Hi Magnus, Rob, Patrick and all,
Magnus, I'm not sure we are getting very far in resolving our argument,
but let me first address an overlap with the
"ARE MY BRAIN CELLS AWARE" thread.
MAGNUS
>The distinction between a pure
>inorganic pattern and an inorganic pattern that is acting as media for
an
>intellectual pattern is sometimes hard to make. But in the dimensional
model
>of the MoQ, there's no need to. Things that we experience on the
inorganic
>level, for example a proton and an electron, *can* be a pure inorganic
pattern.
>It can also at the same time be an intellectual pattern provided
there's a
>language to map the inorganic pattern to its meaning.
I agree that there is no distinction. The electrons act as they always
do, without reference to the fact that they may be part of a higher
pattern. The same goes for an individual neuron. It will detect
neurotransmitters released at the synapse, convert them to an electrical
pulse that travels down the axon and release its own neurotransmitters
at the other end, all this without any reference to the fact that the
signal may be part of a complicated mathematical calculation, or simply
the signal for a full rectum.
I don't think we need to go down to quantum mechanics to explain this.
If you follow the movements of a single gas molecule among many, you
will not be able to tell anything about the movements of the population
as a whole. As a whole, the gas will diffuse from zones of high
concentration to zones of low concentration, but you won't see that
pattern in the movements of your chosen molecule - the diffusion is an
emergent property, a pattern in the population but not the individual.
> JONATHAN
> > > To paraphrase Lao-Tzu, the meaning that can be expressed in
language is
> > > not the real meaning.
>
> MAGNUS
> > Then he was wrong. Intellectual patterns *can* be described using
> language.
> > Mathematics is such a beast.
>
JONATHAN
> Several philosophers have taken the path of searching for a
mathematical
> basis for philosophy. Then along came Goedel who essentially showed
that no
> mathematical construct is ever complete. You can use language to
describe
> whatever pattern you want, even your much loved Black Forest Gateaux,
even
> your undoubtedly beautiful twins, but that description will always be
less
> than the real thing.
MAGNUS
<<<I know about Goedel's theorem but I think it misses the point. What I
think
Lao-Tzu meant was that there's no language that can accurately describe
inorganic, biological or social values. But mathematics *is*
intellectual
value in itself and doesn't need to be described further.
>>>
You say about Lao-Tzu, "he was wrong", because you think mathematics is
excepted from what he talked about.
You also say that Goedel "misses the point", yet Goedel was talking
specifically about mathematics.
Do I take it that your version of the MoQ is incompatible with both the
Tao and Goedel?
JONATHAN to MAGNUS
> At last I see the real source of our disagreement. You have one
starting
> point [Big Bang] for your physical world and a different starting
point for your
> metaphysical world. That is no monism at all.
> I find the idea of a single metaphysical and physical Big Bang much
more
> satisfying.
MAGNUS
<<<That's another reason why I want a quantum level, it takes us right
back to
a monism again.>>>
I still don't see how. Let me ask a specific question of Magnus:
Did the "quantum patterns" he talks about exist before the Big Bang?
MAGNUS
>If the first three levels is only about complexity we'll always end up
arguing
>about where the borders are.
That is happening anyway, if you look at your discussion with Platt
about beehives and ant colonies.
I think that the boundaries between the levels are artificial, but not
arbitrary. Some patterns are easy to classify, but some are too close to
the boundary. Pirsig calls such a pattern a platypus. He doesn't provide
any examples of Platypi arising within the MoQ, but we seem to find
plenty of them.
...MAGNUS
>It also entails redundancy which is quite unwanted in any system. I'm
speaking
>in general terms here but if you want specifics, I believe I list some
concrete
>examples in my essay.
I do not see how introducing new levels reduces redundancy - quite the
opposite.
MAGNUS
>I'm trying to make the MoQ into a coherent, universal metaphysics, not
needing
>biological humans to function.
And what would the point of that be? To reduce the MoQ to logical
positivism?
What does "Man is the Measure" mean to you Magnus?
JONATHAN
> Furthermore, I
> personally believe that the apparent weirdness of quantum mechanics
stems
> not from QM itself, but from our previous brainwashing with a
metaphysics
> that presented causality as an incontravertible absolute.
MAGNUS
<<<Exactly, that's why I'm trying to incorporate QM into the MoQ. Having
a
quantum level beneath the inorganic removes causality since it removes
time, plus it explains the wave - particle dualism. I don't see why you
have a problem with that?
>>>
I've no problem with using quantum mechanics for explaining the
behaviour of energy and matter.
I just don't see why that makes it a separate metaphysical level. (BTW,
I disagree that it removes time).
Furthermore, I find it ironic that you choose to underpin your
metaphysics with a theory you so clearly do not understand.
Sorry if this comes across as insulting, but I don't really know how
else to state my views honestly.
All the best anyway,
Jonathan
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