From: Scott Roberts (jse885@earthlink.net)
Date: Fri Sep 10 2004 - 19:49:13 BST
David M,
[DM:]> I wonder if your view here of priority of the universal
> is conceptually reducing the reality of DQ's creativity.
> It is right from a phenomenal/experience point of view
> but ontologically? If a new event occurs it could be unique
> and simply flux, if it repeats it moves towards the possibility
> of expressing a universal, it surely has to raise itself out of
> the flux persistently to start to look like it will repeat
> enough to be a universal and not an accidental repeat.
> I think it is plausible/likely that when a universal emerges
> that it is doing so via a cumulative influence from previous
> events that later events are being influenced by. Given this
> approach every universal originates with a genetic (not DNA)
> particular/unique prototype to be foolowed by non-unique events
> after that. What problems would you have with this?
>
That it doesn't work, in that it assumes a world of particulars from which
a world of universals comes into being. But one can't get here (concepts)
from there. How can the fact of repeating be noticed at all? Indeed, how
can the new event be noticed at all? Where is the memory needed to match
events as being of a pattern? The "Ultimate", as in how Geoffrey Read uses
the term -- as described on the web site, but contrary to what he says, has
to be both universal and particular, or rather, encapsulate both of them in
contradictory identity. Or, as Peirce says, thirdness (that is, semiotic
phenomena: sign + referenced object + interpretant) are irreducible into
seconds, which would be your new event.
- Scott
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