From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Dec 03 2002 - 14:30:30 GMT
Dear Rick,
I wrote 15/11 22:34 +0100:
'After reading the discussion between mainly Jonathan (14/11 16:48 +0200 and
15/11 15:53 +0200) and Rick (14/11 14:43 -0500), "distinguishability by an
objective scientific instrument" doesn't seem to be a really sharp
distinction between social (plus intellectual) patterns of values and
biological (plus inorganic) patterns of values after all (contrary to what
Pirsig states in "Lila's Child").
...
I think it is not very wise of Pirsig to make the distinction between two
(sets of) levels of static quality dependent on a distinction (between
subjects and objects) which he wants to supplant (as a basic metaphysical
distinction).'
You objected 16/11 3:35 -0500:
'all inorganic/biological patterns are "objective" and all
sociological/intellectual patterns are "subjective". Given this, your point
seems a bit strange to me. For you have essentially said that
distiguishability by an objective instrument doesn't seem to be a really
sharp distinction between objective and subjective patterns.'
If we say that the distinction between Dynamic Quality and static quality is
more fundamental than that between subjects and objects, it is risky to
subsequently define different types of static quality (different types of
patterns of value) by using this distinction between subjects and objects.
It is better, I think, to FIRST define the distinctions between the
different types of patterns of value (and thereby the different types of
static quality) and THEN re-integrate subject-object thinking (NOT as
metaphysics BUT as high quality intellectual pattern of value) by defining
'objective' as 'regarding inorganic and biological patterns of value' and
'subjective' as 'regarding social and intellectual patterns of values'.
In other words: I don't accept as 'GIVEN' that 'all inorganic/biological
patterns are "objective" and all sociological/intellectual patterns are
"subjective"'. I agree however that thus redefining 'objective' and
'subjective' ON THE BASIS OF INDEPENDENTLY DEFINED TERMS FROM THE MOQ does
not change their meaning a lot compared with everyday usage. These
redefinitions of 'objective' and 'subjective' enable us to stay on speaking
terms with people who are still mired in subject-object thinking.
Likewise I don't accept AS A DEFINITION OF BIOLOGICAL VERSUS SOCIAL PATTERNS
OF VALUE the second Pirsig quote from 'Lila's child', which you mentioned
24/11 14:43 -0500 in this thread:
'In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist in the material world.
All societies are subjective. They exist in the mental world. Again the
distinction is very sharp.'
'Let's say the intellectual level is the same as mind', from the first
Pirsig quote, is for me again such a redefinition in MoQish terms of the
SOMish term mind, that enables us to stay on speaking terms with those who
are not yet 'thinking MoQish'. In the MoQ the terms 'objective',
'subjective' and 'mind' are not necessary to describe and explain
experience/reality.
In Pirsig's writings a clear definition of the social level -that does not
depend on the subject-object definition- seems lacking. My definition is
that the social level consists of patterns of value resulting from the
copying of habitual behavior between people. These patterns of values are
only sufficiently stable to be considered as a separate level, if they are
passed on from one generation to the next and stay recognizable.
The SoMish term 'culture' can be redefined as the collection of social
patterns of value that is passed between generations of a certain group of
people, thereby defining that group as 'society'.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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