on 10/1/01 7:44 PM, Angus Guschwan at arshilegorky@yahoo.com wrote:
> Heidegger
> basically says people are "fields."
:or "patterns of values"...
> Nietzsche/Sartre
> tradition is more about the will to dominate the
> objects.
:The higher Intellectual patterns of the Social unit (person) dominating the
lower levels.
To use Sartres (or Camus'?) metaphor: 'Sysyphus' in the face of apparent
absurdity of life (lack of meaning in a purely Subject/Object mode of
existence), chooses to consciously invest his life/actions with meaning, but
by abandoning the notion of 'meaning' being a product of society, *or even
intellect*...
Subject Object metaphysics has committed suicide, and has arisen
transfigured in existential thought.
> Derrida takes on where Heidegger left off,
> and I suppose introduces the "Dynamic" into DQ
> Deconstruction
> is the dynamic that happens, and Derrida talks about
> "frozen" dyads that he wants to decenter and let the
> marginal flow. He also gives a similar explanation as
> for Derrida,
> valuing of presence led to dualities,
Can you explain what that means, please? (esp. last part)
> I would also say Kierkegaard's
> notion of faith is very close to the belief in the
> Quality.
But "Quality" is only subject to belief as the intellectual word/concept of
"Quality" (the map, our way of finding our way). Quality-in-itself is a
radically empirical experience, the "thou art that" that dissolves the
intellectual categories of subject and object. As the cutting edge of
experience, it is not subject to belief, since it is existence itself -
truly beyond good and evil and truth and falsity (since these are social and
intellectual pseudopodia that try to reach out and absorb and digest
reality/Quality).
Kierkegaard and the other existentialists seem to be trying to free
themselves from Subject/Object metaphysics, but not by not trying to reform
it or replace it, but by taking a leap of faith into the preintellectual
abyss.
Since they leave the SOM intact, their focus remains 'ghettoised' (I do
not mean that disrespectively) into the 'Subjective' arena of
Social/Intellectual levels (faith, will to power etc.) The MoQ expands the
area of interest into... well, everything. I think Heidegger might have been
working on something like that when he died.
> But I have a few concerns.
> I have to know the 4
> levels and I have to know what evolution levels are.
This is as I understand it from Lila:
QUALITY(Reality)
/ \
static patterns of value<--->Dynamic Quality
[evolution--->this way please--->]
The 'Levels' are actually static patterns of value/quality - a stable
holding pattern, so to speak.
INTELLECTUAL
SOCIAL
BIOLOGICAL
INORGANIC
Each level of static pattern of values can encompass/control the lower rungs
on the value ladder. At the junction of each level is a Dynamic Quality
transition to the next.
The lower levels are only aware of Quality (Reality) to the extent that
it permits them dominance/cohesion, and often 'regard' Dynamic Q transition
to higher level in same way as a 'falling back' to lower level (ie cannot
distinguish).
E.g. an amoeba (Biological pattern of value) is aware of Quality/Reality
to the extent that it can absorb Inorganic patterns of value into itself -
it doesn't 'evaluate' any other difference / any other difference is of no
utility/value to it. A social pattern of values consumes Biological patterns
to serve itself e.g. fosters marriage/controlled sexuality, controls
violence - but often cannot distinguish purely biological value from
Intellectual patterns of value (e.g. censoring/banning "Ulysses"). Each
level of values seeks cohesion and dominance over everything else, and
regards any change of its status as a 'threat'.
The higher quality static patterns of value / levels are those which
permit the maximum amount of Dynamic Quality, with the minimum amount of
reversion to lower levels of values.
Our current experience of these levels is of course filtered through the
patterns of our intellects - it is true to say that they are a creation of
our intellects - but like a work of art they are created in communion with
experience/quality.
Although Inorganic+Biological, and Social+Intellectual pairs fall roughly
into SOM's Objective and Subjective categories respectively, the MoQ
produces a more refined overview as to how these Intellectual
creations/filters (subjects and objects) fit together. It's like having a
globe (MoQ) to refine ones understanding of a flat map (SOM).
