From: Steve Peterson (peterson.steve@verizon.net)
Date: Sat Oct 09 2004 - 20:40:59 BST
Hi Scott,
On Oct 9, 2004, at 12:12 AM, Scott Roberts wrote:
> Steve,
>
>> I don't know anything about Peircean triads, but I can tell that you
>> are disagreeing with the most fundamental postulate of the MOQ. When
>> Pirsig was faced with the dilemma "is the quality in the subject or
>> the
>> object" he came up with a rather unique solution upon which he built
>> an
>> entire metaphysics. This discussion group is about seeing where
>> making
>> Pirsig's "Copernican inversion" takes us.
>
> And I'm saying that the Copernican inversion needs to be taken
> further. The
> treatment of intellect in the MOQ is a continuation of its treatment in
> SOM. That should be redressed. You have noted, I hope, that I agree
> that
> quality is in neither the subject nor the object.
Steve:
I've only been skimming the posts of late so I don't have a strong
grasp of your position, yet.
> It is SOM that assumes
> that intellect is only in the subject. Earlier philosophy did not, for
> the
> most part.
Steve:
The MOQ considers intellect subjective. I'm not sure what your
complaint is about the place for intellect within Pirsig's MOQ. I'm
sure you've been through this before, but would you mind summarizing
your view?
> Steve said:
> If you don't want to play,
>> fine. In the MOQ, all your talk about universals and particulars may
>> constitute high quality ideas. They just have nothing to do with the
>> MOQ. It is pointless to argue about whether Quality really does
>> precede subjects and objects. It is an intellectual postulate that
>> you
>> either find useful or not.
> Scott said:
> Since I find most of the rest of the MOQ useful (and play within its
> confines), but the bit at the end (how intellect is treated) not
> useful,
> shouldn't I see if I can patch up the beginning to see if the whole
> can be
> useful? In any case, my disagreement with the beginning is not all that
> big. It is really just digging a bit deeper into the fact that DQ must
> occur in the context of existing SQ,
Steve:
does this mean that you don't like Pirsig's DQ as the leading edge of
experience which creates sq?
> plus the observation that Quality is
> meaningless without appreciation of value.
This is the SOM assumption anyway...
> That does not mean that humans
> are the only appreciators. In fact, in the end what one gets is that
> Quality is its own appreciation. To put this all together, I suggest
> that
> what Quality divides into (conceptually) is a triad (sign, pattern, and
> interpretant), not a dyad (subject and object, or dynamic and static),
Steve:
Pirsig suggests that there are lots of ways one can create a
metaphysics of quality...
"A subject-object metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in which the
first
division of Quality-the first slice of undivided experience-is into
subjects and objects. Once you have made that slice, all of human
experience is supposed to fit into one of these two boxes. The trouble
is,
it doesn't. What he had seen is that there is a metaphysical box that
sits
above these two boxes, Quality itself. And once he'd seen this he also
saw
a huge number of ways in which Quality can be divided. Subjects and
objects are just one of the ways.
The question was, which way was best?"
To me, your way sounds the same as SOM.
>
> though it still makes sense to speak in terms of dynamic and static.
> The
> fact that the triad is the shape of meaning should make it an
> especially
> valuable idea to the MOQ.
Can you explain where the dq/sq cut fits in with your triad?
Regards,
Steve
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