Hi Glenn,
Thanks for the response.
> Pirsig says that writing a metaphysics is a degenerate activity and will
be
> flawed, but the flaws he speaks of creep in because the intellectual "map"
> of reality described by a metaphysics falls short in depicting the
"terrain"
> of reality. I don't think it's because of any parallel with Godel's
theorem.
>
My point in mentioning Godel was as an analogy, not a direct
correspondence - that is, in your words: "the intellectual "map" of reality
described by a metaphysics falls short in depicting the "terrain" of
reality" - and it does this because our brains aren't capable of fully
comprehending existence. That doesn't mean our brains don't have useful work
to do, just that we shouldn't expect perfection. (That's what I take Godel
to be saying - we can't have a perfect mathematical system. Is that right?)
Another way of making the same point is to say - as some contributors do -
'I could be wrong' at the end of each post.
> If Godel's theorem applies to a metaphysics, it would mean that the "map
of
> reality" itself is internally incomplete or inconsistent, which is a
separate
> problem from the one of capturing the essence of a "terrain" sufficiently.
Could you explain why you see these as two separate problems? I don't
(necessarily) disagree that they are separate, just that I see them as two
sides of the same coin. I do think that our maps of reality will never be
both consistent and complete, but not because Godel's theorem applies to it
directly - more because we can't capture the essence of the terrain
flawlessly. Hence I see the problems as linked.
> However, the Godel problem is really an academic one - a problem in
> principle, not practicality. No one has shown that important theorems in
> arithmetic are blocked from proof because of Godel's theorem.
That's why I said "mathematics can be useful even when it is imperfect",
although perhaps that would have been better phrased as "incomplete". I
don't disagree with anything you said here.
> >
> It doesn't seem he was motivated by fun, or even enjoyed the exercise once
> he got going.
>
Hmmm. Perhaps you're right that fun isn't the best way to describe it.
Pirsig uses the image of an alcoholic going on a bender, as if it's a
compulsion. Perhaps that is the best way to think of what metaphysics
produces - a compulsion to seek certainty, when there is no (or precious
little) certainty to be had. I think this is what Wittgenstein was getting
at in his 'On Certainty': "Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet
when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. That is
how I act..... The reasonable man does not have certain doubts..... I want
to say: it's not that on some points men know the truth with perfect
certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude."
Sam
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