From: Phaedrus Wolff (PhaedrusWolff@carolina.rr.com)
Date: Mon Jan 10 2005 - 00:54:37 GMT
Hi Matt,
Let me beg forgivness of my ingorance in advance.
Just for my own curiosity, and not making a statement in either direction,
may I ask if what you are saying is that any philosophy that is inconsistent
with knowledge you already have will be rejected? -- and this philosophy
must be consistent with what most philosophers would agree upon?
Thanks,
Chin
----- Original Message -----
From: "Matt Kundert" <pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 3:10 PM
Subject: MD Reply to Paul's Notes on Sam's Essay
> Hello all,
>
> I think Sam is doing some very important work in relation to mysticism. I
> think his strides to rehabilitate the notion of mysticism sans the
> philosophically suspect concept of "experience" is much needed,
particularly
> for our interpretations of Pirsig's work. And I think his archeaology of
> the conceptual machinery at work in Pirsig's mysticism is a much needed
step
> in the right direction.
>
> Sam sent me an advance copy of his essay, for which I was very thankful.
In
> my reply to him, though, I warned Sam that the very end of his essay,
where
> he says, "Pirsig's work - probably via William James - has inherited a
> conceptual shape from Schleiermacher," despite the caveat directly before
> ("this is not to suggest a direct borrowing"), might create a misdirected
> backlash. I think that this is what we are seeing. The importance of
Sam's
> suggestive genealogy is not biographical, is not primarily concerned with
> finding the direct transference of doctrines. It was in creating a
> conceptual milieu, a large expansive background against which Pirsig grew
> out of, much like Pirsig's genealogy of SOM.
>
> Paul's dismissive denials of Pirsig's involvement with Kantian problems I
> think hinge on calling Sam out on a largely misplaced genetic fallacy.
But
> like I said, I think this misses the brunt of the suggestion. In his
essay,
> Sam largely spent his time suggesting that Pirsig has inheirited Kantian
> baggage and laying out the (very suggestive) apparatus that should look
very
> familiar to people who have read and absorbed ZMM and Lila. What Sam
didn't
> do is provide much argumentation for his suggestion. Sam was more
providing
> a "prolegomena to a future critique." This might be why Paul's reply
mainly
> consisted in denials, but this is certainly not to say that the
> argumentation does not exist. I would like to supply some of this
> argumentation, most of which I think Sam would be sympathetic with. Not
to
> tag myself in, but with Sam suffering from the flu and a "holiday"
(christ,
> how many "holidays" do you Europeans take a year? seems like you're all
> always on holiday), I would like to get the dialogue started on the right
> foot.
>
> As I've said, I think Paul's reply consisted mainly in denials of Pirsig's
> involvement in Kantian problems. To me, this all reminds me of a far off
> debate I was engaged in with DMB. DMB suggested that my critiques of
> Pirsigian mysticism (which parrallel Sam's) completely missed the boat
> because mysticism has nothing to do with epistemology. I read Paul's
reply
> as amounting to the same thing. Mysticism has nothing to do with
> epistemology, so it has nothing to do with Descartes or Kant or anything
> else like it in the West. At the time of my debate with DMB, Sam rejoined
> to DMB that, though mysticism may not be epistemology, it may have
> epistemological consequences, i.e., the _claims_ made on behalf of
mysticism
> may have epistemological status. I think this is right and I see the
> continued denials that Pirsigian philosophy runs into the problems of the
> West as denials that Pirsig has to do epistemology, as denying that he has
> to answer the skeptic. But as long as Pirsig's philosophy maintains a
> traditional metaphysical dichotomy, that between appearance and reality,
he
> has to answer the skeptic, and so is forced into the Kantian problematic.
> Naturally, the denial of having to answer the skeptic, though, is only the
> first step of denial. The second step is to then deny that Pirsig
maintains
> an appearance/reality distinction. It is these twin denials that I think
> facile and for which I will run through my long standing argument.
>
> As Sam said, this all revolves around the notion of "pure experience."
> "Pure experience," or "unmediated experience," is unintelligible without
its
> counterpart "unpure experience," or "mediated experience." The
distinction
> between unmediated and mediated experience is Pirsig's distinction between
> Dynamic and static Quality and it is also the distinction that has
> traditionally been used to describe the appearance/reality distinction. I
> have been told time and time again that this distinction is _descriptive_
> and not normative, unlike the appearance/reality distinction, and so does
> not need an epistemology. This line of defense is essentially what all
the
> other particular ones boil down to, but it will not work because Pirsig
> himself dissolves the distinction between descriptive and normative uses
by
> saying that "values are reality." He is in effect saying that all
> descriptions are normative.
