MD Semiotics, the MOQ and the "individual"

From: Arlo Bensinger (ajb102@psu.edu)
Date: Thu Sep 02 2004 - 21:32:11 BST

  • Next message: David Morey: "Re: RE; MD the individual in the MOQ"

    Greetings Ham,

    >You said:
    > > the amoeba experiences, but that is all.
    >
    >How do you know that the amoeba "experiences", or is that only a euphemism
    >for what is observed as a reaction?

    Good question. I'd say it is more a euphorism. In the MOQ, from my limited
    understanding, biological entities are (I think, by definition) able to
    "experience" or "resond to" biological (and the lower level, inorganic)
    Quality. Maybe someone with a better understanding of the MOQ can chime in
    here.

    >To me, the individual's very concept of physical reality is a
    >"representation", in that what we experience is not reality "as it really
    >is". I think what you're calling "semiotic understanding" may be what I
    >refer to as "intellection" --i.e., breaking down pure Essence into the
    >discrete "particulars" we recognize intellectually as objects and events.

    This sounds right, admitting that I don't know all the particulars of
    Essentialism, I find nothing I disagree with in this.

    >This is where I see semiotic logic interfering with metaphysical clarity.
    >If the semiotic world-view prevents us from understanding the individual as
    >an independent entity in relation to "otherness",

    I don't think it "prevents" us from seeing anything, what it does (in this
    case) is make use see that the individual is not an independent entity. Or,
    at the least, it makes us see the two (individual and "collective") are
    dialectically related, and inseparable.

    > it is contradictory to my
    >philosophy, as well as to the concpt of Individual Freedom. Individuality
    >may not be "real" in the absolute sense; but it is critical if one is to
    >regard man as a "free agent".

    It seems to be contradictory to what you are proposing, as our agency is
    structured by the socio-cultural symbolic systems through which we think.
    More radical semioticians, such as Jacques Lacan, proposes that the
    illusory "individual/collective" categorization is not even useful, but
    harmful in that it presents a powerful illusion that structures "everything
    else". I don't go so far as Lacan, in that I find the categorization useful
    (in our culture), and I see it better as a mutual, dialectic relationship.

    >Is it then your opinion that there is no "self" in the MOQ? If so, does
    >MOQ posit any reason (or meaning) for its existence, aside from advancing
    >the "betterness" of a collective society?

    Again, I don't separate "individual" and "collective", so I do not advance
    one over the other. I think they are both parts of the same. Biological
    individuals become "intellectual" **through** the social semiotic.

    I am not, as I've said, an expert on the MOQ. My understanding of it is
    that there is no purpose it terms of a divine mandate for our existence.
    But I don't know if that makes it meaningless. Again, someone else will
    need to chime in on that.

    > > >A plain English definition for "mediate" would be a good start.
    > >
    > > "To stand between". How is that?
    >
    >Again, I see "self-awareness" as the mediator standing between "experience
    >of otherness" and "nothingness".

    I'd propose that "self-awareness" is made possible through a symbolic
    system (again, primarily language). Thus, an infant is made "self-aware" by
    interactions with others and given a symbolic system to represent "self"
    and "other". A "feral child" (or wolfman, as you called it) would not be
    "self-aware" because said child would lack a way to represent the "self"
    and the "other", and would not see these categories because he/she is not
    part of a cultural "collective" that values these categories.

    > The objective world is, as Sartre put it,
    >"shot through with nothingness". In terms of objective reality, the "self"
    >is a nothing. (Eckhart also said "creatures are pure nothings".) But the
    >intellectual creature has the capacity to realize the Value of Essence,
    >thereby affirming its ultimate reality.

    The biological creature has the ability to experience Essence. The
    intellectual creature has the capacity to realize the Value of Essence
    through a social semiotic that structures and orders categorization and
    symbolic representation.

    >Do you see this philosophy in opposition to MOQ? A possible enhancement of
    >it? Or totally irreconcilable with it?
    >
    >Obviously, your answer is of particular interest to me.

    Do you mean semiotics or Essentialism? Obviously I feel semiotics is
    complimentary to the MOQ. From what I've been able to gather from your
    posts and others, is Essentialism shares similarity with the MOQ. Whether
    it is "totally irreconcilable" I couldn't say.

    Arlo

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