From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Wed Nov 10 2004 - 18:09:16 GMT
Ham Priday to Platt Holden, Scott, Mark
Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2004 1:05 PM
Subject: Re: MD Where does quality reside?
Greetings, Platt--
I see you're still fighting the good fight, and you do so with such great
gusto! (It must be your advertising background, something we have in
common.)
>
> I think the following discussion raises some issues about the MOQ that
> need further examination and discussion. Apparently Pirsig restricts the
> definition of consciousness to what comes after "the basic flux of
> experience." Example:
>
> "He thought it was probably the light that infants see when their world is
> still fresh and whole, before consciousness differentiates it into
> patterns." (Lila, 26)
This is another example of poetic license which, to my thinking, muddles the
metaphysics that its author seeks to expound. Let's analyze that bit of
prose. Is there any empirical distinction between the infants' first
experience and "the light that infants see ... before consciousness
differentiates it into patterns"? Seeing light, although intended as an
aphorism here, is experience, is it not? Surely some level of consciousness
is present in the fetus before birth. It doesn't help clarify matters by
suggesting that consciousness is a latent attribute magically imparted to
the postnatal organism. Indeed, the concept of individuality is itself an
evolutionary process of the cerebro-nervous system. Psychologists tell us
that the infant is not aware of it's individuality (selfness) until much
later in its development, usually after repeated experiences with the mother
and probably not until relationships are established with other persons in
its environment. In the existential perspective, we cannot isolate
ourselves from the spacio/temporal processes of the natural world -- even if
we happen to be philosophers.
>
> As regards "non-material consciousness," Pirsig would probably agree that
> there's no such thing. But for "pure experience,".materiality is
> irrelevant. "Pure experience cannot be called either physical or
> psychical: it logically precedes this distinction." (Lila, 29)
>
Again, your insight is right on. This quotation is a more appropriate
statement.
>
> I have always considered consciousness and experience to be
> interdependent, i.e., you can't have one without the other. I've also
> viewed the MOQ as presenting not only an evolutionary theory of values but
> also an evolutionary theory of experience because to Pirsig, values and
> experience are the same: "Quality is direct experience" (Lila, 5). If
> consciousness is considered direct experience and direct experience is
> Quality, then a Metaphysics of Consciousness is what Pirsig proposes.
>
I couldn't phrase it any better. In this same context, I have lately come
to the conclusion that the split between finite existence and its
undifferentiated Source is immutable. Any attempt to intellectualize this
phenomenon as either wholly biological or wholly spiritual amounts to "fuzzy
logic". The two "modalities" are irreconcilable from the existential
viewpoint. I don't know if this makes any sense to you, Platt, and I know
that the debate will go on interminably, but it is my intuition that there
is an absolute principle at work here which makes it impossible to resolve
the dual/non-dual enigma in logical terms. Perhaps this explains why
Eastern philosophy continues to beckon us.
>
Thanks for another opportunity to sound off.
Essentially,
Ham
>
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