>
> To see this more specifically in Pirsig's work, we should first look at
> Pirsig's description of evolution as the "migration of static patterns
> towards Dynamic Quality." (I must apologize to everyone because I will not
> be able give citations or direct quotes (I am without my materials). I
> deplore this sloppiness as much as anyone, particularly when attempting to
> do what I am trying to do, but I can only tell people to remind me to find
> particular passages I'm thinking of that you can't find and for people to
> keep their eyes open for misquotes that might have interpretive
> consequences. I'm quoting and alluding to passages from memory, so I
can't
> be postive on fidelity.) Pirsig says that the MoQ identifies the
undefined
> "betterness" inherent in evolution's description of "survival of the
> fittest" with DQ. DQ is "better" than static patterns. DQ is "more
moral"
> than static patterns. It might be replied that Pirsig's metaphysical
> apparatus is simply supplying us with interpretive categories, a set of
> glasses to see the world or a set of boxes within which we can stick stuff
> to make sense of the world. But again, this won't work as a rejoinder
> because Pirsig isn't simply supplying us with a set of neutral glasses to
> see stuff or boxes to stick stuff. Pirsig uses his metaphysical apparatus
> to _justify_ certain normative decisions. For instance, his claim that it
> is moral to kill germs because we are further along the evolutionary
track.
> In other words, our static patterns are more evolved, closer to Dynamic
> Quality, i.e., we are better than the germs.
>
> This claim that some things (like ideas, human rights, capitalism) are
> closer to Dynamic Quality, or more Dynamic, than other things _and
therefore
> better_ is the exact claim of the appearance/reality distinction. Some
> things are closer to reality than other things, which are mere apperances.
> This claim draws us into epistemology because when you say that, e.g.,
> capitalism is more Dynamic than communism, the skeptic raises his hand and
> says, "How do you know?" The traditional Pirsigian answer has been
"Because
> it's better" which amounts to "Because it is, because you just know it
when
> you experience it." But this isn't an answer, it is a refusal to answer
> because the skeptic can keep asking, "How? How? Why? Why?" To draw the
> connection between appearance/reality and static/Dynamic even tighter, I
> would point out two things. First, unmediated, pure experience is
> consistently aligned with _both_ Dynamic Quality, one half of the first
cut
> of reality, and Quality, the monistic reality that sits behind the first
> distinction. And second, that mysticism in general identifies the
mediation
> between us and reality as language. In Pirsigian philosophy, language is
a
> static pattern (of some sort) and Dynamic Quality is the "pre-intellectual
> edge of experience."
>
> This is why I think there is an appearance/reality distinction at work in
> Pirsig, the distinction that Sam is pointing to when he draws his
parrallels
> between Pirsig and Kant's phenomena/noumena distinction, and why I agree
> with Sam that Pirsig doesn't seem to escape the Kantian, SOMic
problematic.
> So this is the bulk of my argument: To deny the need to do epistemology,
> and maintain an appearance/reality distinction, is to regress to a
> pre-Cartesian "metaphysical dogmatism" where we simply assert our correct
> interpretations of the True Reality without any criteria for success. We
> need to realize that even if, for instance, Eastern mysticism developed
> independently its own notion of "pure experience," that if the work
demanded
> of a concept parrallels the work demanded of it elsewhere (or the work
> demanded of a concept is the same work demanded of another concept) that
the
> one tradition has relevant questions and innovations for the other
> tradition. And we need to realize that, whatever their faults, Descartes
> and Kant were steps _forward_ on the dialectical path that Plato began--if
> only because they brought it that much closer to its demise. Epistemology
> is the grown up version of Plato's dialectic, his method for ascertaining
> Truth. Descartes realized that if epistemology did not come first, all we
> have is dogmatic, assertive speculation. After tunneling our way from
> Descartes to Hume, Kant heroically "woke from his dogmatic slumbers" and
> realized the same thing. If you are going to do metaphysics, you must do
> epistemology.
>
> If the denial of epistemology is _not_ a regress, you need to explain why
we
> need a mediated/unmediated distinction at all. What part does it play,
what
> work does it do? Sam's attempt to redescribe mysticism without reference
to
> "experience" and my past attempts to redescribe the notion of Dynamic
> Quality as "metaphor" and "compliment" are attempts at rehabilitating
> Pirsig's conceptual machinery without the mediated/unmediated distinction.
> Because if the distinction plays the part _Pirsig_ wants it to play, an
> _explanatory_/_justificatory_ role, then you've blundered into having to
> answer the skeptic, and so epistemology, and so the Subject-Object
> Metaphysics.
>
> Matt
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
> http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
>
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Jan 10 2005 - 01:58:34 GMT