It is important to realise that our entire language (social/intellectual
static patterns of value) is structured around our own intentionality. Thus
it sounds silly to say an amoeba 'evaluates' its environment because it
seems we are projecting the DQ of a higher level onto that of a lower, but
MoQ means that our intellectual/social intentionality is *one* species of
value only.
I believe Heidegger tried to define a new kind of philosophical language
precisely to avoid the intellect being colonised by subject/object duality
(though I took a look at one of his texts once, and wanted to run, screaming
into the night... perhaps the german does not translate well... ;)
> It's seems so flimsy in concept after the brilliant
> stroke of DQ. It's seems to me based in "evolution"
> and the notion of higher and lower forms. I understand
> how MOQ dissolves SOM but then it seems weak to use
> this simplistic 4 category analysis system to explain
> things away. It seems like Pirsig makes a brilliant
> stroke and then loses his scholarship in a frenzy of
> easy all encompassing fervor. It uses a Static system
> after saying that life is dynamic.
Dynamic Quality and static patterns of value could be analogous to
transcendence/'going beyond' and 'facticity/giveness' repectively, in
existential philosophy.
The different levels/static patterns of value correspond with different
levels of 'giveness'. The more evolved levels of giveness are those which
are more capable of transcendence/Dynamic Quality. A higher degree of
facticity would equate to a lower level of Dynamic Quality, a lower static
pattern of values.
> That is why I like deconstruction better. In academe
> sure there is jargon. But, everyone can do it.
> Everyone can be dynamic
> everyone deconstructs, whether it is
> humor or whatever. Derrida is tempted to make a system
> and resists, whereas Pirsig does not seem to resist
> this temptation.
ZAMM was one big deconstruction of SOM, perhaps?
Pirsig honestly admits that the MoQ is ultimately a 'degenerate' form of
activity himself. He does it anyway because most of us frankly can't
realistically (that is: with a high degree of Quality) live our lives
constantly deconstructing everything into unvarnished Quality. We have to go
to work, look after the kids, pay the mortgage, feed the yaks, dig the water
well etc.
I think he wants to move the potential effects of his deconstruction of
SOM beyond the arena of just being a mystical, artistic or even intellectual
pursuit, and into the arena of regular folks on the planet. It's his attempt
at a 'catechism' of Quality, which of necessity is going to transfer less
quality than his original deconstruction - but ultimately perhaps may
transfer it to a larger group of people. Man cannot survive on rarefied
intellectual bread alone, after all...
>I think this is a fatal flaw, because
> to me it reeks of "gurudom". I, Pirsig, have made the
> final Hegelian system. Pirsig is kind in making
> attributions to James and other philosophers. But I
> sense a haughtiness in him and his writing even. His
> writing is very prideful, as if he is giving dictums
> (I read with relish his mistake about the Eskimo words
I think there's a lot of new ideas hitting us at once in Lila. Maybe Pirsig
tries to fast-foward to the conclusions to fit his ideas into his
publisher's recommended book-length. Maybe haughtiness is sometimes just a
preemptive strike against rejection. And sure, maybe a man's entitled to a
bit of pride in his life's labour of love...?
> for ice). That is why I think LILA is less successful,
> it didn't have the peace or sense of wonder that ZAMM
> had.
In terms of literary quality, Lila did seem to be more laboured and stilted
than ZAMM, perhaps because the subject matter was inherently less Dynamic in
an absolute sense. In terms of philosophical quality though, I think it is
invaluable, not because it 'solved' everything, or even most things, but
because it provides a starting point for new intellectual inquiry.
I wandered in the philosophical wilderness for ages after reading ZAMM,
it really knocked me on my you-know-what. Although it had a profound
intellectual impact on me, I'm not sure it had a big operational impact on
my life - I didn't really know how to incorporate it, even on an
intellectual level. Lila is a start.
> It's a lecture of a haughty learned man. Derrida
> makes the effort to "be" his philosophy, whereas
> Pirsig resorts back to subject/object world in
> dictating his grand plan.
No, I have to disagree that he resorts back to subjects and objects, and
honestly, I don't see where in the book you got that.
> Those are my feelings. I again am open to debate about
> it. Just trying to express.
Fair enough.
Good luck,
- Oisín
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