From: Scott Roberts (jse885@earthlink.net)
Date: Wed Sep 22 2004 - 04:20:48 BST
DMB et al,
> Scott Roberts said:
> First, let me recap. The MOQ, it is true, puts Quality between and over the
> traditional division between mind and matter. That is good. What I am
> trying to convince people of is that the word Intellect should also be put
> in that spot, not to displace Quality, but to equate the two. The MOQ,
> however, makes a big deal of restricting intellect to humans, and considers
> it as a hindrance to achieving "pure experience". That I reject. It is the
> case that for most people most of the time, intellect is monkey mind, and
> that is bad, but the fix to that is to train and discipline the intellect,
> not to put it to sleep. And I've referred to various mystics, like
> Nagarjuna, Shankara, Nicholas of Cusa, and Franklin Merrell-Wolff to back
> me up.
>
> dmb replies:
> I'm trying to make the case that equating Intellect (the 4th level of static
> quality) and Quality (I suppose you mean Dynamic Quality) is incorrect and
> confusing.
[Scott:] No, I meant Quality. Quality is a name for the ground of
everything, etc. So is Intellect. One can also divide Intellect into
Dynamic Intellect (creative thinking) and Static Intellect (ideas already
thought). The reason for the confusion is that SOM has as part of its
baggage nominalism, the idea that ideas only exist in humans. It is that
SOM assumption that I am trying to overcome.
[DMB:]> There are good reasons for making a distinction between the two.
> Its not that Pirsig makes a big deal out of restricting intellect to
humans,
> its that Pirsig makes a big deal out of the KIND of intelligence that is
> unique to humans becasue it is the most advanced form of static quality.
In
> an evolutionary metaphysics, that's a big deal. And I don't think Pirsig
is
> making a case that we abandon the intellect, that's the mistake the
hippies
> made, the Zen Beats and such and Pirsig warns againsts that as a form of
> degeneracy. And in fact putting the mind to sleep IS A FORM OF MENTAL
> DISCIPLINE that goes BEYOND intellect, where "pure experience" can occur.
On
> this point, I think you've rejected a position that Pirsig does not hold.
I agree that recognizing human intellect as a fourth level of value is a
big deal. In fact, I think it is an even bigger deal, since intellect
contains within itself the dynamic/static business. It therefore gives us
an empirical source for better understanding the DQ/SQ split.
Basically, I don't think that "pure experience" is a useful metaphysical
concept. All experience involves something or other. In any case, Pirsig
treats intellect as covering up "pure experience" (as in the hot stove
example), ignoring that intellect can also be as pure as any other
experience, as in Poincare's aha! moments. On the other hand, if it is
referring to the mystic's experience of absence of all SQ, then it is
ignoring the greater mystical achievement, of Realizing that nirvana is
samsara.
>
> Scott said: You ..have not pointed out the flaw in my reasoning, that a
> "static pattern of value", to be valuable, needs to be appreciated as a
> pattern, and that means treating it *as* a pattern, a universal. If it is
> just a particular, then it cannot be changed, or valued, except insofar
> that it indicates the universal pattern of which it is particular, which
> (the pattern) can be changed.
>
> dmb replies:
> I think its quite a stretch to call that "reasoning". But seriously,
you've
> changed the meaning of the term "static pattern" so that reality has been
> completely cleansed of particulars. Poof. They no longer exist. The
keyboard
> I type upon presently has been transformed into an abstract entity called
> "keyboardness"? That bagel I had for breakfast didn't fill my belly
becasue
> it was really a changless Platonic Form. (Changeless things are really
hard
> on my digestive system.) I don't mean to be silly, but the implications of
> you re-definition lead to all kinds of absurdities.
[Scott:] I did not say that particulars are not real. I said that static
patterns of value are not particulars. Your keyboard has no value except
for its ability to get your words into your computer. That ability is a
universal. Your bagel has no value to you except for its ability to nourish
you and excite your taste buds. Another bagel would do as well. Static
*quality* is determined by universals. Particulars do have value, but only
insofar as they carry out some idea. If they are not carrying out the idea
which they manifest, they are junk (although they may have value for
carrying out some other idea, using your broken keyboard as a paperweight,
for example).
[DMB:]> But more than that, as I
> tried to explain, the distinction between universals and particulars is
the
> distinction between subjects and objects in disguise and the debates that
it
> generates tend to disappear in the MOQ because the MOQ is such a thorough
> attack on the metaphysical primacy of subjects and objects. And finally, I
> can't see how that last sentence makes any sense.
[Scott:] Well, if you don't accept that universals (or ideas) exist outside
humans, that is, if you are a nominalist, then, yes, the distinction
between universals and particulars may be the S/O distinction in disguise.
