RE: MD Solidarity truth

From: Erin N. (enoonan@kent.edu)
Date: Wed Jan 15 2003 - 04:15:52 GMT

  • Next message: Scott R: "Re: MD Ironic Metaphysics"

    >Erin,
    >

    >
    >Since you're using colors, to help see the consequences of what pragmatist
    >is talking about, let's take your khaki couch. You see a khaki couch. If
    >100 people all came in a said that that couch was red, what would you
    >think? Could be, those 100 people are insane, they are conspiring against
    >you, playing a big joke, are all color blind, etc. But you begin to notice
    >that what you called "khaki pants" everybody else calls "red pants." You
    >notice that khaki shirts are called by everyone else "red shirts." What
    >would you think then?

    I understand there is no way to know the true color of
    the couch. You also can't be sure that all those 100
    see the same shade because they could all just agree to call the
    shade they see as red. So we all have opinions on what shade we see.
    Okay so saying the shade of the couch can't be known
    is okay to me but saying my experience isn't knowledge because I am not in the
    statistically majority does not.
    Also saying you can't know the shade is not the same as
    as whether you believe there is shade.

    >>After we take "truth" to be a property of sentences, the differences
    >between two languages strikes up the fact that, though the causal pressures
    >we feel may be from the same world, what marks and noises we call true are
    >different, depending on what set of marks and noises you are using. To
    >call a couch "khaki" as opposed to "[Japanese word]" seems arbitrary, but
    >that is only if you don't identify with any community. If you indentify
    >with an English-speaking community, "khaki" is part of your language
    >tradition and so calling your couch khaki is just what everyone in your
    >language community happens to call it.
    >
    >Matt

    But its a matter of a concept, I'm just using the English
    word to represent that concept.
    Truth is not relative to a particular language of course...
    concepts underlying the languages i'm less sure.

    There is a play I can't remember what its called dammit...
    okay I am going to screw this up because its pretty vague
    but will try it anways.

    There was a horse that ran through town

    1 townmember: it's a horse
    2 townmember: it's a horse
    3 townmember: it's a horse
    4 townmember: it's a rhino

    next day horse runs through town

    1 townmember: it's a horse
    2 townmember: it's a horse
    3 townmember: it's a rhino
    4 townmember: it's a rhino

    okay keeps going until all four say it's a rhino

    It's not useful to say knowledge is a consensus of
    opinion because the trend in this instance is away
    from knowledge.
    I'm with you on knowledge is an opinion but
    saying knowledge = consensus of opinion
    is promoting an approach to this entity of
    looking at the statistic of what others say
    rather then looking at the thing yourself.
    The terms "horse" and "rhino" are arbitrary but
    is the concept of horse arbitry from the concept
    of a rhino? There is no point to ANY communication pragmatic or otherwise
    without the belief that the entity is a particular essence.
    Our concepts are personal essences of that essence.
    The terms we use to describe our concepts we can share
    with others but that doesn't mean our concepts are the same.
    We can recognize the possibility that some people concepts can be closer
    approximations to that essence even though there is no
    way to measure whose is closer.

    Erin

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