Hi Tanya,
I sense Pirsig is Jamesian on his ethics so from
Barret's Illusion of Technique I will practice my
typing skills with this:
I remember my disappointment as a young student years
ago when I first read the classic essay "The Dilemma
of Determinism." The title lead me to expect some
objective and logical refutation that would once and
for all impale the determinist on its prongs and leave
him squirming there forever. I expected, I think, some
new and surprising facts or some new logical relation
of the facts that would finally settle the question in
favor of freedom. INSTEAD, James seemed to hurry past
the objective question in order to get to the moral
issues involved, and I was disappointed to find the
bulk of the essay, as it seemed to me then, a moral
appeal to the reader. For the dilemma of the
determinist, as James presents it, is essentially a
moral and not a metaphysical one. The objective
question between freedom and determinism was thus left
open and inconclusive as it had always been, and my
young mind still felt dreadfully unsettled.
But of course this is where the question has to be
left, and James is entirely right to hew to the line
he does. In this matter he is following the position
of Kant a century before him. The firebreathers of
determinism, like B. F. Skinner, who enter the
dialectical fray convinced that they have seen the
proof of determinism in their laboratory results last
week, are greatly mistaken. The case for or against
free will still stands where Kant left it. We have
introduced all kinds of changes and refinements in
terminology, but the objective merits of the case
remain unaltered. Anything like a decisive proof for
free will or determinism is unavailable. And where the
matter is thus logically inconclusive, practical
concerns enter. It makes a great deal of difference,
practically speaking, if we do believe in freedom. We
are more likely to improve our character if we believe
that the power to do so lies in the exertion of our
will. Determinism, if really followed in practice,
would tend to close off the will toward such striving.
Thus it is to our practical advantage to believe that
we are free beings, and our subjective decision in the
matter does have objective consequences in our life.
Faith in freedom produces future facts that confirm it
- at least in its practical efficacy if not its
ultimate metaphysical truth.
Freedom on such terms would seem to be a bald
practical transaction, a cool quid pro quo. But what
we have in the above summation is half, and less than
half, of the Jamesian position. For if the belief in
freedom is a moral choice on our part, it is
ultimately for James also a religious act. Our moral
life in the end makes sense only as an affirmation of
some religious attitude toward the universe. Many of
his pragmatist followers have sought to dilute this
position; but it is nonetheless James', persistently
though sometimes waveringly held throughout the body
of his writings. To disengage his view, and present it
more sharply, is the main burden of what we have to
say in this chapter....
So you can read it for yourself, but I am sure this is
close to Pirsig's heart on ethics... Pirsig's
"religious attitude" would be Quality I think.... and
there you have it.
Angus
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