From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sun Aug 22 2004 - 08:32:32 BST
Ham Priday to Chris, Platt, et al, Sunday, Aug. 21
Re: Non-empiricist definition of DQ
Chris Phoenix wrote:
> Despite my flirting with physics above, I think I'm talking about a
> metaphysics, not a physics. And think the deepest questions of free will
> should be answerable by physics.
Ham asked:
> Why physics? Because your reality is a world governed by physical
> principles.
Chris answered:
> Say rather "a world governed by principles." A world where things are
> consistent. Where miracles, in the sense of violations of the governing
> principles, don't happen. And physics is the attempt to learn the
> lowest-level of those principles, so "physical principles" is correct in
> a reductionist sense.
Life itself is a miracle, Chris. Your belief system is no more than the
objectivist
view of Science. I see philosophy, and particularly metaphysics, as a quest
for reality beyond the empirical observation of physical objects.
Chris continued:
To me, metaphysics is at the opposite end of the scale. It's looking
for the very highest-level "organizing" principles. And it's looking in
a strange place: symbolic manipulation informed by human experience.
This means it runs a serious risk of navel-contemplation, of telling
just-so stories, of supporting preconceived notions--in short, all the
ills that mind is heir to. So I like to try to compare it to reality,
You have in effect said that metaphysics is a fantasy which is answerable
to "your reality" (the objective data of experience). This is not a
philosophy. It's the mindset of the objectivist and is closed to any
concept of reality beyond empirical proof.
> Don't read too much purpose into nanotechnology. I think it's more
> accurate to think of it as just an extension of technology: trying to
> extend human control into more aspects of physics and matter. Lots of
> people see lots of possibilities here, for extending old patterns into
> new areas (which, I'm coming to think, is dangerous if those "new" areas
> are actually existing levels which are foundational for people); or more
> rarely, for creating genuinely new patterns (which I still think is very
> cool and even, in Pirsig's terms, highly moral).
MOQers take note! Chris has adopted your terms for an explanation of
nanotechnology. Maybe the unsolved riddle of DQ is that it's really
technology!
Our discussion then turned to the question of Free Will. Ham said:
> The notion that everything is theoretically determinable by its antecedant
> causes means that man, whether he knows it or not, is not a free creature.
Chris replied:
> Um, I don't think that idea is very current anymore. Frankly, I'm not
> sure free will is all that interesting. Whether or not free will exists
> has less effect on my actions than what I had for breakfast. The world
> would be the same either way. It's like arguing whether I have a soul;
> outside of a religious context, the question disappears.
> I found a paper that seems to confirm [Godel's Incompleteness Theorem].
> And if such is the case, then we (qua mathematicians) are machines that
> are unable to recognize the fact that they are machines.
Ham:
> Chris, do you really believe that man is a "machine"? (That makes you a
> mechanist, you know, and only confirms my suspicions about
> nanotechnology's objective.)
Chris:
> What if I believe that it simply doesn't matter whether man is a machine
> or not? What does that make me? What if I believe the question is
> undecidable? What if I say I think it's ill-posed and I'm not curious
> enough to search for the problem?
> As the saying goes: if our brains could figure out how they work they
> would have been much smarter than they are.
Ham:
> I'm sorry, Chris. "Smartness" may be a desirable attribute of the brain,
> but it doesn't lead us to philosophical wisdom. Its only function is
> dealing with the complexities of a finite world which is largely of man's
> creation.
Chris:
> We were talking about whether the brain can understand how it works in
> detail. Not about philosophical wisdom.
Aren't we? Shouldn't we be?
Later, Ham said:
> I'm saying that IF man could possess complete knowledge (which he
> obviously cannot) he would not be Free.
Chris replied:
> OK, that's a good point. I'm curious: Does that mean that an omniscient
> God isn't free? (Note I'm not asking whether you believe in God; that's
> a separate question.)
That depends on how you define God. I don't use the term "omniscience"
because it assumes a knowledge of all things, which is not my conception of
the Creator (Essence). "Things" are differentiated phenomena experienced in
time and space. Such experience is the empirical perspective of the finite
mind and does not apply to Essence which transcends finite existence.
Essence is more like "the opposite of nothingness", and, like all absolutes,
is incomprehensible to man. In theory, however, Essence may be considered
Free, inasmuch as it is the perfect embodiment of Value.
Since others will be reading this, I think I may have come up with a simple
way to express the central idea of Essentialism. But it won't work unless
you are willing to forget -- at least for now -- any preconceptions you may
have about Quality and subject/object metaphysics.. Are you with me?
The essence of reality may be understood as either objective (i.e.,
insensible) or subjective (i.e., experiential). If it is insensible, your
sensibility is excluded and reality is a meaningless "other" to you. If it
is experiential -- that is to say, "derived from your experience" -- your
sensibility is innate to it, giving meaning to your life-experience. Unlike
the positivists who reject subjectivity, I have opted for a "subjective"
essence to which man is linked by his sense of its Value. (Note that my use
of "subjective" here does not mean that objects don't exist, but rather that
their existence is a construct of subjective experience. In other words,
EVERYTHING is subjective.)
In short, Essentialism is a philosophy in which Value my be viewed as the
essence of man's reality. The "morality" of this philosophy is implicit in
its teleology. Since the finite mind is incapable of an absolute
comprehension of Essence but can sense its Value, man is "free" to seek out,
nurture, and ultimately "reunite" with those values that uniquely define his
essence.
Can this philosophy be "appended to" or integrated within the MOQ as its
metaphysical core? At this point, I don't know. But it would certainly be
a fascinating, and I think worthwhile, project.
What do you all think?
Essentially yours,
Ham
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