From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Oct 01 2002 - 06:48:41 BST
Hi Platt:
As I predicted in a different recent post, Platt and my "redescription war"
has begun in full force ;-)
With that in mind, I simply want to go through and punch up the differences
as I see them.
Matt:
"Your right about Rorty (though, as usual, you're attempt to catch him in a
language-trap fails)."
Platt:
"My "trap," if there is one, is based on logic whose form transcends
native spoken languages, like mathematics."
Point one: Platt believes, like Noam Chomsky, that a form (semantic rules
for Chomsky, logical and mathematical rules for Platt) transcends language.
Rorty and I do not. Language is an evolutionary affair, just as Darwin
made biology an evolutionary affair. Language is not something that has a
universal form, but merely has contingent facets that are built up in a
"natural selection" fashion.
Matt:
"However, I don't find anything absolute or universal
about Quality. To say that Quality is Reality is simply to redescribe
reality. There's nothing universal or absolute about it. Its just simply
everywhere and everything we experience."
Platt:
"Last time I looked, "everywhere and everything" means absolute and/or
universal. Pirsig writes, "Whether the stove is the cause of the low
quality or whether possibly something else is the cause is not yet
absolutely certain. But that the quality is low is absolutely certain. It is
the primary empirical reality from which such things as stoves and heat
and oaths and self are later intellectually constructed." (5)
If you aren't absolutely certain about the Quality (reality) of sitting on a
hot stove, perhaps you'd like to try it some time. Without saying a word,
I'll stoke the coals in a stove and then, without a word, you place your
rear end on it. My guess is you'll directly experience "Truth." (-: "
Point two: Platt believes that Quality has an intrinsic nature that
transcends time and space. Rorty and I do not. The only thing we know
about Quality is that which we experience.
Like Aquinas before me, "When you meet a contradiction, make a
distinction." In this case, I'm making a distinction between "universal
meaning everywhere" and "universal meaning ahistorical". Quality as
"universal meaning everywhere" is simply that when I experience something,
it is Quality. Quality as "universal meaning ahistorical" suggests that
Quality has an intrinsic nature that we must correspond to.
So, when Pirsig says, "that the quality is low is absolutely certain," I
can only agree that, if you experience quality as low, it is absolutely
certain. Pirsig amounts to saying that it is absolutely certain that
Quality (a.k.a. Reality) causes our experience. Of course it does. Rorty
cannot help but agree that our environment causes us to have certain
beliefs. But saying that we are "absolutely certain" that we gain these
beliefs from our immediate surroundings doesn't add anything to the
description.
So, when you say that you are absolutely certain that I'll perceive the
burning stove as a low quality situation, I'm not so certain. The problem,
as I see it, is that you are not taking into account the possibility of my
being a masochist. A masochist is a real stumbling block to Quality having
an intrinsic nature. My suggestion: drop the attempt at finding an
intrinsic nature to Quality.
In fact, here's Rorty following Donald Davidson's lead (an American
philosopher that Rorty interprets as a pragmatist):
"Davidson's claim that a truth theory for a natural language is nothing
more or less than an empirical explanation of the causal relations which
hold between features of the environment and the holding true of sentences,
seems to me all the guarantee we need that we are, always and everywhere,
'in touch with the world'. If we have such a guarantee, then we have all
the insurance we need against 'relativism' and 'arbitrariness'. For
Davidson tells us that we can never be more arbitrary than the world lets
us be. So even if there is no Way the World Is, even if there is no such
thing as 'the intrinsic nature of reality', there are still causal
pressures. These pressures will be described in different ways at
different times and for different purposes, but they are pressures none the
less."
Matt:
"It is true, "truth" is something that only arises through the use of
language. Without languange, truth doesn't even make sense. (If you
remember, though, there are two routes to formulating truths: one private
and the other public.) The Pirsig that says that truth is self-evident and
a nonverbal reaction is a Pirsig that hasn't taken the linguistic turn and
one that I think needs to. Truth isn't a nonverbal reaction to Quality.
