Re: MD Middle East - collective morality

From: John Beasley (beasley@austarnet.com.au)
Date: Sat May 04 2002 - 06:53:37 BST


Hi Scott,

Good to have you involved. I like several of the points you have made. You
said

"It seems to me that 'collective' is a synonym for social, albeit in a much
more dangerous fashion"

I largely agree. No collective can experience anything, especially quality.
Individuals are the arbiters of quality. However, an individual can
experience injustice, which may involve a 'collective'. What do you say
about an individual who claims to experience injustice inflicted upon a
collective of which they are a part, though? How do we reconcile your
statement "the collective is a purely fictitious body", with a person's
upset over some slight to a collective of which that person feels a part?

Another point you raise that I agree with

"this discussion board sounds, in many ways, more like a theological debate
than a philosophical one."

Heresies, cults, fundamentalism. Yes, its got the lot. But isn't that true
of philosophy too? The philosophers I read (very few) seem to get quite
personal with each other, too. In the case of Pirsig I think the problem
comes from reifying 'Quality', while claiming it is undefinable. In a narrow
sense it is indeed undefinable, but that does not prevent us arguing about
it. It simply means it can never be pinned down in a neat verbal formula,
which is true for just about everything. I argue that quality is a far more
complex thing than Pirsig implies, and that that complexity can and must be
explored if we are not to be left with the overly simplistic view that
quality just is, and we all know it when we meet it. Much of the theological
edge to the debate here seems to stem from making 'Quality' synonymous with
'the Good' or just 'God', then judging others as among the saved, or not.
Wim's plea for respect for all individuals in the Palestinian dispute is to
me absolutely central. Talk of human beings as 'germs' is not only blatantly
offensive, but shows IMHO complete incomprehension of where Pirsig is coming
from.

In another post you say

"in Pirsig's schema ... the realm of the intellectual (i.e., in the
individual), is the place where DQ has the most potential of real
"progress." Social change is slow, individual by individual, but that's
where it really takes root"

I would want to reorient this to place it in the context of a human
developmental sequence. The infant is absolutely individual, as yet
untouched by social level constraints. Yet the developmental task of
childhood is socialisation, equipping the child to live in society. This, it
seems to me, is a necessary stage, good in itself, at the time, but tragic
if not transcended. Adolescence is for many in our culture a time of
asserting individual values, often in defiance of the collective social
norms. Again, good and necessary at the time, but sad if not transcended.
Early adulthood tends to be dominated by issues to do with making one's way
in society, hence social values again dominate, though there is a strong
individual ego involved, able to negotiate and manipulate the social
constructs. Social values such as fame and success are powerful incentives
to conform. Again this is understandable and acceptable in its place.

What really interests me is what follows. In the Indian tradition, midlife
was the time for the individual to break loose from the social bonds and
seek quality. Unlike Western spirituality, which overwhelmingly puts the
ideology ahead of the individual, and hence focusses on dogma, Eastern
spirituality put the searcher in the centre, and allows an open search for
meaning and quality, moving from guru to guru, if need be, in search of what
meets the inner need of the individual. It seems to me that Western society
is undergoing a fundamental shift in this direction in our times, and I
applaud this.

I am becoming convinced that the social change that matters is indeed
effected by individuals who grow and change over time. I see this as a deep
form of growth, often quite at odds with the political process, in which
expediency and power inevitably exert too much influence. While Pirsig is
right in asserting that this change is often intellectual, I think this
limits it too much. Writers like Wilber are challenging us to look beyond
the intellectually defined individual. The mystic is affirming a level of
reality that transcends individuality. I used to think that it probably was
a relapse to biological values, but I now suspect that it is indeed a
transcendence of biological, social, and intellectual, values. The mystic
would probably say that it simply acknowledging the truth, which is to free
oneself of the illusions which lie at the heart of our ego development,
which paradoxically emerged in our early socialisation. The undoing of these
early boundaries is not simple or easy, and it is only through a
transformative praxis that this occurs. I find the main problem with Pirsig
is the assumption that quality is immediately accessible, or worse, knowable
through intellect, while the mystic recognises the huge task involved in
simply returning to immediate awareness of what is. This, it seems to me, is
the real area of debate.

Regards,

John B

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