From: David Morey (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Aug 15 2004 - 12:37:18 BST
Hi Ham
Thanks for reply. You said: Objects, things, and events are empirical
phenonema that make up our
cognizant experience of reality; so the "differences" between them are
self-evident.
It may be self evident now, but the point of Pirsig's
analysis of SOM is to go back & ask how this
became self-evident and to question this self-evidence.
So far I think where you see advantages of your system
over Pirsig's you have not yet fully grasped Pirsig's.
I do not think you need to adopt Pirsig's MOQ but I
do think you would gain much from a better understanding of it.
Maybe your ideas can bring something new to us but I cannot
see it at the moment. So far I find your thesis most use in terms of
bringing
thinkers like Eckhart to the party. If Pirsig cannot help you develop
your ideas how about Husserl he looks very carefully at how meaning
related to experience.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: <hampday@earthlink.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2004 6:56 AM
Subject: Re: MD Metaphysics of Value
>
> From Ham in response to David Morey, August 14
> Re: MD Metaphysics of Value
>
> David asked a bunch of questions, most of which can be answered by reading
> my thesis or by checking the appended Glossary at the end of that long
page:
>
>
> > what is a 'thing', what is an 'event', what is the difference,
> > how do you tell the difference between a 'thing' and an
> > 'event' when you are experiencing them? What is the opposite
> > of conscious, how do we know there is anything that is not
> > conscious? If essence is close to Quality for you how
> > does essence relate to dynamic and static quality?
>
> Objects, things, and events are empirical phenonema that make up our
> cognizant experience of reality; so the "differences" between them are
> self-evident. I don't know what you mean by "the opposite of conscious",
> unless it refers to the nothingness that separates [delimits] all entities
> experienced. We can't "know" (i.e., prove) that there is anything that is
> not consciousness. I don't make a distinction between dynamic and static
> Value because I see no need for it. Value is the essence of man's
reality;
> whether one considers it in the present or from a historical
(evolutionary)
> perspective.
>
> > You say: Experience IS that which is divisible, definable, and knowable!
>
> This seems obvious to me. Everything experienced, including thought and
> sensation, is capable of being reduced to its constituent components
> (divided), defined, and made cognizant (knowable). Indeed, the criteria
you
> cite apply only to experience, which is an epistemological dualism.
Hence,
> I'm unable to make sense of the remainder of your statement, or why you
feel
> compelled to hold my thesis "suspect" or "restricted" because it does not
> totally coincide with MOQ or SOM. If the Philosophy of Essence was an
> exact replica of Mr. Pirsig's MOQ (as at least one participant in this
> discussion is trying to prove), what would be the point in my being here?
>
> > Yes and no, we certainly cannot start to have an epistemological
> > relationship within experience until we divide it up, usually
> > into SOM. Subject-object dualism has this use, one problem
> > with SOM apart from it often breaking down into either idealism
> > or materialism (i.e one half of the divide or the other) is that it
> ignores
> > the fact that to have a divide you must originally begin with a whole or
> > One that you divide. Quality is what Pirsig uses as a name for the
> > unknowable undivided One. He then goes on to suggest that a
> > SQ/DQ division of quality will teach us many things that SOM does
> > not, it is a better division he suggests, and most of us here agree with
> > this value of MOQ over SOM for future intellectual progress. You
> > seem to be approaching some similar issues, but I currently suspect
> > that there are aspects of SOM restricting the progress of your own
> > thesis.
> >
> > Is suggestion that Quality has a source not a leap into the dark?
> > Quality, for me, is just there. It pours forth, I know of no source,
> > or from where it comes, and by some strange process -the evolution
> > of consciousness, via the differentiation of experience, it becomes
> > knowable and we/I can make out the SQ patterns that provides
> > some kind of understanding of the amazing process of the pouring
> > forth of experience.
>
> You may regard my thesis as a "leap in the dark". In fact, I have stated
in
> the supporting ontology [see the "Creation" section] that it is a
> hypothetical scenario. I maintain that we as "free agents" of Essence
cannot
> have access to Absolute Truth, including complete knowledge of creation
and
> ultimate reality. However, I believe this theory to be a reasonable and
> consistent concept considered within the ontological framework of a
> "negational" Essence, the basis for which can be found in the writings of
> Plotinus and the teachings of Eckhart, among others.
>
> > Essentially yours
> > Ham
>
>
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