When you look at a sunrise, there's nothing truthful about it. Its not
until one says, "Ah, that's nice." That, according to the person, would be
a truthful statement."
Platt:
"Pirsig doesn't need to take a "linguistic turn" because for him reality
(direct experience) is prior to concepts. Truth, like in the hot stove
experiment above, is immediately and directly perceived. You don't need
the linguist turn of a Greek chorus in the background singing, "Get off,
get off, it's true, it's hot" to know your backside is getting scorched."
Point three: Platt doesn't want to take the "linguistic turn" and I do.
Platt equate's reality with truth or, at least, that both reality and truth
are "out there." For me, reality is the environment that makes causal
pressures on us and truth is a property of sentences.
Now, what should be pointed out is that Pirsig almost seems to make the
linguistic turn by making experience prior to intellectual concepts.
You'll notice that Pirsig makes no mention of truth in the extract on the
hot stove. The particular extract you pulled out is completely
commensurate with Rorty. To finish the "turn," Pirsig would then have to
view truth as a property, not as an experience.
Matt:
"I would never say "all the factors involved can be weighed" because there
are potentially an infinite set of factors. The use of recontextualization
is to see the context with recourse to as many factors as one sees as
important. The more efforts at recontextualization, the more we may be
able to see other factors that might be important."
Platt:
"You don't deny that Rorty's moral philosophy is relativism. So if a
culture practices human sacrifice, we've nothing to say."
(Sigh) Yes, Platt, I do deny that Rorty's moral philosophy is relativism.
Really, Platt, I wish you would read my writings on Rorty holisticly, not
piece by piece. Everything I've written is coherent with everything else.
If there is a contradiction, please, by all means, point it out. However,
if I've dissolved a contradiction, and you still think its a contradiction,
please talk about why you believe that and not keep pointing out the same
contradiction that I've already dissolved.
I'm sorry if I seem exasperated, but my patience is finally, after all this
time, wearing thin. I don't mind us disagreeing fundamentally. I think it
is quite fruitful to point out the differences between us clearly and
concisely, if possible. But I don't find it fruitful to keep having to
repeat myself, given that I've already said many of these things to you in
this past series of posts. I try to only assume that a given conversant
has only read the post they've responded to, unless they acknowledge
otherwise and unless they've been in a continuous dialogue with me. If you
don't understand what I've said because of vocabulary or unfamiliarity, I'm
always more than happy to reformulate what I've said, as I've shown in past
posts. If you missed something that I wrongly assumed you had read, then
I'll be more than happy to say it again. But if responding to a
"criticism" of your's consists in going back to an old post when in
dialogue with you and copying and pasting my old and still viable reply
into the current post I'm working on, then I find it taxing on my nerves
and time. If you feel I'm doing the same thing to you, please tell me and
I'll try and work at what I'm doing wrong. I mean, geez-ez, Platt,
sometimes it seems like you don't even read some of my posts.
But, because your efforts in pounding home the same,
already-rebuffed-to-my-satisfaction criticism again and again may be your
own way of saying, "Please, for the love of God, reformulate!", I'll try
again. But just this last time, damnit. From now on, you'll have to ask
nicely ;-)
Again, I apologize for the emotional language. I'll put on my professional
game-face again.
(Note: I do respond to the Rorty quote you put at the end of your post
later on, which is, rightly, a new and very good criticism.)
Rorty says that as context changes so does our moral outlook. There are no
universal, ahistorical truths. Relativism is a mirage, something no one
really believes. People who are called relativists are those who believe
that "two incompatible opinions on a important topic" are "less algorithmic
than had been thought." Rorty is an ethnocentrist. He believes we are
justified in making moral claims based on our historically contingent
language-game/culture because it is the only way we can make moral claims.
