From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Wed Oct 06 2004 - 01:00:44 BST
----- Original Message -----
From: Ham Priday, Oct. 5, 2004, 7:40 PM
To: Scott, Mel, DMB, Simon, Platt, et al
Re: MD A bit of reasoning
This will be my last "unsolicited" posting on MD for reasons that I needn't
elaborate for most of you. I've had an enlightening private exchange with
Platt and had been waiting for Paul's "revised new exposition" of the MOQ ,
but he has either become discouraged or found better things to do. In the
month that has passed since he announced he was taking time out for this
project, the daily postings have run their expected course, offering
personal interpretations of various enigmatic statements from the Good
Book -- including the author's recommended "mystery" website which has
apparently introduced still more puzzles to ponder!
The forum has lately narrowed to metaphysical issues concerning the Fourth
Level of SQ, or what most of us commoners better understand as the nature
and derivation of Intellect. Although Intellect is universally defined as
the capacity for knowledge or rational thought, it is clear that the MOQ
holds a much broader definition that embraces consciousness, cognizant
sensibility, and will. Confusion still abounds, as is evident from this
recent exchange between Mel and Scott.
[Scott:]
The issue is whether Intellect is there in inorganic and
biological levels. I don't understand "Intellect is evolutionary a
process" with respect to this question. Also, I would think that to call
Quality an attribute is non-MOQ. What is it an attribute of?
>
[Mel:]
Think of quality as an attribute of being
As I understand MoQ, there is no intellect
in the physical or biological, but rather
the physical and biological are in the
intellect or maybe more correctly they
are foundations for intellect.
>
[Scott:]
I don't think that Pirsig would approve of saying that Quality is
an attribute of being. I think he would say that being is a product of
Quality. The rest of what you say is, I believe, MOQ's position (but not
mine).
>
I'd like to make a few final points about our differences that I think most
philosophers would agree on. They are interspersed in the quotes of Mel and
Scott and are offered in the spirit of clarification rather than to pedal my
own metaphysical thesis.
1. Reality is the unitary Whole experienced differentially. Existence and
everything perceived in it is finitely differentiated. That includes
substantive things, properties and attributes, numerality and
spatio-temperal dimensions, and consciousness itself.
2. What we call Quality is a comparative attribute that presupposes a
self/other dualism (SOM). [Thus, Mel is right in suggesting that Quality is
an attribute of being; but as being is an intellectual creation of man, this
concept
denies Quality the godhead status MOQ's author would like it to have. On
the other hand, if, as Scott suggests, Pirsig were to define being as a
"product of Quality" it would make no sense in any philosophical context.]
[Scott to mel:]
You are correct, my treatment of intellect is outside of MOQ. I
have tried to be clear about that.
> What I should ask is, why you are considering
> Intellect a pre-existing condition or attribute?
> This is intriguing.
[Scott:]
> Because I consider intellect to be irreducible, that is, it is not
> something that can be developed from a universe that did not contain it.
> Instead, I agree with those pre-SOM philosophies that regarded human
> intellect as a degraded and limited form of divine intellect, which latter
> is what drives the evolutionary process. (There are, to be sure, huge
> adjustments that need to be made to the pre-SOM philosophies, not least of
> which is to include evolution, but also to avoid an overly-theistic
> picture.)
I don't know what Scott considers "overly theistic", except in the sense of
"political correctness'' to which philosophy should never have to stoop.
However, he is correct in his conception of the intellect as irreducible.
But it is also individual:
3. Intellect does not exist as a property of inorganic matter or as a
component of a "collective conscience". It is a co-function of
consciousness
and the brain, and is proprietary to the individuated self.
4. Consciousness (i.e., conscious awareness) is the subject of all
experience, without which objective reality would not exist. Using the
brain
to codify experience, consciousness is the mediator between organic
sensibility and
Value.
