From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sun Nov 21 2004 - 21:55:55 GMT
Dear Sam,
You wrote 19 Nov 2004 16:09:07 -0000 that the issue between us is whether
theology is inseparable from religious practice (your position) or implies
(as any -ology) a distinction between thinking and practice (my position).
You express agreement with my statement:
'to the extent that theology implies instruction for rather than study of
religious practice, emotional distancing [as in science] does not seem to be
implied to me'.
O.k., let's understand 'theology' as 'instruction for religious practice'
then and return to the original issue: my objection (14 Oct 2004 10:14:54
+0200) to Scott's quote (and your agreement with it):
"What I find annoying are critics of religion who have not studied it. No
modern non-fundamentalist theologian is ignorant of the value of science,
but how many critics of religion are familiar with modern theology?"
I object to the implication that you have to study instructions for
religious practice to be allowed to criticize religious practice.
You continued:
'common grammar in our language ... does not mean that the two experiences
[A experiencing X and B experiencing X] are identical'.
Not not the language, but the mutual identification (to some extent) between
A and B makes them suppose identity of their experiences. Why do you suppose
that their experiences are different? Just your distinction (undoing
identification) between A and B.
My evidence that 'there are more Quakers who are former Anglicans than the
other way around [and p]robably ... even more Quakers who are also members
of the Anglican church than Anglicans who left Quakerism...' is Dutch Quaker
experience (almost all Dutch Quakers coming from other churches and
sometimes retaining a double membership and hardly any that I know of who
leave Quakerism to return to a more regular church) and a few instances I
read about of members of Britain Yearly meeting with double memberships.
You disagree again with me (only) when you write:
'I think the destruction of symbols has an impact down the other levels,
especially the biological.'
Does that deny that it is not the symbols themselves that harm lower levels?
I agree that higher level patterns of value can have a function in
stabilizing and maintaining lower level patterns of value. So
degeneracy/degradation of higher level patterns of value can 'value'
degeneracy/degradation at lower levels. That doesn't contradict my statement
(31 Oct 2004 16:59:30 +0100) 'a symbol cannot harm what it symbolizes',
however.
Your point was 'about science being incapable of physical violence'.
Break-down of science (degeneracy/degradation at the 4th level) might
'value' physical violence. Science itself can only do so to the extent that
it is understood as degenerate compared to higher quality 4th level patterns
of value or to DQ. Seems highly unlikely to me, as science is a high quality
4th level pattern of value.
You conclude with:
'I don't see "becoming competent at the third level" as being equivalent to
"having social status among fellow practitioners".'
Isn't 'social status' the core value, the essence of stability of 3rd level
patterns of value (like 'truth' or comparability of symbols and symbolized
is at the 4th level)?
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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