Hey Erin,
Hope you don't mind if I field some of your newest comments....
> ERIN: It right to take life/death is confusing to me too. But the respect
for
> life is important, the rules defining the levels seem to point to this
> importance (something is better then nothing, alive is better then dead,).
> I don't like the "eye for an eye" idea about death, it seems more like
revenge
> then justice. I know this is a cliche but have to ask "do two wrongs make
a
> right".
RICK
Good question. Let's see what the MOQ would say.....
PIRSIG
Is it scientifically moral for a society to kill a human being? That is
a very big question still being fought in courts and legislatures all over
the world.
An evolutionary morality would at first seem to say yes, a society has a
right to murder people to prevent its own destruction. A primitive isolated
village threatened by brigands has a moral right and obligation to kill them
in self-defense since a village is a higher form of evolution. When the
United States drafted troops for the Civil War everyone knew that innocent
people would be murdered. The North could have permitted the slave states
to become independent and saved hundreds of thousands of lives. But an
evolutionary morality argues that the North was right in pursuing that war
because a nation is a higher form of evolution than a human body, and the
principle of human equality is an even higher form than a nation. John
Brown's truth was never an abstraction. It still keeps marching on.
When a society itself is not threatened, as in the execution of
individual criminals, the issue becomes more complex. In the case of
treason or insurrection or war a criminal's threat to a society can be very
real. But if an established social structure is not seriously threatened by
a criminal, then an evolutionary morality would argue that there is no moral
justification for killing him.
RICK
Was that helpful? Let's go over it a little slower....
PIRSIG
Is it scientifically moral for a society to kill a human being? That is a
very big question still being fought in courts and legislatures all over the
world.
RICK
I'm not sure I've ever heard of a court or legislature arguing over whether
anything was 'scientifically immoral'. I think the morals of politics tend
to be associated more with social duty or religion rather than science. But
he's framing the question in his own terms and that's fine. His analysis
will entail not only capital punishment, but also notions of war.
PIRSIG
An evolutionary morality would at first seem to say yes, a society has a
right to murder people to prevent its own destruction.
RICK
He says the MOQ would "seem" to say yes "at first", implying that the answer
will ultimately turn out to be no. Strangely, it doesn't. It stays yes.
PIRSIG
A primitive isolated village threatened by brigands has a moral right and
obligation to kill them in self-defense since a village is a higher form of
evolution.
RICK
He's talking about society defending itself against the barbarians at the
gates. He says it's moral because a village is a higher form of evolution
than no village. Sounds good so far.
PIRSIG
When the United States drafted troops for the Civil War everyone knew that
innocent people would be murdered. The North could have permitted the slave
states to become independent and saved hundreds of thousands of lives. But
an evolutionary morality argues that the North was right in pursuing that
war because a nation is a higher form of evolution than a human body, and
the principle of human equality is an even higher form than a nation.
RICK
The trouble with this part is that Pirsig has now switched from the
'barbarians at the gates' to a full scale war between nations with armies.
The villagers in the previous example were moral because a village was
better than no village. But that won't work here. The Southerners were no
barbarians. They wanted to form their own nation... and two nations should
be twice as moral as one (or just as moral, at least). But either way,
it's no longer matter of 'society' vs. 'no society'. Now it's a matter of
'one society' vs. 'another society' and the previous justification no longer
holds.
Knowing this, Pirsig subtly replaces his 'society is a higher form of
evolution than no society' argument with a 'society is higher form of
evolution than a human body (ie. an individual)' argument. The problem with
this one though is that it works just as well for the South as for the
North. The Confederate States of America were also a higher form of
evolution the a human body and so they too were justified in sending
individuals to die on their behalf.
But Pirsig knows this too. So he ends with a good old fashioned
normative argument. Namely that the principle of human equality is an even
higher form [of evolution] than a nation. Or in other words... slavery is
bad. The MOQ hasn't given us much yet (if anything?). And none of this
helps us in cases where neither nation keeps slaves (or both).
PIRSIG
When a society itself is not threatened, as in the execution of individual
criminals, the issue becomes more complex.
RICK
He implies that he's going to discuss the morality of capital punishment in
cases where society itself isn't threatened (ie.your everyday murderers,
rapists). But instead...
PIRSIG
In the case of treason or insurrection or war a criminal's threat to a
society can be very real.
RICK
This seems to admit of 2 interpretations:
(1) Society is justified in executing criminals who commit crimes like
treason, or incite insurrection or war. But the problem with this
interpretation is that it would contradict the last sentence in which he
said he was going to address cases where the criminal wasn't a threat to
society itself.
(2) He's no longer talking about treason, insurrection, or war
themselves being a threat to society. Rather, he's talking about criminal
behavior being a greater threat to society during times of treason,
insurrection and war. That is, society's powers to execute criminals that
don't threaten society itself are at their height (or only exist) during
times of treason, war and insurrection (I wonder what Pirsig would have
thought of 'Korematsu v. US'). But this interpretation suggests that
society DOES have some powers to execute criminals who don't threaten
society itself.... Which would clash would the next line....
PIRSIG
But if an established social structure is not seriously threatened by a
criminal, then an evolutionary morality would argue that there is no moral
justification for killing him.
RICK
Didn't he just said it was COMPLEX only two sentences ago? I'm not sure
even Pirsig knows what he's talking about now... And we've gotten zip from
the MOQ on capital punishment.
rick
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