>===== Original Message From moq_discuss@moq.org =====
>RICK
> Huh? If a family resemblance is the basis on which a cognitive concept
>is formed than wouldn't the resemblance have to reflect something
>pre-cognitive (ie perceptive)? If the 'conceptual family resemblance'
>didn't reflect something perceived than they would be arbitrary; wouldn't
>they? A process of cognitive-DIFFERENTIATION would be nonsensical if the
>differences didn't reflect some actual aspect of perception., etc.
2) There is not clear lines that divide se
ERIN: 1)Sure there are no clear dividers in between sensation, perception, and
cognition. Wittgenstein introduced the family resemblance idea of concept
formation when he urged anyone to come up with a definiton of game. All the
exemplars of game had a family resemblance quality--chess, soccer, solitaire.
To me detection of a shade 1 (blue) from a shade 2 (green) is perception and
labeling both shades as blue is cognitive. Have you ever seen a car that was
a bluish-green and one person would describe it as green and the other blue.
They both detected the difference but labelled it differently.
>RICK
> You're mixing up the examples. In the quote you took, I was SEEING
>(perception) two colors -green and blue- in shades I couldn't NAME
>(cognition). The Natchez was SEEING (perception) one color -a blue/green
>hybrid- in two different shades he couldn't NAME (cognition).
>
ERIN: I mixed examples purposely. To explain the difference between you and
Natchez guy use the analogy of Martha Stewart and you. The only reason you
say that you see two colors and the Natchez guy is seeing two shades is
because of the labels. Don't say you don't know if they see the difference--if
they can separate the color chips without different labels they can see the
difference.
>ERIN
> If Martha handed you the [papayawhip and lemonchiffon] napkins without
>naming them, would be analogous to me handing blue and green chips to the
>Natchez.
>
>RICK
> I don't think it is analogous, as I said, I believe it's spurious. When
>Martha shows me the Papaya and lemon napkins, it's evident of my inability
>to NAME a perceived difference; that is, to produce the socially agreed upon
>referent for the difference I'm seeing. When you show the blue/green chips
>to the Natchez it's evident of his inability to PERCEIVE a certain kind of
>difference; it's not that he doesn't know the words 'blue' and 'green', it's
>that he would believe both words refer to the same thing (that
>'thing' would be the color X he sees in the middle of a prism (royXbiv).
ERIN: If the Natchez had the inability to perceive the difference he would not
be able to separate all the blue chips from the green chips.
I have been confused at why it is so hard to come eye to eye on this and the
only thing i can come up with is that we have two different conceptions of
PERCEPTION. I have the feeling that our perception is comparable to the
Natchez blue-green. They need to be distinguished for any light bulb to go
off.
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:01:57 BST