> Hi Roger, Rich, Glove & MD!
>
> Sent: Saturday, June 19, 1999 by Glove:
> Glove quotes Rich:
> Epistemologically you may never prove to yourselves that the outside
world
> exists, but the framework of ontological understanding known as the MOQ
has
> as an essential foundation an "objective" evolution of Quality ...
> Mary:
> I want to examine this below, but first I want to look at the two replies
> you received, Rich. One from Glove and one from Risky-Roger-dodger ;)
>
> Glove responds:
> Pirsig writes: "These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to
> Dynamic Quality. Only a living being can do that." (pg. 185 teal
paperback)
> I fail to see where objectivity comes into the picture here, but I will
> ponder it further.
>
> Sent: Sunday, June 20, 1999 11:35 AM by Roger
> > Roger replies:
> > I don't think this statement is correct. I believe Pirsig erred here.
If
> > this is true, then how did the living patterns emerge from inorganic
> matter
> > to begin with? If this is true, then how does the governor on a steam
> engine
> > respond to the dynamic increase in temperature? If this is true, then
the
> > entire inorganic level cannot respond to quality. If this is true, then
> > artificial intelligence is doomed.
>
> Mary:
> Rich, when you said, "...an "objective" evolution of Quality...", are you
> referring to the static levels and moral codes? If so, I can understand
> because the whole evolutionary static construction that Pirsig developed
can
> easily be comprehended by SOM thinking. It is essentially an expanded
> version of Darwinian evolution.
>
> Glove quotes Pirsig from pg 185 (teal). This is followed by an even more
> abbreviated quote of 185 by Roger. When you then said, "I believe Pirsig
> erred here.", Roger, I was forced to get out of my chair, find my teal
copy
> and check it out! If read in context, I don't see where Pirsig erred.
>
> If you back up to the beginning of the chapter (13) on pg 182, Pirsig
begins
> by saying, "Historically every effort to unite science and ethics has been
a
> disaster. You can't paste a moral system on top of a pile of amoral
> objective matter. ... But the MOQ doesn't permit this ... 'amoral
objective
> matter' is a low-grade form of morality." The confusion one may feel with
> this quote is that the word "moral" is used in 2 different ways. The
> pasted-on moral system Pirsig first talks about seems to be the ordinary
> moral system of values we humans have developed in support of our Social
> level. This is objective morality as commonly understood by SOM. But the
> "low-grade form of morality" he attributes to the Inorganic level is of
the
> MOQ type, supported by Pirsig's moral codes, and so Pirsig is right - you
> can't attribute social morals to a rock, but you must attribute inorganic
> morals to it.
>
> After a couple of paragraphs where he discusses the moral codes operating
> between the levels, he introduces "Dynamic Morality" and says, "...in the
> MOQ all these sets of morals, plus another Dynamic morality, are not only
> real, they are the whole thing. ... We're at last dealing with morals on
the
> basis of reason." To me, this says we are finally able to use
> subject/object logic to evaluate the MOQ-morality of a given situation at
or
> between any static level(s). Pirsig developed (or discovered) the static
> levels and the moral codes. The use of the word "morals" is fraught with
> danger, however, because you have to be vigilant in recalling that (unless
> stated otherwise) he is usually talking about MOQ-morals not Social Level
> morals. MOQ-Morals contain within them all the Social Level morals. He
> then segues into the quote used above. Here's an expanded version:
>
> "...societies and thoughts and principles themselves are no more than sets
> of static patterns. These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adust
to
> Dynamic Quality. Only a living being can do that. The strongest moral
> argument against capital punishment is that it weakens a society's Dynamic
> capability - its capability for change and evolution."
>
> Now, back to Glove quotes Rich:
> Epistemologically you may never prove to yourselves that the outside
world
> exists, but the framework of ontological understanding known as the MOQ
has
> as an essential foundation an "objective" evolution of Quality - beginning
> with matter (sun/earth), forming bodies and societies and the (Imperfect)
> representations of the aforementioned as conceived by individual
intellects.
> The beauty of his work is that these realities are themselves Value.
>
> At first, I would have disagreed with you, Rich, just as Roger does above.
> But after re-reading the first part of chapter 13, I think I get what you
> are driving at. The "objective evolution of Quality" refers to the
> evolution of the static levels. Taken as an evolutionary system, these
> static levels are easily comprehended by S/O logic - Pirsig says so.
>
> The harder thing for me to understand is, "The beauty of his work is that
> these realities are themselves Value". Pirsig hammers this in over and
over
> throughout Lila, but also says, "...societies and thoughts and principles
> themselves are no more than sets of static patterns. These patterns can't
> by themselves perceive or adust to Dynamic Quality. Only a living being
can
> do that."
>
> Only a living being can do that. Pirsig is discussing "societies and
> thoughts and principles". Within that context, to say that only a living
> being can adjust to Dynamic Quality is to say that only a living being can
> introduce change in society, thought, or principles. I don't believe
Pirsig
> intended to say that living beings are required to effect change at all
> levels - only those at which living beings are in context. There is no
> context in which living beings exist at the Inorganic level. There are no
> inorganic patterns that support the existence of life *at that level*.
>
> Pirsig seems to make a distinction between material things and patterns of
> value. Repeatedly, he tells us that the thing does not have Value, Value
> has the thing. Does he mean that the material world doesn't actually
exist?
