Hullo Andrew,
I've just returned from a holiday and noticed your post of 03.01.02, in
which you said
"It is my believe that society has a mind of it's own that operates above
and beyond the intellect. Of course, information may be passed back and
forth between society and the intellectual just as between the intellectual
and the
biological. Thus the intellectual may have some influence on society and
vice-versa, but there cannot be a distinction that places the intellectual
above
society-since society is the result of the sharing of information processed
by
the intellectual capacity of individuals. This appears to be a blunder on
Pirsig's part."
While I disagree with your general conclusion that society is superior to
the individual (intellect), I think you are correct in critiquing Pirsig at
this point. I find that most truly interesting concepts do not divide neatly
into Pirsig's supposedly discrete four levels - eg. terrorist, democracy,
love. Also, Pirsig allows that the values of each level are quite different,
yet still wants us to believe that Quality is unitary. This is the
fundamental flaw in his metaphysics, in my opinion.
Secondly, Pirsig himself realised that if the intellect is given unfettered
supremacy it might well destroy the social fabric that supports it (Lila Chs
13 & 24). He therefore suggests that the intellectual level is actually in
the service of the social, which might otherwise be destroyed by
inappropriate intellectual exploration. This sounds fine, but is actually
opening up a Pandora's box that leads to confusion. For surely the social
level exists in the service of the biological? It sounds plausible. But take
the next step, and the logic falls in a heap, for there is no plausibility
whatever in asserting that the biological is in the service of the
inorganic. This little exercise shows a fundamental rift in the hierarchy
between the inorganic and organic realms, that Pirsig appears not to notice.
To return to the relationship between social and intellectual realms, I
think Pirsig is generally correct in asserting that social values are
static, and can only change or develop insofar as they are challenged by
individuals who can perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality. (Ch 13) Much of
the book is a discussion of how dynamism might be misread as insanity by the
dominant society. So I do not share your faith in social values, and there
is no evidence of society having "a mind of its own", in my view. Ken
Wilber, a much clearer thinker than Pirsig in these matters, also argues
against allowing collectives the status of individuals, which Pirsig seems
to do in his writing about the 'Giant'. I totally agree with Wilber that the
individual, the 'self' that Pirsig mocks, is actually fundamental to
constructing a worth while theory of how things are.
I appreciate your comments, and am pleased you contributed your thoughts.
John B
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