As we continue to recontextualize our situation, we continue to refine what
we think is moral, so we end up progessing from slavery to segregation to
equality. It is legitimate for us to say that today is better than
yesterday, but the historicist simply realizes that us saying it is from
this present context only and yesterday had a different way of looking at
things and tommorow probably will, too.
That is about as short and concise as I can put it. This is not to be
taken as the end-all-be-all of his position. If I've forgotten something
I've said in past posts, I apologize for forgetfulness and I fart in that
post's general direction.
Thank you all for your time and consideration.
;-)
Matt:
"That Pirsig "establishes universal moral levels" I deny outright. There is
nothing universal about Quality or the levels. The levels are contingent,
they are as we find them and recontextualize them. What the MoQ is best
seen as is an effort to recontextualize old problems, to see new factors.
When we use the MoQ to contextualize the 60's, for instance. When we say
that it is more moral for doctor to kill a germ, it is within a context
that says "It's okay 'cuz the doctor is more evolved," not because its
always been more moral for doctors to kill germs."
Platt:
"According to Pirsig, you're wrong. It's always been moral for doctors to
kill germs. From Chapter 13:
"But what's not so obvious is that, given a value-centered Metaphysics
of Quality, it is absolutely, scientifically moral for a doctor to prefer the
patient. This is not just an arbitrary social convention that should apply
to some doctors but not to all doctors, or to some cultures but not all
cultures. It's true for all people at all times, now and forever, a moral
pattern of reality as real as H20. We're at last dealing with morals on
the basis of reason." "
This is the same as point two. This seems to make it quite clear that
Pirsig would agree with Platt's interpretation of him. The only
counterpoint I would add to lessen the effects of this passage, and to make
room for my interpretation, is the difficulty I'm having in trying to
figure out how a pattern of reality is both created temporally and is
universal, "now and forever." We can crosslist this passage with ZMM and
discrepancies appear, but even worse we can crosslist this passage with
other places in Lila where Pirsig describes the formation of static
patterns. The static patterns build up on top of each other. All four
levels don't exist all at the same time since the beginning of time. If
they do, then Lila is subject to the same criticism Pirsig leveled against
the universal existence of "ghosts" from ZMM.
Matt:
"That Rorty adheres to an environment that causes us to have beliefs, I
certainly won't deny. Once again, though, this isn't somewhere you can
catch him in a word-trap. Its just something that happens. There's
nothing universal about putting your hand on a stove and saying "Damn
that's hot" (outside of the fact that almost anybody you'll meet will say
that)."
Platt:
Well, I don't know what exact words you'll say when we do the hot stove
experiment above, but I'll wager you'll exhibit a universal reaction when
you sit on it.
Well, once again, suppose I said, "Mmmm, I love it. Can I have some more?"
and really meant it.
Matt:
"Think of it this way: you are defining Dynamic Quality by labeling it. You
are constricting it. Insofar as Dynamic Quality has to be a metaphor, an
unfamilar sound, Rorty has nothing wrong with it. Metaphors, in this way,
are undefined because people gradually understand their usage and meaning
by context. As soon as a metaphor becomes defined, in a strict sense, it
becomes literal. This is the dynamic that occurs between DQ and static
Quality."
Platt:
"Think of it this way: to communicate we have to use words. But words
are not the things they denote. A menu won't fill your empty stomach."
This is redescription at its best. One description, followed by a
redecription, followed by another redescription. A phrase like, "think of
it this way" clearly identifies what's going on.
This is point two, but with the overt reference to a correspondence theory
of truth. It is clear that "words about the environment" is not the same
thing as "the environment," but trying to get our words to match up
correctly somehow with our evironment is what pragmatists think it is best
to avoid.
Platt:
"But, do you know of anyone, past or present,
who has a metaphysics based on the premise that the world is a moral
order having four distinct levels of static moral patterns and an
undefinable Dynamic creative moral aspect? As for Pirsig fitting into the
Greek tradition, if you mean he's rational as opposed to Rorty who
proposes we transcend "logocentrism," I agree."
