Re: MD Pirsig a nominalist?

From: David Morey (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Wed Sep 01 2004 - 18:54:53 BST

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    Scott:
    Pirsig's attitude toward intellect derives from nominalism and
    the empirical tradition

    DM: no, Pirsig does not start with the particular,
    he starts with holistic quality, and then applies
    SQ/DQ to start understanding experience,
    could you have any more universal concepts?

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott Roberts" < >
    To: < >
    Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 5:07 PM
    Subject: RE: MD Plotinus, Pirsig and Wilber

    > DMB et al,
    >
    > > dmb answers:
    > > I can see how a person can conclude that Pirsig and Plotinus are at
    odds,
    > > but would again insist that this conclusion is based on a misreading of
    > the
    > > terms. As F.S.C. Northrop put it, "The philosophically important thing
    > about
    > > any common-sense term as it enters into any philosophical theory is not
    > its
    > > bare dictionary meaning, but the particular contextual meaning usually
    > > unique to the philosophical system in question." And actually the quote
    > > you've provided shows that Plotinus is using words like "thought" and
    > > "intellect" in a way that is completely different from Pirsig.
    >
    > [Scott:] Of course they are, because for Plotinus thought was something
    > primordial, while for Pirsig thought was something derived. And that is
    the
    > big difference between the two. For they are not talking about two
    > different things, like apples versus marriages, but both are referring to
    > thinking. One calls our thinking a finite, temporal shadow of a divine
    > thinking that exists outisde of time, while the other calls our thinking a
    > static pattern of values created in time. Hence Plotinus can call life a
    > form of thought, but Pirsig cannot, since for Pirsig life preceded
    thought.
    > Hence Borchert is misinterpreting Plotinus by replacing "Reason-Principle"
    > with "Creative Spirit". The latter could be anything (like DQ or God),
    > while the former specifically ties creativity with reason. This is
    > impossible in Pirsig's metaphysics, so the two systems (Plotinus's and
    > Pirsig's) are not different menus of the same underlying realities. The
    two
    > systems point to two different realities.
    >
    > But notice
    > > how Plotinus is saying there are different levels of thought, namely
    > > vegetative, sensitive and psychic. In Pirsig's terms, he's talking about
    > the
    > > levels of static patterns, an evolutionary hierarchy, not just
    > intellectual
    > > patterns. Again, as Borchet puts it, "Plotinus did not have this
    > terminolgy
    > > at his disposal".
    >
    > [Scott:] True, that Plotinus did not this terminology, but this
    terminology
    > is used to present a different metaphysics than Plotinus's, not the same
    in
    > different terms. Both Pirsig and Whitehead operated in reaction to SOM,
    and
    > in compliance with the evolutionary mindset developed in the 19th century,
    > while Plotinus did not. The fact that both Pirsig and Plotinus thought in
    > terms of levels is of secondary importance to the difference that Plotinus
    > thought of time as an unfolding of eternity while Pirsig (and Whitehead)
    > treat time as basic. This means that for Plotinus, the "superior" level
    > comes ontologically before the "inferior", while for Pirsig and Whitehead
    > it comes after. For Pirsig and Whitehead, the present moment is the point
    > at which something (DQ for Pirsig, God for Whitehead) makes something new
    > out of past stuff. For Plotinus (and all pre-modern philosophers in the
    > Platonic tradition) the present is more of a finite window into the
    > non-temporal reality.
    >
    > But notice how Plotinus says "every life is some form of
    > > thought." In Pirsigian terms, I think he's saying that each level of
    > reality
    > > is a form of consciousness so that even subatomic particales can express
    a
    > > preference or a chair is a moral order. When we look through the terms
    as
    > if
    > > they were transparent and see the ideas they are meant to depict, we
    then
    > > see that Pirsig and Plotinus share the same vision of reality.
    >
    > [Scott: ]Their visions of reality are very different. See above.
    >
    > >
    > > Scott also said:
    > > I think Borchert and Wilber, based on the quotes you gave, wish to make
    > > Plotinus fit the modern ideas people have of mysticism, which are
    > > unfortunately shared by Pirsig. They are, I think, trying to
    disassociate
    > > mysticism from philosophy and theology,.. ...Now the modern mystical
    > > interpreter wishes to re-endow nature with something God-like, which is
    > > legitimate, but having forgotten, or misinterpreted the ancients (as I
    > > think Borchert is doing -- notice the use of the phrase "creative
    Spirit"
    > > and not "Intellect" or "Reason-Principle"), can think only of something
    > > "undifferentiated" or "pre-intellectual" behind it all.
    > >
    > > dmb replies:
    > > Hmmm. Its not at all clear what you're trying to say here, but let me
    > make a
    > > few points about the modern, or rather post-modern, interpreters of
    > > mysticism, particularly Pirsig and Wilber, who say essentially the same
    > > thing. Both of them attack modernity's scientific materialism for the
    same
    > > reasons, at least two of which are addressed and corrected by adopting
    and
    > > integrating the perennial philosophy. As sketched out above, the first
    > task
    > > is to correct modernity's view that intellect is disconnected to the
    rest
    > of
    > > reality, that it was born without parents, as Pirsig puts it. The MOQ's
    > > solution is to show that the intellectual levels has a "matter-of-fact
    > > evolutionary relationship" with its parent and the rest of static
    reality.
    > > This view already existed in the perennial philosophy and in all the
    world
    > > great religions.
    >
    > [Scott:] No. Pirsig's attitude toward intellect derives from nominalism
    and
    > the empirical tradition, that is, only in the last 500 years or so. The
    > idea of placing intellect within an evolutionary relationship is only
    about
    > 150 years old. Not part of the perennial philosophy at all. Before the
    > modern period, change was considered regressive, a descent from the Golden
    > Age. The physical was an inferior copy made from the intellectual.
    >
    > This is where the levels come into it, in Plotinus, in
    > > Wilber and in Pirsig. The other major problem with modernity's
    > materialism,
    > > which Pirsig call SOM and Wilber calls flatland, is that it denies the
    > > validity of mystical experience as anything more than a merely
    subjective
    > > hallucination. Both of them integrate the perennial philosophy's
    mysticism
    > > by expanding the idea of empiricism and including the mystical
    experience
    > as
    > > a valid experience. Wilber's approach can even be called psychological
    and
    > > is based on heaps and heaps of scientific data, and yet it recognizes
    the
    > > validity of mysticism. And as I understand it, neither of them have done
    > > anything to misinterpret the ancients, but are in fact correcting the
    > > misinterpretations committed by scientific materialism, which has
    > basically
    > > thrown out the wisdom of the ages. Their idea was to rid the world of
    > > irrational superstitions and such, and this is a very good thing in
    light
    > of
    > > the Inquistions and holy wars and such, but they created a spiritually
    > > empty, soulless world in the process. Guys like Wilber and Pirsig are
    > trying
    > > to fix that in a way that does not revert to bible-babble or other
    social
    > > level stuff.
    >
    > [Scott:] Yes, the re-acknowledging of the mystical is a Good Thing, but
    > that is not the question here, which was: is Pirsig's philosophy more like
    > Plotinus, the Tao, or Whitehead? I don't know enough about the Tao as a
    > philosophical system, so I am not going to contradict Pirsig's answer to
    > the question (the Tao). So my claim is that as metaphysical systems go,
    > Pirsig is more like Whitehead than Plotinus, for the reasons given above.
    > So while one might say that both Pirsig and Plotinus are Perennial
    > Philosophers, they are very different metaphysicians.
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    >
    >
    >
    >
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