From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Thu Jan 09 2003 - 23:25:39 GMT
Everyone,
I'd like to add this to this discussion of "absolute."
As I see it there are two interpretations of Pirsig on "absolute": the
Kantian one and Hegelian/historicist one. They both have textual support,
so I would identify this as a tension in Pirsig's writing. The Kantian
interpretation (which Platt would favor) emphasizes the need for a
foundation upon which we can build beliefs. These beliefs then, because
they are built on an absolute, universal platform, can be viewed as
absolute and universal after all the kinks in logic have been worked out.
This is the Platonic chase for absolute certainty that Descartes took on,
Hume gave up on, and Kant solidified in its modern form.
The Hegelian/historicist interpretation (which pragmatists favor)
emphasizes Pirsig's constuction of an evolutionary platform. Our platform
evolves. Because it changes, each "foundation" for our beliefs is
provisional and can't really be taken in an absolute, universal sense.
This is Hegel's great appreciation of contingency. I say
"Hegelian/historicist" rather than simply "Hegelian" because Hegel himself
equivocated on historicism in a way when he posited an end telos to
history: Absolute Mind/Spirit [depending on translation].
Pirsig can be read as a Hegelian and Pirsig recognizes that when he says,
"Psychology Today said he was a follower of Hegel." He repudiates part of
this comparison when he says, "It [the Metaphysics of Quality] adds that
this good is not a social code or some intellectualized Hegelian Absolute.
It is direct everyday experience." I interpret this as his eschewment of
Hegel's equivocation and Kant's foundation. Our "foundation" is experience
i.e. a contingent, changing context.
Matt
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