Re: MD Sophocles not Socrates

From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Mon Oct 28 2002 - 21:52:55 GMT


Hi Platt,

'Eudaimonia' is often translated as happiness, but in origin it is a much
richer concept, which is why I didn't simply say happiness (see my PS). I
was mainly concerned to move away from calling for 'individual', as a result
of criticisms of that (including yours); I would be happy to eventually
change the title, but for the time being, although cumbersome, it is
strictly accurate. As for Aristotle being the father of logic, absolutely
yes. Logical and intellectual prowess has a key role in eudaimonia, but
Aristotle is specific in saying that 'practical wisdom is not a matter for
scientific reason'. Your dictionary is inaccurate on that point (or at
least, it is misleading if it doesn't expand on what it means by 'reason').
(BTW one way of reading my proposal is to say that I'm raising Aristotelean
criticisms of a residual Platonism in Pirsig's thinking.)

Psychotherapy was just one example (although not being a science doesn't
invalidate it from the perspective I'm arguing for. Do you reject it as a
whole?). I keep thinking of other examples, which is actually a worrying
sign. A specific question for you, given your love of art. I was thinking
about Rembrandt's portraiture, especially the later self-portraits. Clearly
work as a portrait artist can be cashed out in social terms, but how would
you characterise the difference between a Rembrandt portrait and one done by
a jobbing artist, assuming that the latter had an adequate technical
proficiency? The difference I would guess would be the depth of vision or
psychological acuity that the Rembrandt would display, and I think we would
both agree that the difference couldn't be cashed out in social terms. How
would you characterise the 'extra' from Rembrandt (ie the fourth level or
even DQ/mystical stuff)?

Sam
www.elizaphanian.v-2-1.net/home.html

PS From the Nussbaum I'm reading:
"Some texts we shall discuss are rendered obscure on this point by the
common translation of Greek 'eudaimonia' by English 'happiness'. Especially
given our Kantian and Utilitarian heritage in moral philosophy, in both
parts of which 'happiness' is taken to be the name of a feeling of
contentment or pleasure, and a view that makes happiness the supreme good is
asumed to be, by definition, a view that gives supreme value to
psychological states rather than to activities, this translation is badly
misleading. To the Greeks, eudaimonia means something like 'living a good
life for a human being'; or as a recent writer, John Cooper, has suggested,
'human flourishing'. Aristotle tells us that it is equivalent, in ordinary
discourse, to 'living well and doing well'. Most Greeks would understand
eudaimonia to be something essentially active, of which praiseworthy
activities are not just productive means, but actual constituent parts. It
is possible for a Greek thinker to argue that eudaimonia is equivalent to a
state of pleasure; to this extent activity is not a conceptual part of the
notion. But even here we should be aware that many Greek thinkers conceive
of pleasure as something active rather than stative; an equation of
eudaimonia with pleasure might, then, not mean what we would expect it to
mean in a Utilitarian writer. The view that eudaimonia is equivalent to a
state of pleasure is an unconventional and _prima facie_ counterintuitive
position in the Greek tradition. A very common position would be
Aristotle's, that eudaimonia consists in activity according to
excellence(s)."

Or as we might put it, activity governed by Quality :o)

MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 01 2002 - 10:38:06 GMT