> If so, is it something separate from the static levels of Value? Are
> material things then actually 'only' manifestations of Values? If so,
where
> did the original 'material' of which they are composed come from? What
> about causation? What are Values? Do these values exist if not
manifested?
>
> Does Pirsig answer my questions? (Teal PB page numbers)
>
> pg 75: "Values are 'more' empirical, in fact, than subjects or objects."
> pg 76: "What the MOQ would do is take this separate category, Quality, and
> show how it contains within itself both subjects and objects ... Quality
is
> the primary empirical reality of the world...
> Mary: Like Ford Motors, Quality is Job One.
>
> pg 113: "The MOQ subscribes to what is called empiricism. ... all
legitimate
> human knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about what the
senses
> provide."
> Mary: I am relieved. The MOQ is not trying to establish itself as a
> religion. So far, as Pirsig presents it, there is no requirement to
suspend
> disbelief in order to accept the MOQ.
>
> pg 114: "The value is the reality that brings the thoughts to mind. ... a
> thing that has no value does not exist. The thing has not created the
> value. The value has created the thing."
> Mary: Nothing exists independently of Value. That means my thought that
> Value molds material reality into a 'thing of value' , that is, Value
> changes the shape of pre-existing material reality - is false. Without
the
> Value the material thing is not there.
>
> pg 116: "Substance is a subspecies of Value."
> pg 120: "... substance is a derived concept, not anything that is directly
> experienced. ... All people ever see is data."
> Mary: Pirsig spells it out. If we don't have the data, the thing does
not
> exist. This leads me to ask, however, if Pirsig means that Pluto didn't
> exist before it was discovered - or quarks, and I think he means yes, or
at
> least yes because it doesn't matter. If you have no data on which to base
> an assertion (an assertion like Pluto does exist) then your statement
> requires a suspension of disbelief among your followers. It becomes an
> article of faith alone. That's not to say, however, that to know Pluto is
> there you must see it with your own eyes. We can infer that a body
resides
> in space by the effect it has on the motion of other bodies in space.
>
> Same with quarks. Let's say you went back in time to Isaac Newton's day
and
> you told him that there were 3 quarks in every proton and 3 in every
> neutron. If you only had the scientific instruments and knowledge
available
> in his time with which to prove your assertion, you wouldn't be able to do
> it. If Newton wanted to believe you he would have to do so based solely
on
> faith. You could not provide him with anything upon which to base a
> 'belief' in quarks.
>
> Pg 119: "...'causation' can be replaced by 'value'.
> pg 160" "All life is a migration of static patterns of quality toward
> Dynamic Quality."
>
> Mary: In another post sometime back, someone asked how something that
> started out as good already could be striving for good. I think Pirsig
> answers this here. To me, at the most basic inorganic level preferences
> were exercised that resulted in something good or satisfying to inorganic
> things at the inorganic level. As more and more preferences were
exercised
> different preferences became possible. In each case, some of them worked
> out (that is, were able to statically latch) while others didn't work
> (couldn't latch) and disappeared. The ones that couldn't latch could be
> considered bad preferences; so that today we are left with a continuous
> chain of "good" (latched) preferences that have become more and more
> complex. There are still an infinite number of latchable (good) and
> unlatchable (bad) preferences out there to be tried, but at any given
moment
> one could say that everything that 'exists' is good on some level, while
at
> the same time those good things are still continuing to strive for some
more
> good (more latches).
>
> More latches mean more stability. For a static pattern stability is good.
> To boil it all down, Dynamic Quality itself is good because it enables the
> existence of static quality and static latches; but this is not the same
> thing as saying that all the results of a Dynamic Experience are always
> good. Possibilities are neither good nor bad, they are just
possibilities.
> Dynamic Quality makes all possibilities available. Making them available
is
> good, but those possibilities don't become good themselves until latched.
>
> pg 179: "Mental patterns do not originate out of inorganic nature. They
> originate out of society ... what a mind thinks is as dominated by social
> patterns as social patterns are dominated by biological patterns... Our
> intellectual description of nature is always culturally derived."
> Mary: This quote is one of the most disconcerting to me when combined
with
> "things that have no value do not exist". What a mind thinks is dominated
> by its Social level patterns; or, put another way, what we Value is
> dominated by Social level patterns. Is it then possible for an "actual"
> separate reality containing 'things' to exist right in front of our nose
> that we do not 'see' because we do not value it? If a valueless tree
falls
> in a valueless forest does it make a valueless sound?
>
> If I had to summarize, I'd say Pirsig is telling us that there is no such
> thing as SOM causation. There is no first cause; there is only Value. As
> human beings our Social level has decided to 'value' finding a first
cause,
> so through religion and science we will keep searching for it; but won't
> find it - since it does not exist. We will never find that 'first cause'
> static latch. When you think about it, even if there was a first cause it
> didn't have to statically latch. It was, after all the First Cause. It
> didn't need a latch because it never need happen again. Latches are only
> needed for things that are repeatable. Latches are only needed for
> everything that follows First Cause. If the first cause did latch it
> wouldn't be the First Cause anymore. It would be the Second Cause or
Third.
> As humans, we are the first Value expression that 'values' a first cause.
> First causes were not valued by anything that came before us. It might be
> interesting sometime, though, to examine why humanity needs First Cause so
> much.
>
> Discussion?
> - Mary
>
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