Re: MD Gardner on Pragmatism

From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Jan 14 2003 - 16:28:08 GMT

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    Glenn,

    Gardner has an interesting attack on pragmatism. To balance the piece on
    Gardner, I offer this pragmatist response. Like Platt, I think he's
    misunderstood what "correspondence with reality" is supposed to cash out
    to. If its just "observations," or "empirical evidence," then naturally
    all pragmatists are on board. However, the highly sophisticated
    philosophical duel is not about empirical testing and here is where I think
    Gardner has misinterpreted James. When James says, "It becomes true, is
    *made* true by events," he's making the point, in contemporary
    philosophical parlance, that "truth" is a property of sentences and, rather
    than discovering the Truth of what the world is really like, we have a
    belief we haven't decided on, we take in some oberservations, and then we
    make the belief true, or we discard the belief.

    So, yeah, in a trivial sense we all are pragmatists, and that's exactly the
    point. Pragmatists want us to discard the entire notion that there is
    anything philosophically interesting about "correspondence with the world"
    that will eventually lead us to "Truth." And that's why they want us to
    trade in our "dicovering" metaphors for "making" metaphors. If we
    "discover" truth, then that implies truth is "out there" just waiting for
    us to attain it. The world's already decided what's true, we just have to
    find out. If we "make" truths, then that implies that truth is a property
    of our beliefs. All we need then are suitable causes or reasons for
    changing the status of those beliefs (like experimentation).

    One of Gardner's last statements is why I think he's recontextualizing to
    make it look like James is on his side (which is entirely possible, James
    was notoriously wish-washy; a good biography of all the early pragmatists
    that I recommend is The Metaphysical Club by Louis Menand): "The notion
    that a statement can have an absolute, timeless correspondence with the
    world, whether verified or not, is too useful a notion." This is at the
    very bottom of the realist v. pragmatist debate. The realist says that he
    finds use in the notion of absolute, timeless correspondence, but every
    time the pragmatist asks he finds the answer less than suitable. The
    pragmatist not only can't find any use out of it, he can't even understand
    what "correspondence to the world" is supposed to mean, in something other
    than its trivial sense. Gardner wants to cast doubt on contemporary
    pragmatism by showing that James wouldn't have even followed it. The
    pragmatists, on the other hand, want to update the Founding Father
    Pragmatists to a changed intellectual landscape (an idea taken from Dewey).

    Matt

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