Greetings,
Happy to oblige Platt.
1) Is direct everyday experience synonymous with intuition?
This question was a request for clarification of the way Horse used the term. I think that intuition
is one aspect of everyday experience but am happy, for the sake of argument to use the term
intuition instead. You see, if I intuit that my cat will eat a mouse tomorrow, I can only verify
that intuition tomorrow when I hear the squeaks. This seems to be a qualitatively different
'everyday experience' to my having seen my cat eat a mouse yesterday. My question would have been
better if I had asked, 'Is your use of the term 'everyday . . . etc.' Your clarification clears that
one up for me. (Horse?)
2) Can we ascertain what is good from empirical evidence?.
I agree with you.
3) If we can, then how.?
Once again, I agree with you.
4) How does 2 and 3 square with non-naturalism?
Oh bugger. Now I'm in trouble. Non-naturalism (as in the theory, not merely anything opposed to
naturalism) denies that ethical language can be reduced to factual statements and so would deny 2).
Your position that 2) is acceptable if we allow a 'sense of value' is the same as the intuitionist
position with the only exception being that you regard such a sense of value as a form of empirical
evidence. I'm still trying to work out the ramifications of such a distinction and am not sure it
actually matters one jot. This is where I need help. What is the difference between ethical
non-naturalism (which, as Horse points out, uses naturalistic terms as an intellectual construct
applied to SQ not DQ) which recognises intuition as empirical, and ethical non-naturalism which
makes a distinction between empirical and 'sense of value?' The only theoretical difference that I
can see between the MoQ and established forms of ethical non-naturalism is that the MoQ regards
subjects and objects as being, in some sense, 'properties' of good, in a sort of upside down
naturalism, while non-naturalism is happy to remain silent on the issue and simply to say that we
can all intuit what good is. On a meta-ethical level there is no difficulty in non-naturalism being
seen either way, while on a normative ethical level I fail to see the advantage.
So, the MoQ is a form of non-naturalistic upside down naturalism with a healthy dose of downside
down naturalism thrown in for good measure - and I think an element of inverted prescriptivism might
come in handy at some point soon. Where's the ambiguity? Its over there in the box! Now you see why
I am asking the questions. I genuinely seek answers.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@shellier.freeserve.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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