RE: MD Morality

From: Struan (struan@clara.co.uk)
Date: Wed Jan 24 2001 - 16:17:03 GMT


Greetings,

"RICK:
Just out of curiosity, is there any philosopher (or anyone at all) you
believe has come closer to success in this endeavour than Pirsig?"

Well I don't think anyone is any further away from doing this than Pirsig,
but I don't believe that anyone has reconciled science with ethics to this
date. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill made a brave attempt but did not
succeed.

JONATHAN:
--------------------------
Maybe I am being presumptuous, but I think I can improve on Pirsig's
examples:
Let's consider the disease Rubella (German Measles) - a minor childhood
disease with very mild symptoms and nearly always free of complications.
Although vaccination for this disease has been around for quite a while,
there are strong reasons against its use because the risk the
vaccination - mainly that the risks of the complications of the
vaccination itself outweigh the risks of the disease.
However, Rubella has disastrous effects on the development of the unborn
foetus, and it is considered extremely dangerous to expose a pregnant
woman to the disease. In the 1970's, in many countries it was already
common practice to vaccinate all teenage girls (but not boys
pre-adolescent girls - since neither tend to become pregnant).
During the 1980's, policy changed, and many countries started to
vaccinate ALL babies against Rubella. It had been noticed that the
vaccine was only ~80% effective, so a significant fraction of vaccinated
pregnant mothers were at risk from picking up Rubella e.g. from a sick
boy. The vaccination campaign slogan in the UK at that time was "Don't
let your boy get the girl next door into trouble". The rationale was
simple - vaccinate the whole population and the incidence of the disease
will go right down, reducing the risk to any pregnant women who is not
immune.

Here we have a clear case of the "bigger picture" taking precedence. On
an individual level (most closely matches Pirsig's biological),
vaccinating any person is a bad idea - the vaccine potentially does more
harm than good. On a wider level (matching Pirsig's social level),
vaccinating everyone
is of general benefit to society by preventing the birth of babies
malformed due to Rubella.
------------------------------

My response:
You (almost) equate the individual with the biological level and yet we know
that an individual, under Pirsig's framework, comprises all levels at once.
One could, with equal validity, argue that the individual is the peak of the
intellectual level and so should not be encouraged to put itself at risk for
the sake of society, therefore it is wrong to encourage individuals to take
the vaccine. The 'bigger picture', I could claim, requires us to see
individuals as primarily a 'collection of ideas and these ideas take moral
precedence over society' (Lila Chpt 13). Under this reading of the moq, all
we have done is decide to focus upon the intellectual level aspect of the
individual rather than focus, as you do, upon the biological aspect.
Unsurprisingly, we have each come out with opposite conclusions. Of course
one might say that society contains a number of individuals and that these
individuals are all 'collections of ideas' therefore the risk should be
calculated by weighing up the amount of 'collections of ideas' that might be
lost when undertaking each course of action. If 100 people are seriously
affected by the vaccine in order to save 10000 (for example), then it is
moral to continue the vaccination programme because more of the intellectual
level has been preserved. As with all the other ethical examples I have
seen, one COULD just as easily come to another conclusion which is equally
justifiable under Pirsig's framework. That, to me, is a very compelling
reason to throw out the framework altogether.

As an aside, I suspect that the people who decided on which course of action
to take in your example, relied upon the principle of utility to decide
their course of action - The action which produces 'the greatest happiness
for the greatest number' is the right one to follow.

JONATHAN:
"I agree with one important provision. Since conscious human behaviour
derives from human understanding of given situations, the whole of
"understanding" is part of the moral framework.

Agreed, in the sense that the whole of human understanding has a direct
influence upon morality and can therefore reasonably be seen as part of the
moral framework. I disagree in the sense that understanding ITSELF is not
moral. There is no sense in which I am immoral if I don't understand how
photosynthesis works in great detail, and there is no sense in which you are
more moral simply because you do.

JONATHAN:
"Whether one values a leaf over a stone, or a flag over a human life are
highly ethical questions."

Well the latter is, the former could be. It comes back to the 'human
behaviour' issue (upon which you agreed). I said that, 'there is no rational
sense in which a leaf has moral priority over a stone' while your 'one' has
introduced the moral agent required to change the statement and make it
rational. It is what one does with the stone that raises moral questions.
Throw it at the policeman or stem the leak in the dyke, for example.

JONATHAN:
"As for consistency, although the general framework may be consistent, any
individual moral pronouncement is unique. Otherwise, why should we ever
bother with elections? Let's decide on the most moral policies once and for
all and then do away with democracy."

But it is precisely my contention that the framework is not consistent and I
hope my answer to your example continues to explain why.

JONATHAN:
"Interesting response Struan. Why did you so readily accept my "big picture
is more moral" position without questioning it?"

Because I take an entirely pragmatic approach to ethics. Accumulating as
many facts as possible about an issue demonstrably works well.

JONATHAN:
"I am puzzled how you can do that and still consider ZAMM a good novel - it
wasn't particularly brilliant as a travelogue!"

I thought the framework was forwarded in Lila and I don't consider that a
good novel. But anyway, I reject Logical Positivism and yet I still love
reading A.J Ayer's books. Surely I don't have to agree with something to
enjoy it.

Struan

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