The non-ontology of Truth (was Re: MD criticisms of DQ)

From: Jonathan B. Marder (jonathan.marder@newmail.net)
Date: Mon Feb 12 2001 - 12:48:58 GMT


Hi Platt, Rick, Elephant, Horse and all,

I have been avidly following the discussion on the nature of Truth and whether
or not it is absolute.
I was going to write a substantial post on the subject, but decided that a
short one is a better idea.

1. "TRUE" is a relative term - we must always ask "true to what?". If there is
no standard or reference (accepted "facts", rules or axioms), then the word
"true" is meaningless. Thus, we can only talk about "absolute truth" in terms
of compliance with an "absolute standard". At that level, what is considered
absolute becomes an issue of the universally accepted standard - not some
standard that is itself intrinsically absolute.
(To put it mischievously, even absolutes are relative!).

2. The absoluteness (or not) of Truth is a non-issue in the MoQ. A few words
from Elephant and Rick
make it clear why we cannot regard Truth as an ontology:

> ELEPHANT (to Rick):
> Interesting that you say that "Nobody is arguing that self-contradictions
> can be true (a strawman if I've ever read one).". . .

Of course! self-contradictions and other logical fallacies are not TRUE, but
they *are* REAL (otherwise we wouldn't be able to discuss them). Truth and
reality are not the same. Truth is subordinate. The REAL TRUTH is the truth
that is closest to our CHOSEN picture of reality. To put it another way, we
choose the truth that has the greatest quality/utility.

Now, what did I miss? (Elephant - I'm waiting to be trampled . . .)

Jonathan

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