RE: MD Individuality

From: Patrick van den Berg (cirandar@yahoo.com)
Date: Sat Nov 16 2002 - 21:48:46 GMT

  • Next message: John Maher: "RE: MD Individuality"

    Hi John,

    You replied:
    > What 'seems like dualism' to you is not dualism in any
    > meaningful sense of the word.
    >
    > Correlating cognitive events with brain events is no
    > more indicative of dualism than the fact that the
    > sound a record player produces correlates to the state
    > of the groove on the record. It would be silly to
    > conclude that there are two irreducible aspects of the
    > universe.

    With all due respect, aren't the neural events we can 'see' in the
    laboratory totally different things than our cognitions? To me they are
    as irreduciable to each other as wood is to marmer. They're simply two
    different things. They have no obvious relationship as between 'sound
    and grooves'. If you think there is, show me!

    > Furthermore, there is no reason to conclude that a NCC
    > shows cause and effect or otherwise explains
    > consciousness. It attempts to show, by definition,
    > only a correlation.

    Yes, you're correct on that. My mistake. But once one says that one
    hopes one day to find a one-to-one correlation (or 'a correlation of
    100%') between mind and brain, as like I said some people say, the very
    usage of the term 'correlation' isn't apt anymore: We just then seem to
    talk about one and the same thing.
    But anyhow, doesn't the word 'correlation' in the NCC show a feat of
    desparation on the neuroscientists-part? Don't they seem to admit that
    the best we can offer is merely a correlation between cognitive and
    brain events? And once you admit you can't find a 100% correlation, but
    always (much?) less than that, doesn't that conversely mean that SOME
    neural events CAN't be correlated with cognitive events, and more
    interestingly, that SOME (parts of) cognitive events CAN't be correlated
    with any neural event? Once you admit that, that there are parts in the
    mind that can't be mapped in any way to the brain, you admit that they
    are two different things. Again: seems like dualism to me.
     
    > If you throw everyone into the 'dualist' bag it is
    > perhaps unsurprising that you can't find philosophers
    > who think otherwise, which answers your final
    > question.

    Well, I can't hide a distaste against attempts to come to grips with the
    mind-body problem in terms of 'emergence' or 'supervenience', which I
    believe are popular concepts in the philosophy of mind nowadays. Indeed
    I dismiss these attempts to formulate some (material) monism as merely
    word-games, and yes, I tend to conclude then that they fail, and then I
    indeed throw them in the 'dualist bag'. Hm...

    But really, give me the names of some contempary philosophers you know
    that transcended (Cartesian) dualism, then I'll try to have an open mind
    on them, when you describe them or what I can find about them on the
    web.

    Friendly greetings, Patrick.

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