But, of course, I am trying to argue against nominalism. That last sentence
of mine was awkward, but I hope the keyboard and bagel examples explain
what I meant. A particular manifests a universal. But once it exists, it
cannot be changed. Improvement happens by changing the universal.
Typewriters got replaced with word processors because the latter has more
functionality than the former. Fleas are better than rocks because fleas
can partially defy gravity (a universal -- a particular rock falling to the
ground is a particular manifesting gravity). The value is not a muscle, but
what muscles can do, like defy gravity. Change works with universals, not
particulars.
>
> Scott said:
> .........................Having the social bridge is important for its
> moral arguments, but it is not sufficient to explain the apparent
> difference between our thinking and our perception, of why S/O should have
> arisen in the first place. Lila does not go into this, since it is about
> morality, so my criticism is that if one does go into problems of mind and
> matter, the metaphysical basis laid by the MOQ is inadequate. It needs to
> see that there is an essential difference between the fourth level and the
> other three levels, which is that the fourth level can reflect on itself,
> while the other levels, if a cosmic Intellect is ignored, cannot. So how
> did the ability to reflect come into existence? Well, simple, let us not
> ignore cosmic Intellect. But the MOQ does ignore it.
>
> dmb replies:
> Sorry dude, but you're just plain wrong. Its all in there. If you've read
> the book several times and still insist that it is not, then I hardly know
> what to tell you. The cosmic intelligence you say he ignores, that's
called
> Dynamic Quality.
Nowhere does he say that DQ is intelligent. Instead, he calls it
pre-intellectual.
[DMB:] Where SOM comes from in the first place? Well, if Pirsig's
> exploration of that development from the pre-Socratic sophists to the
> present and his explanation of it as a flaw in the process of giving birth
> to a new level of reality isn't enough for you, then I don't know what
else
> to tell you.
[Scott:] The unanswered question was where does the S/O distinction come
from , not SOM. SOM is a product of human intellect. The S/O distinction is
what makes human intellect possible. My question is: how did reflecting on
SQ get started? The MOQ only says it just happened (DQ created it,
presumably). I say it can't just happen, that it must be aboriginal, but
only started in humans a couple of millenia ago. (Note: when I refer to the
S/O distinction, I am using S and O in the sense of definition #5, not #1.
See below).
[DMB:] And its not that the MOQ is inadequate for a discussing of mind
> and matter, but rather the MOQ shows that these are SOM-based problems and
> not real questions. The difference between perceptions and thoughts is so
> simple in the MOQ that one is almost underwhelmed by it.
[Scott:] I came to philosophy as a student of computer and cognitive
science, and was confronted by the question of whether or not a computer
could be conscious. I didn't think it could be, but couldn't specify why.
People can do things, like identify a pattern from a bunch of particulars.
They turn photons into color and air vibrations into sound. How? Most of
all, people are aware of things, and can reflect on them. Why can't a
computer?
The MOQ's partial answer to this is to reject the materialism that forces a
belief that human abilities are reproducible in silicon. But that is only a
partial answer, for it still doesn't provide what it is that is different
between a human and a computer. The MOQ keeps the assumption that intellect
developed in time from a universe without intellect. Ok, there is something
called DQ that can do it all. But that is no more helpful than saying God
did it all unless DQ is also Dynamic Intellect, that is, if the
universal/particular distinction is present at all levels. For that is what
intellect does: finds patterns, reflects on them, and makes better ones.
(Of course cosmic intellect wouldn't have to find patterns, since it
created all of them.) Pirsig explictly calls DQ "pre-intellectual". So if
DQ is a "cosmic intelligence" then it is a pre-intellectual intelligence.
So now who is being confusing?
In the preceding paragraph I snuck in the "universal/particular
distinction" as a mark of any intellect, human or cosmic. The human case, I
assume, is not disputed. To justify it on a cosmic level, see above:
particulars in all cases (inorganic, etc.) manifest universals (or are
detritus), and those universals (like gravity, or sexual reproduction)
exist with or without humans.
[DMB:] Perceptions are
> sensory experience or biological quality, while thoughts are mental
> experience or intellectual quality. Both are experienced. Both are
empirical
> and both are real, but they are different levels of experience. Making
these
> distinctions, between different levels of static quality does not negate
the
> cosmic intelligence, but instead demonstrates and manifests this cosmic
> intelligence in infinite detail, and the evolutionary levels only mark its
> progress. Exactly why and how the ability to think reflectively, and to
> comtemplate and to dream, how all that came into existence is probably
> beyond any mortal's ability to know.
