From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Tue Nov 05 2002 - 09:50:40 GMT
Hi Peter, David, Davor, anyone following the discussion.
David said (from Peter's original criticism, and I think Davor agreed):
> I agree with whoever it was that pointed out that your
> "eudaimonic" individual actually describes the social level excellence,
even
> if it is expressed in rational Aristotelean terms. I should add that the
> thespians of ancient Greece, like Sophocles?, are also prime examples of
the
> very height of the social level.
I think this is an accurate reflection of the 'standard' MoQ position. That
is, I think this is a correct articulation of Pirsig's account (so you have
his authority on your side!)
It fits in with Pirsig's various descriptions of the intellectual level:
"In Lila, I never defined the intellectual level of the MOQ, since everyone
who is up to reading Lila already knows what "intellectual" means. For
purposes of MOQ precision, let's say that the intellectual level is the same
as mind. It is the collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the
brain, that stand for patterns of experience."
"For precision in the MOQ it's better to limit intelligence to symbol
manipulation, as defined earlier. I think that a lot of perceived fuzziness
of these levels can come from expanding terms beyond their ordinary
dictionary meanings when there is no need to do so."
And in the discussions in Lila itself, there are various comments which
tally with this account (as we would expect!)
When he is talking about the death penalty, Pirsig (Phaedrus?) writes: "What
makes killing him immoral is that a criminal is not just a biological
organism. He is not even just a defective unit of society. Whenever you kill
a human being you are killing a source of thought too. A human being is a
collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence over a society...
it is more moral for an idea to kill a society than it is for a society to
kill an idea."
It seems central to the standard account of the MoQ that 'ideas' are the
highest levels of static quality that we can be aware of, subordinate only
to DQ itself. Ideas, and the associated products of the intellectual level
are the things that we can be aware of that have the most value, they are
the most precious things.
Pirsig in Lila's Child again: "It's moral for a society to prevent a
criminal from destroying it by killing him if that is necessary. But an
imprisoned criminal is no longer a threat to society and it becomes arguably
immoral to kill him because he is still capable of thought."
The capacity for thought - our capacity to "collect and manipulate
symbols" - is what gives us access to the highest static level of the MoQ.
This is our most valuable attribute.
With me so far? Is this a fair exposition of your views (and of the
'standard account' of the MoQ?)
My problem with this can be easily expressed. According to this account of
the MoQ the worst thing about the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is that they
removed collections of ideas from existence (and an openness to DQ).
Everything that I have referred to as 'eudaimonic' - let's take Sophocles as
a prototype - is less important than the existing and potential products of
the intellect. So things like loss to families of loved ones, breaking up of
friendships, any and all human flourishing that doesn't fall under the
heading of 'manipulation of symbols' is less important than the intellectual
products that we have been deprived of as a result of that terrorism.
I find that conclusion absurd.
Pirsig writes of why we should accept the idea that Quality is reality, that
the reason is "The harmony (i.e. Quality) it produces among the elements of
our existing understanding." And this is broadly the justification for the
MoQ - it is a higher quality explanation of our understandings than the
alternatives.
Now, faced with what I see the MoQ saying about 9/11 I am faced with a
quandary. Either my understanding of the MoQ is wrong, and the MoQ does NOT
say that the worst thing about 9/11 was the loss of intellectual patterns
(so the fourth level includes what I am calling 'eudaimonic' values - and
Peter, David and Davor also now need to adjust their understandings) OR we
need to change our understandings of the MoQ so that it doesn't produce such
deeply disharmonious and counter-intuitive conclusions.
Of course, being deeply counter-intuitive doesn't rule something out as
wrong absolutely. It just means that the Quality produced by that new
understanding must outweigh our intuitions. The discords must take their
place and gain their Quality from their role in a wider and deeper harmony.
One last point. In Lila's Child, Pirsig seems to acknowledge that
intellectual values are contained within 'eudaimonic' values: "Dusenberry
really didn't have any methods. He opposed the static "objectivity" he saw
in other anthropologists because it shut out a deeper intellectual
understanding that came from his friendship with the Indians. He just wrote
and said whatever he liked. I suppose this could be called "Dynamic
intellectualism" though it is better not to invent new terms for such an
ancient trait."
"A deeper intellectual understanding that came from friendship." Let us not
forget that - according to Aristotle - friendship is the highest excellence
available to the eudaimonic individual.
To my understanding, a MoQ that sees eudaimonic values as the appropriate
scale of values for the fourth level is a higher Quality MoQ than the
standard account, which sees intellectual values as the appropriate scale.
As always, I look forward to any and all comments that you wish to send my
way :o)
Sam
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