From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Fri Dec 17 2004 - 11:05:42 GMT
Hi Chin,
> It seems we may be a bit further apart than you thought.
What a shame!!
Chin earlier:
>If you relate mysticism to a certain philosopher, then you are denying that other philosophers are
mystic. If you
>think about it, your definition of mystic covers quite a few philosophers.
>
> Sam) Of course it does. I'm wanting to say that mysticism is a baggier,
> looser sort of word that does not correspond to a specific, definitional,
> Platonic 'essence of mysticism' - which I see as deluded, even if it has
> been accepted by various venerable authorities. I'm
> *disagreeing* with the idea that
> mysticism can be captured by any one philosopher, or school of philosophy. I
> think there are interesting resemblances between the spiritual disciplines
> of the various religions, but I don't take that to mean that they are
> necessarily describing the same thing - I think that is a simple mistake.
>
> Chin says - I agree, unless this "same thing" is the universe, known as
> Quality to Pirsig.
If we live in the same world, then there is hope for a convergence of the different traditions, as
we participate in the same conversation, and something new will then emerge from the blend. I see
the 'essence of mysticism' approach as short-circuiting that evolution in a western-biassed fashion.
> Sam) I think to be a mystic is to be more engaged with the truth of the
> world than otherwise (ie to be more open to Quality) and I think this is a
> *relative* phenomenon, which can't be understood apart from the wider
> culture.
>
> Chin says - If by "wider culture" you mean a universal world culture where
> no one is denied their religious or cultural beliefs but all are accepted,
> and even considered, or as Pirsig said dusted off to see if they benefit
> society - I love the idea of a Utopia, all people of the world tuned into
> the same Quality truths that would hold no need for DQ, but would we not go
> mad with all this happiness?
Wasn't this the point of your people in bubbles story? My point was that something can't be
described as better or worse without some sort of context or relevance to give it sense. That needs
unpacking, but roughly speaking, to say 'some things are better than others' (the core of the MoQ as
I understand it) depends upon the existence of the 'others'. In other words, what might be seen as
mystical in one era is not necessarily seen as mystical in another, if that insight or breakthrough
has been statically latched. For example, Mother Teresa is not seen as mystical in the way that
Francis of Assisi was, even though there is a clear correspondence between their activities.
Chin earlier > Your definition of mystic is fine. Do we need a better one?
>
> he he he - ask DMB ;-)
>
> Chin says - I think you carried it out too far, as opposed to leaving it
> defined in its general sense, and this is where you and he had differences.
> I fear this is where we are having ours. Maybe it just needs to be left
> defined in simple terms.
Yes, great, lets leave it simple and baggy, or even drop the word altogether. I'm wanting latitude
and room for manouevre, I'm not wanting to put it into a strait-jacket (unless it has the adjective
'Christian' placed in front of it, when I think we can be much more specific about what that
particular tradition was exploring)
> Chin says - it seems you are describing DQ as opposed to a mystical
> experience. It would be my belief that a mystical experience is not limited
> to any knowledge, or preparation, except unloading the baggage that keeps
> you from being touched by it....<snip>
I thought Pirsig identified DQ with the mystical experience? In any case, yes, I am describing DQ,
and I don't think that DQ=mystical experience in the Jamesian sense.
<snip a bit I agreed with>
> Then you have to go searching for universal (or immortal) truths to fill the
> void. Quality seems as good a word as any I have come across to help keep
> this universal connection in perspective. The metaphysics is secondary, and
> only as a way of explanation so that this Quality can be accepted, and can
> rid of this need of religious and intellectual masturbation.
Absolutely, very happy with this. What was the phrase Ian used, 'before Pirsig encased Quality in
metaphysical concrete'? It's the metaphysics that I have trouble with, not the understanding of
Quality.
> This is what I meant by Socrates was a mystic. He defined Quality before
> Pirsig, he just didn't call it anything. No divisions were needed, and none
> would be needed now if we hadn't been so intent on dividing, or defining, or
> naming it to begin with. Since Aristotle first went his separate way,
> questioning Plato, it seems we have not advanced much in philosophy. At
> least that is how I see it.
Ah. So you see the process of definition etc as coming after Socrates? I'm not so sure. I think a
good case can be made for arguing that Socrates is the source of the pursuit of definitions, and
that this was the triumph of dialectic over rhetoric, which Pirsig (correctly I think) identifies as
where it all started to go wrong.
Consider this remark of Wittgenstein's from 1931: 'People say again and again that philosophy doesn'
t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the
Greeks. But the people who say that don't understand why it has to be so. It is because our language
has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there
continues to be a verb 'to be' that looks as if it functions in the same way as 'to eat' and 'to
drink', as long as we still have the adjectives 'identical' 'true' 'false' 'possible', as long as we
continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space etc etc, people will keep stumbling over
the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems
capable of clearing up.'
Wittgenstein saw this as the outworking of the Platonic style of doing philosophy. He once said 'It
has puzzled me why Socrates is regarded as a great philosopher. Because when Socrates asks for the
meaning of a word and people give him examples of how that word is used, he isn't satisfied but
wants a unique definition. Now if someone shows me how a word is used and its different meanings,
that is just the sort of answer I want.' Or consider these remarks, the first made in 1931, the
second in 1945: 'Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of time!
What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing and clarify nothing?'; 'Socrates keeps
reducing the Sophist to silence, - but does he have right on his side when he does this? Well it is
true that the Sophist does not know what he thinks he knows; but that is no triumph for Socrates. It
can't be a case of "You see! you don't know it!" - nor yet, triumphantly, of "So none of us knows
anything".'
I expect that Wittgenstein had in mind a passage such as this one, from Socrates' first speech in
the Phaedrus: 'in every discussion there is only one way of beginning if one is to come to a sound
conclusion, and that is to know what one is discussing... Let us then begin by agreeing upon a
definition'. In the conclusion of the Phaedrus Socrates restates this: 'a man must know the truth
about any subject that he deals with; he must be able to define it.' For Wittgenstein it is this
emphasis upon definability in words which is the source of all our metaphysical illusions, illusions
which 'lie as deep in us as the forms of our language'.
So: are we agreed that the process of definitions is a bad thing, especially when it comes to
mysticism, but disagreeing on where Socrates fits? Or are we disagreeing that definitions are a bad
thing, and agreeing that Socrates wanted definitions?
Cheers
Sam
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