I don't know of anyone who has done exactly what Pirsig has done, just as I
don't know anyone who has done exactly what Rorty has done. Just as I
don't know anyone else who has created "a metaphysics based on the premise
that the world is a moral order having four distinct levels of static moral
patterns and an undefinable Dynamic creative moral aspect," I don't know
anyone who has created a linguistified, nominalist, ethonocentric,
heorically historicized neopramatism that uses recontextualization, strong
misreadings, and ad hoc narratives. Both are, to me, unique. Just as most
people, being configurations of beliefs and desires, are unique.
Pirsig fits into the Greek tradition in a number of ways. The one I was
refering to was the tradition of metaphysics started by Plato. That our
theories are attempts to get closer to reality, rather than ways to cope
with it. And I wouldn't say "transcend" for that implies getting "beyond"
or "above." This is what the Platonic tradition, by reinforcing the
reality-appearence distinction, wishes to do. It wishes to transcend
appearence by getting to reality. Hence, meta-physics: "beyond" physics.
I would say that Rorty proposes that we find an alternative to
"logocentrism" on the basis that its just not working out.
Platt:
"It's not so much I want him to believe that knowledge is founded on
evidence provided by our senses, but that he does believe it--as I have
tried to show by the many quotes I've offered."
Point four: Platt believes there is a real, true, correct interpretation of
Pirsig in the sense that all other interpretations of Pirsig would be
proven false by the one True Interpretation. The goal of this view is to
find the secret key that will unlock the meaning of the text. I believe in
"interpretations all the way down". I believe all we can offer is an
interpretation of a text, of ZMM or Lila.
I will admit that Pirsig, judging from Platt's timely quotes and my own
readings of the texts, would probably repudiate my "historicized Pirsig."
But to understand what I mean by interpretation is to realize that Pirsig
is interpreting his own texts the same as we are. He can tell us what his
beliefs and desires are and, as his philosophy is an extension of those, we
can see how they match up with the static things he has written. Just as
Pirsig would probably repudiate my "historicized Pirsig," Pirsig would
probably have to, as many here freely admit, repudiate much of ZMM. Which
leads me to the next logical step: its possible that Pirsig might now
repudiate large parts of Lila. We will never really know as Pirsig has
sworn off most writing, but the point is that we are interpreting a text.
The intention of the writer is only on passing concern (or no concern at
all). In constructing an accurate portrayal of the writer's own beliefs,
it may be helpful to ask him for clarification. But in using the text for
your own purposes, which everyone here is involved in by using the MoQ as
an alternative to SOM, it is only secondary that your interpretation be an
accurate reflection what Pirsig really meant or means.
Another point is that Platt, you said, "knowledge is founded on evidence
provided by our senses" as a reformulation of foundationalism. This needs
clarification because that's not what I mean. Foundationalism is the
belief that for our everyday beliefs to have any kind of certainty at all,
to be able to distinguish knowledge from opinion, one must have a
theoretical foundation, like the kind Descrates gave. I have no problem
with saying with you that knoweldge (as justified belief) is grounded on
evidence gleaned from our environment. That's how a belief becomes
justified. But metaphysicians like Descartes, Kant, and Pirsig go further
saying there needs to be a system like the Metaphysics of Quality to hold
up our beliefs. To my mind, Pirsig in Lila is clearly a foundationalist,
and I ignore every last bit of it.
Platt:
"Yes, all theories are created, just as Rorty has created his. I see no
contradiction between Lila and ZMM on that score."
Platt, I will now sink down and attempt to catch you in a word trap:
contrast "Yes, all theories are created" with "Pirsig establishes universal
moral levels in ascending order of rightness." Now, I can't at the moment
find it, but Pirsig says in Lila somewhere (yes, I realize I'm not helping
my case by not being able to find it) that, roughly, "the Metaphysics of
Quality is there whether we talk about it or not". There seems to an
equivocation here. How do you create something that is universal?
