Roger, David, and all,
ROG:
The statement that science could also be biologically derived comes
immediately prior to the Descartes paragraph.
The full paragraph, with the missing part starting at
the second sentence, is:
PIRSIG:
Our scientific description of nature is always culturally
derived. Nature tells us only what our culture predisposes
us to hear. The *selection* of which inorganic patterns to
observe and which to ignore is made on the basis of social
patterns of value, or when it is not, on the basis of
biological patterns of value. (p 343, paperback)
Now that I see the full quote, I can infer from context that by
'derived' he probably means 'motivated', since two sentences later
he talks about how social patterns are the basis of selection for
scientific study. This could mean, contrary to what I originally
thought, that Pirsig thinks scientific descriptions of nature are
derived from culture in the sense that social patterns select which
inorganic patterns to study and which not to study. This kind of
social mediation doesn't necessarily color the output of science.
So support for my main grievance is evaporating.
However, there's a few complaints I have with this expanded quote.
That is, I'm trying to make sense of it. First, it doesn't make
sense to say that if I look up into the glare of the sun, I will
not see its light if my culture doesn't predispose me to see it.
People from all cultures squint when they look in the sun.
In any event, how can we also sometimes select something to observe
or ignore on the basis of biological patterns after he just got
through telling us that nature reveals to us only what our culture
predisposes?
Further, what does it mean to 'select on the basis of a biological
pattern'? Biological patterns make us aware of inorganic objects, but
biological patterns are not equipped to make selections about which
inorganic patterns to study and which to ignore. That
takes a kind of intelligence biological patterns don't have.
Examples will help.
Suppose a physicist selects for study the decay rate of plutonium, and
she's funded by the government to build nuclear power plants. Clearly
this is a selection made on the basis of a social pattern and Pirsig
is correct about this.
Suppose another physicist selects for study the radiation emitted from
quasars. Obviously a social pattern is not the basis for this
selection, because there is no social gain to knowing anything about
quasars, and let's suppose he is funded to study anything he wants.
So the only possibility Pirsig leaves us with is that this selection
was made on the basis of a biological pattern. Biological patterns only
make primitive selections, like fight or flight, eat when I'm hungry,
throw up when I'm sick. The selection of quasar radiation is too
advanced for the biological level to handle. It has to be on the basis
of an intellectual pattern of value. Sheer curiosity. Knowledge for
its own sake.
So here's what I would have said:
Our scientific description of nature is intellectual but it's
always culturally or intellectually motivated. Nature reveals itself
to us through biological patterns, but the *selection*
of which inorganic patterns to study and which to ignore is
made on the basis of social patterns of value, or when it is not,
on the basis of intellectual patterns of value.
You can see now how much more radical Pirsig's claims are. The
idea that you can't observe something in nature unless it is
predisposed by your culture is exactly what some of the more
radical postmodernists say: that reality is socially constructed.
Glenn
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