From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Aug 21 2004 - 06:14:23 BST
From Ham Priday
To: Chris Phoenix, Friday, August 20
Re: MD Re: Non-empiricist definition of DQ
Hi, Chris.
You say you're not really a physicist, but you certainly think like one when
you say ...
> Despite my flirting with physics above, I think I'm talking about a
> metaphysics, not a physics. And think the deepest questions of free will
> should be answerable by physics.
Why physics? Because your reality is a world governed by physical
principles. [I peaked at your website and see that you're very much into
nanotechnology -- not one of my favorite sciences, as you now know]. I
won't be able to shake you from that world because it is your personal
mindset. As for myself, although my BS was in Biology/Chemistry, a
physicist is the last person I'd consult on the question of Free Will. I
have a close friend who happens to be a professor of bio-chemistry and sees
everything in terms of the dynamics of chemicals and genes. From what I've
seen of nanotechnology, you guys want to make molecules behave like living
organisms as a sort of "post-evolution" of Nature -- perhaps even create a
more efficient brain in the process!. To me, that's the epitome of logical
positivism. It's based squarely on the idea that the essence of reality is
in the object.
You asked ...
> Whoa. Where did cause-and-effect determinism come in? And where did I
> promise to explain free will?
You didn't ... I just wanted to see your explanation. The question of Free
Will applies to every philosophy.
Actually, my question was a very simple one that might even have been
answered by the statement: "I don't believe man has it" I'm surprised that
MOQ followers seem disinterested in the question of Free Will. To
philosophers outside of this forum it has been a major issue since Darwin.
The idea that everything is theoretically determinable by its antecedant
causes means that man, whether he knows it or not, is not a free creature.
(A good source on the paradox of Freedom is "Free Will" by Laura Waddell
Elkstrom, published in paperback by Westview Press.) I don't know how DQ
gets around this problem; but my solution is to posit finite knowledge as
the outer limit of man's intelligence, which makes him a free agent within
empirical reality.
> Of course, there may be a higher level in which it's possible to know
> exactly what possibilities exist and how evolution will go. So it may
> be that whether we have free will or not depends on which level you look
> from: the human level where we play metaphysics, or some hypothetical
> higher level.
But isn't "metaphysics" supposed to be a philosophy of reality "beyond" the
physical level? Or does Mr. Pirsig have a "special" definition for this
term, too?
> Godel's Incompleteness Theorem proves that interesting systems contain
> ideas the truth of which is unknowable within that system. A richer
> system could exist that would be able to evaluate the truth of things
> that the original system can't--but of course would have its own
> unknowabilities.
Godel would seem to be getting there. But why the need for a higher system?
This is equivalent to arguing for multiple universes. To me, there is man's
reality (finitude) and there is ultimate reality (absoluteness), "ultimate"
meaning the source (and end) of all difference and process.
> I found a paper that seems to confirm this interpretation. "And if such
> is the case, then we (qua mathematicians) are machines that are unable
> to recognize the fact that they are machines.
Chris, do you really believe that man is a "machine"? (That makes you a
mechanist, you know, and only confirms my suspicions about nanotechnology's
objective.)
>As the saying goes: if our
> brains could figure out how they work they would have been much smarter
> than they are.
I'm sorry, Chris. "Smartness" may be a desirable attribute of the brain,
but it doesn't lead us to philosophical wisdom. Its only function is
dealing with the complexities of a finite world which is largely of man's
creation.
> You talk about the alternative to free will as being a state of knowing
> everything.
No. You missed the point -- an important one. I'm saying that IF man could
possess complete knowledge (which he obviously cannot) he would not be Free.
This is my attempt to turn Sartre's "dreadful freedom" into a "divine gift".
As stated in my Postscript: It vindicates the inaccessibility of Absolute
Truth as consistent with the principle of Individual Freedom.
I like the way your mind works, Chris; but I'm afraid we're working in
opposite directions. Appreciate the thoughtful response anyway.
Essentially yours,
Ham
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Aug 21 2004 - 06:15:32 BST