But this is a low blow. I think it would be simpler for you to say that
there are inconsistentcies between ZMM and Lila. And from everything
you've said before on Lila being an updated version of Pirsig's philosophy
from ZMM, this would be an easy and consistent thing for you to say.
Platt:
"Rorty denies we need to put insights into an overarching theory, then
proceeds to do exactly that. Do you really think he ever intends to
change his theory that "truth is intersubjective agreement?" "
Rorty's is not a theory that attempts to ground out these insights into a
foundation. If we treat theories as summaries, then you can see how this
works. However, if we treat theories as getting closer and closer to
truth, then I don't think it is fair to think Rorty has an overarching
theory. Rorty never proposes anything like this.
And yes, I don't see why he wouldn't be able to change his beliefs about
truth (which you, again, inexplicably limit him to only one of his two
accounts). Do I think it is probable? No, maybe not. But if God came
down from the heavens and took Rorty by the throat and said, "Listen punk.
How much more real do you want Me to be?" and Rorty sincerely believed that
this had happened, then I don't see why he wouldn't amend his beliefs.
Platt:
"Likewise, I don't think any good, edifying narratives or insights can come
from Rorty."
The lines are drawn.
Probably the most important criticism that you've pinned on Rorty comes
here at the end of your post:
"Not only do I base my conclusion on his quirky, murky expository style,
but also on these words he wrote: We must accept the fact "that we have
not once seen the Truth, and so
will not, intuitively recognize it when we see it again." This means that
when "the secret police come, when the torturers violate the innocent there
is nothing to be said to them."
Rorty has certainly been attacked on this. The point of this line by Rorty
is that we have a groundless desire for something to condemn the evil acts
of tyrants. That even when they win, something will prove them wrong. In
this striking passage I think something wonderful appears: in repudiating
this nonhuman condemnation, Rorty is forcing us to take responsibility for
condemning the tyrants and torturers. The fact is, if any of the horrific
dystopias existed, like Orwell's 1984 or Zamyatin's We, we would be pretty
powerless. If anything was constructed that had such enourmous power and
control over everyone, it would be the end of humanity as we know it today.
But Rorty's message is not one of despair; its one of liberation. He's
telling us that we must be watchful over ourselves, no one else is going to
do it for us. We must take control of our lives and make what we can.
There's a reason Rorty was a Trotskyite supporter of the Cold War. He
feared the Communist realization of 1984 just as much as the next guy.
What Rorty makes us realize is that we must hope for a better future. We
must take the existing institutions we have and make them better, more
liberating and less cruel. We must take the image of 1984 and always
remind of ourselves of how we do not want to be. And then we must create
utopic visions that we can hope to be and that we can take strides to become.
And now, finally, I would turn to one last Rorty quote that sums up why the
"redescription war" that I predicted as long ago as the first "Confessions"
post was convened and how it is impossible to get around:
"On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be
asked for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of
truth or the idea of the "intrinsic nature of reality." The trouble with
arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honored vocabulary is that
they are expected to be phrased in that very vocabulary. They are expected
to show that central elements in that vocabulary are "inconsistent in their
own terms" or that they "deconstruct themselves." But they can never be
shown. Any argument to the effect that our familiar use of a familiar term
is incoherent, or empty, or confused, or vague, or "merely metaphorical" is
bound to be inconclusive and question-beggin. For such use is, after all,
the paradigm of coherent, meaningful, literal, speech. Such arguments are
always parasitic upon, and abbreviations for, claims that a better
vocabulary is available. Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination
of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly,
a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and
a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things."
I think we can all see the outlines of Pirsig's project in this quote.
What I would argue is that, while Pirsig went to great lengths to shrug off
what he calls SOM, he didn't quite make it by keeping the
appearence-reality distinction implicit in his development of his
metaphysics. If we "trim away the fat," I believe we can turn Pirsig into
a stong poet who has overcome the tradition.
Matt
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