To: Glenn and MOQers
From: Rog
GLENN:
... It means that science could not function well in a hand-to-mouth
society where you don't have any free time to think rationally and explore
the natural world. So the 'means' of science depend on society. There is
nothing earth-shaking or controversial about this. But do the 'ends' of
science depend on society or culture? Are the laws of physics derived from
culture?
ROG:
I would say the ends of science support the advancement of life and society.
The laws of physics are models that emerge out of the context of our social
(and biological) values. Personally, I interpret "derived from society," as
meaning emergent from society and coherent with it (and my interpretation
could be wrong). How do you interpret the phrase?
GLENN:
Descartes did important work
in analytic geometry, for example. Does this mean analytic geometry has a
certain Frenchness about it? Has another society come up with a competing
variety of analytic geometry that is more derivative of its culture? No.
ROG:
What do you mean by "more derivitive?" Have you noticed that Pirsig qualified
his cultural derivation statement with the caveat that it could be
biologically derived? Some models can be so basic to our way of
thinking/perceiving that they can say more about our natures than our
cultures.
GLENN:
In quote 3, as with quote 2, Pirsig is again talking about scientific
conclusions being derived by or mediated from the social level.
He says science's independence from the social world is a myth. A close
examination, he says, shows the independence is false and he hints that
the myth was perpetuated by scientists as a conspiratorial survival ploy.
Pirsig's close examination amounts to arguing that all the objects in
the universe, from the moon to dinosaur bones, have to first be 'socially
mediated' and that therefore, presumably, scientific objectivity is
impossible.
ROG:
I don't see it as a conspiracy, as much as a somewhat shallow yet practical
set of beliefs. As for objectivity, I believe the MOQ would explain the term
as consistency to experience and consistency between experimenters. We have a
common biological heritage and most scientists adopt a common social system
of beliefs. This allows objectivity/consistency to be possible.
GLENN:
This is a postmodern attitude that doesn't apply equally to all domains
of science. It certainly applies to fields like anthropology but hardly
at all, or not at all, to physics and chemistry. What possible social
pattern could be at work that would mediate our observations of water
molecules, for example? None I can think of. Pirsig offers no salient
examples.
ROG:
I agree that some domains are more socially-influenced than others. For an
example though, consider the worldview that atoms and molecules are material
vs the worldview that atoms and molecules are consistent patterns or stable
series of events. Each can be consistent with experience, yet lead to
different models, descriptions, experiments and associated scientific
exploration (thinking about things differently can lead you to different
questions)
GLENN:
I also wonder about Pirsig's justification for putting science at the
intellectual level if he really believes what he says in these quotes.
Pirsig says that patterns in a level depend on patterns that reside in
levels below it, and that the higher level patterns got to be where they
are because they grew away from their lower level patterns and took on
independent purposes. It strikes me as odd then that he would put science
in the intellectual level, the penultimate level of static existence, and
then implicitly argue that its place there is unjustified. Why do I say
this?
ROG:
But the reason the level is penultimate is that it is the most dynamic. And
I don't see the fact that it emerges out of society as diminishing its value.
What would be the use of an intellectual set of patterns that you couldn't
relate to? Why do you think his clarifications/caveats on science make it
unjustified?
GLENN:
Pirsig, as I've tried to show above, argues that science depends on the
social level not only for its 'means' but also for its 'ends'. All
patterns depend on its lower level for its 'means', but Pirsig mentions
no pattern depending on its lower level patterns for its 'ends', except
science. How could science depend on lower level patterns for its 'ends'
and still be called a higher level pattern? How could a science based on
a socially derived choice for 'c' in E=mc^2 (if you could believe that) be
justified as intellectual, as breaking away from the social? I don't think
it could. If Pirsig justifies science at the intellectual level because
he thinks at least *some* data and evidence come from the objective world
or can be reasonably objectively obtained, he doesn't say.
ROG:
He says that society started as a way to improve biology, but that it grew
beyond this original purpose. Same with science. (I could also argue that
life started as a more stable type of pattern -- survival/lastability via
dynamic adaptiveness). As for the objective world, remember that this phrase
refers to a high quality interpretation of experience. As for the value of
science, it isn't in its objectivity (or its consistency), it is in its value
to the advancement of life, society and knowledge.
Rog
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