Re: MD levels

From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Dec 03 2002 - 22:24:17 GMT

  • Next message: Valence: "Re: MD Pirsig in Lila: Beat inspiration or plagiarism ?"

    Dear Platt,

    You wrote 18/11 10:16 -0500:
    'I also conclude from passages in Lila that intellect arose simultaneously
    with the social level (intellect as symbols, i.e. language) although it took
    many years for intellectual values to become dominant and become a level all
    by itself.'

    How and from which passages do you conclude that intellectual patterns of
    value arose simultaneously with the social level and that the arising of
    intellectual patterns of value doesn't imply that the intellectual level
    arose?

    You may know by now that in my MoQ a level comes into being when a new type
    of patterns of value comes into being. You will also know that I don't care
    very much whether Pirsig would agree, but only whether he and others would
    still recognize my MoQ as MoQ (in other words: whether it is still a part of
    the MoQ understood as an intellectual pattern of value). I know that for you
    a statement is only true in a MoQ context if it is a correct interpretation
    of Pirsig's words, however, so please explain yourself on that basis.

    You also wrote:
    'Notice that another term is included in Pirsig's definition- "experience."
    This is where meanings get complicated. In MoQ terms, Is consciousness
    necessary for experience? Can experience of self occur without symbolic
    representation? Is "awareness" a valid synonym for experience?'

    I'd say that Pirsig's definition of consciousness as 'the collection and
    manipulation of symbols, created in the brain, that stand for patterns of
    experience' implies that experience is necessary for consciousness, rather
    than the other way around. 'Self' is not mentioned.

    I wrote 17/11 22:35 +0100
    '"Value" interpreted as "that without which we don't experience anything" is
    the main phenomenon present across levels according to the MoQ (even if "the
    ^value^ that holds a glass of water together and the ^value^ that holds a
    nation together ... are completely different from each other"). What
    additional meaning does your 'awareness' have compared to this 'value'?'

    You replied 18/11 10:16 -0500:
    'I use awareness as a synonym for experience, ... My claim that awareness
    expands with each level ... is important because Darwinian evolution largely
    ignores the development of "interiors" whereas the MoQ is all about that
    neglected aspect of phenomena.'

    So your 'awareness' adds 'interiorness' to 'value' and adds to the MoQ the
    idea that the 'interior space' (of ???) expands with each level?
    I understand the concept of 'value' in a MoQ context to ignore the
    distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior', and rightly so, because
    introducing this distinction immediately re-introduces 'subjects', that can
    have an 'interior' AND (when seen as 'objects' by other 'subjects') and an
    'exterior'.
    If you say 'the MoQ is all about [the interior] aspect of phenomena', you
    seem to interpret 'value' or 'Quality' (which is the core concept of the
    MoQ) again as 'value in the mind of a subject' or 'Quality as attributed to
    an object by a subject'. In other words: you seem to presuppose subjects
    (with 'interiors') before there can be value/Quality.

    I don't think that 'awareness' is a necessary concept and 'its expansion
    with each successive level' a valuable idea for the MoQ. It rather risks
    re-introducing SOM in disguise.

    You can (again) object:
    'But "experience" has the same problem, connoting an "experience of"
    something by somebody. The English language is so subject-object oriented
    that there's practically no escape from that underlying if questionable S-O
    split.'

    We can distinguish between
    1) the problem that 'patterns of value' understood as 'patterned experience'
    seems to imply that WE (having that experience) are subjects experiencing
    objects and
    2) the problem that ascribing 'awareness' or an 'interior aspect' to those
    'patterns of value' seems to imply that these 'patterns of value' are
    themselves 'subjects' and from another viewpoint (when we recognize that
    they also have an 'exterior aspect) 'objects'.
    The second problem can be avoided. The first problem can be solved by
    explaining (as Pirsig does in 'Lila') that the (patterned) experience comes
    first and that 'subjects' and 'objects' are deduced from that experience.

    With friendly greetings,

    Wim

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