[Scott:] My point is that we do not need to assume that those abilities
"came into existence" in a cosmos that didn't have them. That assumption is
called nominalism, and it arose hand in hand with SOM. Throw it out, just
as the MOQ throws out the idea that value is only something subjective in
humans. The logic for throwing nominalism out is that intellect is
irreducible, as Peirce argues. It involves what he calls thirdness: a sign
(a particular, such as the physical word), a referent (the universal it
signifies), and an interpretant (that which connects the particular to the
universal). Such a triad cannot be produced from dyads (e.g., an electron
absorbing a photon, or one billiard ball hitting another), which are
strictly particulars. (There is also a logical argument showing that space
and time are not fundamental, which makes "coming into existence" of
anything moot, but at this point that would just be a distraction.)
[DMB:] But this kind of ability is what puts
> it at the top of the heap and what distinguishes it from the rest of
> reality. Let's not spoil that by mixing it up with the mystic reality, of
> which intellect is only a subset.
[Scott:] I do not deny that intellect belongs on the top of the heap. It is
a really new thing that intellect has started operating within the physical
universe, in human beings, during the last couple of millenia. The spoiling
comes from treating intellect nominalistically so that people, especially
many with mystical inclinations, fail to appreciate it (John Beasley was a
notable example in this forum, though there have been many others). It is
our connection to godhood, not an obstacle. What obstructs are lingering
social and biological attachments. Intellect is not just analysis of
existing SQ. It also creates new SQ. It is DQ/SQ.
>
> "RTA WAS THE 'COSMIC ORDER OF THINGS'."
<snip>
[Scott:] I wonder why Pirsig, in listing various derivatives of "rt" left
out the Latin ratio, or reason.
> [Scott quoted and commented:
> Pirsig, LC #111: "The "objects" in the MOQ refer to definition 1
> ["Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
> or touch; a material thing" . Objects are biological patterns and
> inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns."
>
> So, if we accept this, we cannot speak of intellectual and social things
as
> objects of thought. So this redefinition on Pirsig's part is just silly.
> There are two meanings of "subject" in SOM. One is that which Pirsig calls
> intellectual and social SQ, the collection of thoughts, ideas, feelings,
> etc.. The other is that which perceives an object, or thinks about an
> object, and so forth (subject as implied in definition 5 [4 in the text]).
> The MOQ only dissolves the mind/matter distinction according to the first
> meaning. It does not dissolve the second. It just makes it unsayable.
>
> dmb says:
> Pirsig's attack on SOM is one thing, the confusion caused by our
linguistic
> customs is another and I think you're confusing the two. In any case, the
> MOQ doesn't deny that an idea can be subjected to scrutiny or become the
> object of discussion. In factg, that's about all Pirsig ever does. This
> particular LC quote only says that physical things are to be categorized
as
> orgainic and inorganic static quality. He's just telling the reader how to
> translate the most basic of terms. How could the MOQ forbid us to "speak
of
> intellectual and social things" when Pirsig's books are almost purely
that;
> talk of social and intellectual things? These objections of your seem
> increasingly wierd. I mean, its hard for me to imagine how you could fail
to
> see this. I'll tell what, dish up a Pirsig quote that says social and
> intellectual static quality cannot be objects of thought and I'll eat my
> copy of Lila.
[Scott:] Pirsig did the confusing in this note. The text at which the note
occurs is Donny saying "'Subject' means 'knowing subject.' and 'object'
means 'known object'". Pirsig's note gives 5 definitions of 'object', of
which the 5th is "Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the
mind", and his comment is "The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1.
Objects are biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or
social patterns. The 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
It seems to me that in definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any
distinction between them is meaningless."
In other words, Pirsig is complaining that a subject in one sense of the
word (definition 1) can be an object in the different sense (definition
#5). This is silly thing to complain about, and of course as you point out,
the MOQ in fact uses the words both ways. So why not keep using the words
in both senses? The importance of doing so is that the definition #5 sense
is the essence of intellect. The MOQ correctly denies a fundamental
division of reality into subjects and objects in the #1 sense. But it
should not ignore the essential character of intellect that is expressed in
the #5 sense. It is this sense that allows one to see that intellect is
that which allows for detachment. One's social and intellectual hangups can
be treated as objects of thought, and thereby cease to be hangups.
> dmb says:
> Huh? OK, now I'm pulling my hair out. What does the static/Dynamic split
> have to do with the fact that matter cannot reflect upon itself. And who
> ever said it could? Why do you imagine that the difference between mind
and
> mattter is ignored in making this split? Again, its hard to imagine how
this
> could make any sense. I think these objections only reveal a great deal of
> confusion on your part.
[Scott:] Intellect is dynamic (in the MOQ sense of 'dynamic', i.e.,
creative). By reflecting on existing SQ it can create new SQ. The other
three levels cannot. So intellect should not be categorized as just SQ.
