From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Oct 26 2004 - 15:24:32 BST
All:
Pirsig describes faith as "a willingness to believe in falsehoods."
He also says that it's "possible for more than one set of truths to
exist."
So how does he distinguish a truth from a falsehood?
If, as he said, one should choose truth on the basis of its quality, like
choosing paintings in a gallery, then truth becomes a matter of personal
belief. And so, logically, do falsehoods.
Perhaps someone will explain this apparent contradiction. Why is faith in
what's true any different than faith in what's false?.
It's been my contention from the start of this thread that all
metaphysical premises are based on faith, that faith in God is no
different in principle than faith in the premises of science such as
materialism and reductionism, or Pirsig's faith in "logical consistency,
agreement with experience, and economy of explanation.".
Like other metaphysicians who purport to explain reality, Pirsig seems to
stumble when one examines his premises in light of some of his assertions,
such as the assertion that faith is a "willingness to believe in
falsehoods." If one's belief in a personal God is intellectually
appealing, I see no reason to claim such belief is false given Pirsig's
"paintings you like" standard of truth.
Platt
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