Don't
let your boy get the girl next door into trouble". The rationale was
simple - vaccinate the whole population and the incidence of the disease
will go right down, reducing the risk to any pregnant women who is not
immune.
Here we have a clear case of the "bigger picture" taking precedence. On
an individual level (most closely matches Pirsig's biological),
vaccinating any person is a bad idea - the vaccine potentially does more
harm than good. On a wider level (matching Pirsig's social level),
vaccinating everyone
is of general benefit to society by preventing the birth of babies
malformed due to Rubella.
STRUAN
<<<
1) Morality is concerned only with human behaviour. To believe otherwise
degrades morality. (I have been through this in some detail previously).
>>>
I agree with one important provision. Since conscious human behaviour
derives from human understanding of given situations, the whole of
"understanding" is part of the moral framework.
Otherwise, why even bother with philosophy?
<<<
2) Given the above, this talk of the relationship between levels is moot
in ethical discussion. There is no rational sense in which a leaf has
moral
priority over a stone for example. Equally, as humans are composed of
all levels at once it is impossible to be consistent in moral
pronouncements
(as Pirsig's failure to provide coherent examples demonstrates).
>>>
I disagree. Whether one values a leaf over a stone, or a flag over a
human life are highly ethical questions. Pirsig provides plenty of
examples, both deliberately and in the normal run of the plot (e.g.
eating that chunk of dead cow for his own sustenance). As for
consistency, although the general framework may be consistent, any
individual moral pronouncement is unique. Otherwise, why should we ever
bother with elections? Let's decide on the most moral policies once and
for all and then do away with democracy.
<<<
3) If you want to derive what we *ought* to do from the *fact* of
complexity, you need to give a good reason why you are doing so.
. . . >>>
Interesting response Struan. Why did you so readily accept my "big
picture is more moral" position without questioning it?
STRUAN
<<<
'Starting' from a Quality position is not sufficient if you want to
establish Quality as the primary empirical reality. Pirsig clearly
realised that he had to try and prove it if anyone half reasonable were
to take him seriously. As I
don't consider the concept of everything being Quality is a coherent
one, let alone the actuality, you will see that this is another reason
why I reject the framework.
>>>
That's another issue (MD metaphysics thread). The ontology is first
presented in ZAMM. The first point is that Aristotelian "truth" is
misused as if it were an ontology (Pirsig's SOM). The alternative
ontology is based on (radical) empiricism - not Pirsig's invention. He
just happens to call the concept Quality.
<<<Now what have I missed that you can tell me off for again?
Struan
>>>
Well, at least now you have stated your explicit rejection of Pirsig's
framework. I am puzzled how you can do that and still consider ZAMM a
good novel - it wasn't particularly brilliant as a travelogue!
For now, I would be happy to see your response to my Rubella example
above.
All the best,
Jonathan
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