>
> Scott said:
> Yes, I have flip-flopped. If nominalism is the idea that
> "universals aren't real", then the MOQ is not nominalistic, and that is
> where I agreed with Paul, acknowledging that the MOQ regards universals as
> real. But if nominalism is the idea that universals only exist in humans
> (which is how Peirce defines it), then the MOQ is nominalistic.
>
> dmb says:
> Why can't universals be real AND exist only in human beings? But as I keep
> trying to explain, these debates are a symptom of SOM, where ideas have a
> dubious ontological status. This is not a problem in the MOQ, where ideas
> are as real as rocks and trees. I think the fact that you've become hung
up
> on this point only shows that you have failed to understand the problem
with
> SOM and the MOQ as a solution.
[Scott:] While I think that your inability to see the vital role of ideas
in all of nature as symptomatic of SOM. It is SOM that isolated ideas
strictly to humans. Instead, it is better to say that we understand
something in nature when we connect to the idea that the natural object
expresses (if it is a true understanding).
>
> dmb had said:
> > But this cosmic intelligence, if you will, is not to be confused with
the
> > intellectual level of static patterns, which is a much more speciific
kind
> > of intelligence.
>
> Scott replied:
> Why not "confuse" it? If our intellect is a connection to cosmic
> intelligence, that is something extremely important to know, for the
reason
> given in my opening remarks.
>
> dmb says:
> Seriously? I have to explain why its bad to confuse things?
Please don't ignore the quotes around "confuse". I meant: let us not
separate completely our intellect with cosmic intellect. Human intellect is
cosmic intellect extremely muddied up with social and biological
attachments, and bad assumptions. By purifying our own intellect we recover
cosmic intellect. This will take a very long time, but the first step is to
quit talk of "going beyond" intellect.
[DMB:] Don't you think
> that Pirsig has gone to great lengths the explain the difference between
DQ
> and sq and then the differences between the various levels of sq? Don't
you
> think that one would need an exceptionally good reason to erase this basic
> distinctions? I do. The differences and distinctions give us definition
and
> meaning and that's what metaphysics is all about. Yes, they are connected.
> Pirsig also goes to great lengths to explain that...
[Scott:] The only distinction I want to correct is placing intellect solely
on the SQ side. By correcting this distinction, I believe I am making an
improved metaphysics, one more adequate to experience. Pirsig specifically
denies that there was any intellect before humans (as you quoted a while
back from a source I don't have). I say he is wrong, and have given my
reasons for saying so. Also my reasons for why it matters to correct it.
Just repeating the MOQ at me does not show my reasons to be invalid.
> Scott concluded:
> Rocks, considered by themselves, are not intellectuals. But a rock is a
> particular. It points to SQ, the laws of nature, including the laws of
> rockhood, which are universals, which exist as universals whether or not
we
> know what they are. If they were not universals, there could be no Quality
> evolution, only mindless, mechanical evolution.
>
> dmb replies:
> Rocks are not intellectuals. OK, I'll agree with you there, but I fail to
> see the logic or the point of everything that follows. You seem to be
> confusing universals with particulars and then assert this is necessary to
> avoid mindless mechanical evolution. This makes no sense to me
whatsoever.
[Scott:] Well, I hope my remarks above help you understand. If all that
exists are particulars, then there is no value. Value lies in what
particulars can do, how they relate to other particulars, etc. Such
relations and functionalities are universals. Without universals, without
awareness of universals, and appreciation of how well the particulars
manifest the universals, all there is is mindless mechanism, and evolution
"just happened".
[DMB:] > I've tried to draw you out with the hope that an interesting
problem would
> be discovered in the process, but now I am pretty much convinced that your
> criticisms of the MOQ have no merit or validity, but are rather predicated
> on some fundamental misconceptions in your approach. To be perfectly
frank,
> I think you don't know what you're talking about. Unless you can provide
> some actual Pirsigisms, some actual assertions, quotes or ideas from the
> author himself, I shall find it impossible to take your objections
> seriously. So far they have all seemed quite ill-concieved, if not
downright
> fictional.
[Scott:] My disagreements with Pirsig arise from his nominalism (in
Peirce's meaning, that universals are restricted to humans). Since he just
assumes it, he does not give arguments for it, so there isn't much to
quote. I have frequently quoted his characterization of DQ as
"pre-intellectual", and have frequently brought up his view of Zen as
working to go beyond intellect, and why I disagree with it, as does the Zen
Master, Robert Aitken, as well as other mystics like Franklin Merrell-Wolff
(which is not to say that we can't go beyond where our intellect is now).
These are two cases where I think his metaphsyics has been skewed by his
nominalism. I am arguing that intellect is better thought of as being both
dynamic and static, but Pirsig does not consider that possibility, so
again, there is nothing to quote.
>
> But thanks for your time. Sincerely,
And thanks for yours,
- Scott
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