From: Erin N. (enoonan@kent.edu)
Date: Tue Jan 14 2003 - 17:24:42 GMT
>===== Original Message From moq_discuss@moq.org =====
>Erin,
>
>>So truth is determined by majority vote?
>
>Not you, too? ;-)
>
>No, truth is not determined by majority vote.
I'm just trying to figure out if I like this idea
that knowledge is determined by majority opinion (did I say that right?).
You can have a consensus of opinion that the earth is flat in one
era and a consensus of opinion that the earth is round in another era.
Saying knowledge is consensus is equating these when one
seems closer to the concept of knowledge.
Practically I really am concerned about the politics in
academia. It seems this enourages resistance to original
thinking (although I understand that it allows it).
>Erin said:
>Actually when I asked that question that wasn't exactly
>what I had intended. I was thinking more of
>folk knowledge of something (majority opinion) and
>expertise knowledge of something.
>
>Matt:
>Well, on folk knowledge I think the pragmatists would stand as a
>empiricists and traditionalists. Because we believe in the Loch Ness
>monster doesn't mean that we will be able to find the Loch Ness monster. A
>pragmatist would think that folk knowledge is knowledge that might not be
>useful. The urging for things to fall under expertise is the urge to
>demystify the folk knowledge so it falls under some of our more
>conventional categories of use: logical consistency, agreement with
>experience, economy of explanation. If the community of Loch Ness all
>believe in the monster, then sure, its true for that community of
>language-users. However, because that belief fails in some of our more
>conventional requirements, and doesn't have much use for people living
>outside of Loch Ness, we feel safe in not believing it. Believers in the
>Loch Ness monster may have some use in believing in her, however, so it may
>be good for them to hold on to the belief in spite of our continued failure
>in finding her.
>
>Is that what you were asking?
>
>Matt
Well I was thinking when an emprical study has results
that show counterintuitive findings that conflict with
a widely accepted folk belief.
I am trying to think of an example.........hmmmm....
okay I am not sure if this works because both are
intuitive in this example..
I remember a teacher saying that cold weather has
nothing to do with why you get a cold. The reason
you get more colds in winter is about being indoors
more and the germ/air circulation whatnot is the real
dealio.
Doesn't folk knowledge say to keep bundled up in
winter so you don't catch a cold..
but the empirical study saying its not about temperature?
I am sorry if I am screwing up the truth about
how you get a cold but this idea of it not
being about temperature was given in a class
about research methods.
To this day I still think temperature matters.
I think temperature can affect your immune system
in some way. And it being cold out is very consistent with
experience, logical consistency, etc.
I don't know, I think I am rambling but there
are times when folk knowledge is more consistent
with experience then a particular empirical finding.
Maybe I can come up with a better example.
erin
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