Hi Jonathan and all
> I think we should be careful to distinguish between intelligence and
> intellect. IMO, intellect includes a socio-philosophic aspect that goes way
> beyond mere intelligence. I don't have a problem with describing cells as
> intelligent, but I do have a problem describing them as intellectual.
I'm afraid I usually consider them to be two forms of the same word. But
I can try to distinguish them, it can't hurt. I still have to use the term
"intellectual pattern" though.
> I
> re-read your answer to Marco, and conclude that what you call language
> covers any aspect of interaction. Thus when a proton and electron attract,
> they are speaking the language of electrostatic forces. By that definition,
> EVERYTHING demonstrates intelligence - even that I can go along with, but I
> repeat, intelligence is not intellect.
I see your point, but I wouldn't go that far. The distinction between a pure
inorganic pattern and an inorganic pattern that is acting as media for an
intellectual pattern is sometimes hard to make. But in the dimensional model
of the MoQ, there's no need to. Things that we experience on the inorganic
level, for example a proton and an electron, *can* be a pure inorganic pattern.
It can also at the same time be an intellectual pattern provided there's a
language to map the inorganic pattern to its meaning.
> JONATHAN
> > > To paraphrase Lao-Tzu, the meaning that can be expressed in language is
> > > not the real meaning.
>
> MAGNUS
> > Then he was wrong. Intellectual patterns *can* be described using
> language.
> > Mathematics is such a beast.
>
> Several philosophers have taken the path of searching for a mathematical
> basis for philosophy. Then along came Goedel who essentially showed that no
> mathematical construct is ever complete. You can use language to describe
> whatever pattern you want, even your much loved Black Forest Gateaux, even
> your undoubtedly beautiful twins, but that description will always be less
> than the real thing.
I know about Goedel's theorem but I think it misses the point. What I think
Lao-Tzu meant was that there's no language that can accurately describe
inorganic, biological or social values. But mathematics *is* intellectual
value in itself and doesn't need to be described further.
> MAGUS(4 Jan 2002)
> <<<patterns of value at the quantum level are the basis for inorganic
> quality. The inorganic world in built from them, and that the fact that they
> contain meaning is demonstrated by the fact that they decode into the
> physical world we see around us. >>>>
>
> JONATHAN (5 Jan 2002)
> <<<But it is WE who compartmentalize the world into separate entities that
> interact and "decode" each other.>>>
>
> MAGNUS (6 Jan 2002)
> <<<It is not only 'WE' that 'compartmentalize the world'. It is quality
> events at all levels that do.>>>
>
> JONATHAN (7 Jan 2002)
> <<<True, but first WE compartmentalize Quality into distinct quality
> events!!!!!!>>>
>
> MAGNUS
> > We're going in circles here. My argument is just above. If reality is
> > like you describe it, then quality events just started happening ~10
> > years ago.
>
> No Magnus, we are not just going round in circles. We are going down a
> metaphysical spiral staircase, and you yourself show where we are headed . .
> .
Ehh, and where would that be?
> MAGNUS
> > The MoQ, being a monism, has Quality as a non-compartmentalized starting
> > point. But that is the starting point used when talking about the MoQ.
> > It was not the starting point for our universe at the Big Bang. If
> > you take the MoQ seriously, it was already at work when the Big Bang
> > happened.
>
> At last I see the real source of our disagreement. You have one starting
> point for your physical world and a different starting point for your
> metaphysical world. That is no monism at all.
> I find the idea of a single metaphysical and physical Big Bang much more
> satisfying.
That's another reason why I want a quantum level, it takes us right back to
a monism again.
> JONATHAN
> > > I go along with the abstract=intellectual. If you remember my "3+1" idea
> > > from December 1998
> > > (http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/9812/0049.html) it was
> > > exactly that.
> > > The abstraction of intellect from the other 3 levels makes it something
> > > quite different.
> >
> MAGNUS
> > Your 3+1 idea makes the lower 3 levels into an organization chart, that's
> > not a metaphysics. The levels are not about scale! Each level is
> orthogonal
> > to all other levels, i.e. extends in a 90 degree angle to all other.
>
> I don't know why my topographical image of the levels is any less
> metaphysical than Pirsig's or yours. In your scheme, Pirsig's levels just
> don't stack up. Inorganicness, biologicalness, socialness and intellect are
> just four different parameters - not levels at all.
> I claim that Pirsig's first three levels represent increasing levels of
> complexity. Intellect was the exception, and that is why I suggested that it
> was perhaps better to regard intellect not as a level but as an abstraction.
If the first three levels is only about complexity we'll always end up arguing
about where the borders are. So if you claim that to be a metaphysics which
states that Quality=Reality=Morality, then you'd had a universe arguing with
itself about level borders at each and every quality event.
It also entails redundancy which is quite unwanted in any system. I'm speaking
in general terms here but if you want specifics, I believe I list some concrete
examples in my essay.
> MAGNUS
> > So, what exactly is your criticism? That you know more than I do? Not much
> > of an argument methinks. I may not use the most commonly used terms when
> > writing about quantum mechanics but that's because I'm trying to use the
> > MoQ plus what I know about QM to break some new ground.
>
> No Magnus, I recognise that you DO use common terms, or rather, I think that
> you MISuse them, throwing them around as jargon. I still don't see where you
> are going with all this.
I'm trying to make the MoQ into a coherent, universal metaphysics, not needing
biological humans to function.
> Furthermore, I
> personally believe that the apparent weirdness of quantum mechanics stems
> not from QM itself, but from our previous brainwashing with a metaphysics
> that presented causality as an incontravertible absolute.
Exactly, that's why I'm trying to incorporate QM into the MoQ. Having a
quantum level beneath the inorganic removes causality since it removes
time, plus it explains the wave - particle dualism. I don't see why you
have a problem with that?
Magnus
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