5. Value, like Quality, is comparative and presupposes dualism. However,
while Quality can be applied only to known (empirical) entities or events,
Value can be attributed to the "unknowable" as well. Webster's Collegiate
defines Value as "something intrinsically valuable or desirable (ex: sought
material values instead of human values)". Thus, we can logically speak of
such incomprehensible or desideristic concepts as Peace, Beauty,
Contentment, Generosity, Wisdom, Freedom, Fulfillment, Infinitude, God and
Eternity as having Value, whereas it would be awkward, if not ludicrous, to
apply the word Quality to them.
[This may explain why Pirsig uses the term Value only in relation to DQ,
generally using Quality for all other references. It is also why Quality is
meaningless as a descriptive term for Primary Source, whereas Value is
eminently well suited; e.g., Essence Value. In the language of Shakespeare,
it was poetic license to say "the quality of mercy is not strained". In the
language of contemporary philosophy, the Quality of Pirsig most certainly
is.]
6. The division of existential reality that MOQ purportedly resolves through
the use of Quality patterns is a muddled concept. Since physical reality
is differentiated, the premise Quality = reality implies that Quality is
everything,
which may be pantheism but is definitely not monism. Substitution
of Value for Quality doesn't solve the problem. Subject/object dualism can
only be resolved by positing an uncreated primary source that transcends
existence. This Mr. Pirsig and his acolytes refuse to do.
7. If existence is explained as the differentiated mode of an unconditional
source [Essence], there is no need to "hybridize" Intellect, Man, or
Evolution by setting up levels or patterns to represent their SQ/DQ
complements, and then have to speculate as to precisely where the divide
occurs..
[Scott prev:]
The MOQ says that I am a set of inorganic, biological, social, and
intellectual SQ, capable of responding to DQ. I disagree with this
definition, preferring to think of myself as a locus of DQ/SQ interaction.
[Simon asked:]
What's the difference?
[Scott answered:]
The difference is that I consider the Dynamic to be a part of me, and not
external to me.
Scott's reply to Simon expresses the *sine qua non* of Essentialism -- the
principle of an immanent source. Here is the real flaw in the SOM
perspective which Mr. Pirsig and all of us are battling. You could win this
battle by freeing yourselves from the notion that your philosophy must have
an empirical basis. The empiricist sees all reality as otherness, thereby
excluding man. Unless the essence of man has a "commonality" with the
Source, both reality and man's existence are meaningless, as are all
attempts to define man as a valid metaphysical entity. Value provides that
commonality; it is man's link to Essence. As Scott says, the individual is
"the locus of this [Value] interaction".
Reality is anthropocentric in the sense that it is man's valuistic
perspective of the Creator. This concept is totally lacking in MOQ. I
think Scott realizes this and is working his way toward Essentialism. But
there is a major impediment standing in his way: the Pirsigian notion that
reality cannot be "subjective" because it connotes "unreal". He says.
> Pirsig rejects the "just subjective" since he regards ideas as
> being as real as rocks and trees. But he accepts that ideas are
"restricted
> to humans", that universals (which are ideas) are only third and fourth
> level SQ. So if he rejects nominalism according to one definition, but
> accepts it according to another, the two definitions must be different,
no?
Whatever repugnance you feel toward "nominalism" (which, after all, is not
subjectivism) and all other labels such as "idealism" and "theism", assume
for the moment that Montague was right -- that every apprehended object is
created or constructed by the apprehender. That would make reality
"subjective", would it not? Would the reality of your experience or mine be
altered in any way if it were subjective? Would the world be any "less
real" as a consequence?
For me, reality is subjective because I am subjective. This underscores
Scott's previous assertion that "I consider the Dynamic to be a part of me,
and not external to me." There is nothing sacred about an objective
reality. To say that things are "objective" only means that they exist
"externally" to you. That is a fallacy because they don't. Existence is
the finite experience of reality which is subjective. If there were no
experience there would be no existence. Therefore, unless you deny your own
subjectivity (i.e., conscious experience), it is metaphysically impossible
for reality to be objective. Once you are struck by the truth of this
concept, you will begin to understand what it means to be an Essentialist.
Anyway, it's been fun. Peace and best wishes to all of you!
Sincerely,
Ham
>
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