From: Ian Glendinning (ian@psybertron.org)
Date: Tue Jan 18 2005 - 23:44:20 GMT
Hi Matt,
Sorry this will have to be very brief, but I'll come back to it.
Yes, my inserted notes did become a bit repetitive, but I wasn't "pressing
you" particularly, as simply clutching at the repeated opportunity to make
the same point to the asembled throng.
In short I agree - I'm not saying there are "no" rules, more that logic is
not the only rule, maybe in complex situations, not even the most important
rule. Changing the rules, is perhaps as you say the more important rule, but
we're playing with the semantics of the word rule itself now. Certainly such
rules cannot therefore be considered absolute or axiomatic. Playing games of
changing rules with words is what poetry is about, etc ...
(The final point about whether a pragmatist can believe in anything
pre-cognitive - I'd like to expand when I have time ... when I say
pragmatism, I'm talking natural language not some philosophical conventional
label - when I say "pre-cognitive" I may be meaning something closer to
intuitive pre-"post-rationalisation", unless by "talk" you mean something
like any form of signification / communication. Rather than believing, I'm
probably closer to "suspending disbelief".)
Ian
----- Original Message -----
From: "Matt Kundert" < >
To: < >
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 8:51 PM
Subject: Re: MD Them pesky pragmatists
> Hey Ian,
>
> I'm confused about where our conversation went. I think we were focusing
> on two different things in the last exchange. I didn't really know we
> were focusing on "rationality" and "logic," the "evolution in the meaning
> of the word (or the idea of) 'reasoned argument,'" but I can do that for a
> moment.
>
> For instance, you keep pressing me on a point about the "rules of logic,"
> implying I have some kind fervent reverence for it. I think that pretty
> misguided. You may not remember, but I was the guy that was some time ago
> said to have a very poor grasp of logic, or at least no respect for it.
> Pragmatists would naturally agree that "rules" are simply guidelines
> (taking Geoffery Rush's brilliantly delivered line in Pirates of the
> Carribean as their standard). That's why I love Rorty's formulation of
> philosophy as "the greatest game of all precisely because it is the game
> of changing the rules." But part of Wittgenstein's brilliance was
> pointing out the importance of rules to intelligibility. If there are no
> rules, then there's no way to interpret anything. A language game needs
> rules to exist.
>
> So, when you say, "the only rule of conversation is to have one,"
> pragmatists involved in the philosophy of language will reply, "Well,
> yeah, but you are going to need a whole lot more to _have_ the
> conversation." And that's about it, though. The two most general rules
> of conversation: Rule 1) Conversations are a must. Rule 2) You need more
> rules to have a conversation. So every particular conversation is going
> to have its own rules, depending on what kind of conversation it is. Part
> of the demand for rules is to disbar certain things from the playing
> field, so when you're having a conversation about football, you know
> you're talking about a game played with a round, black and white rubber
> ball and not a game played with an ovoid, brown pigskin ball.
>
> This is why I don't understand your harping about the "rules of logic." I
> would take the rules of logic to be a pretty standard thing to follow in a
> reasonable conversation. Pirsig would certainly agree to them, as I think
> his "tests of truth" includes them. They help you distinguish between
> consequences and bs. This isn't to say you need a Logic Book on hand to
> have an argument. Most people have the most basic rules of logic
> internalized. We follow them implicitly, indeed most of our thinking is
> already structured by them.
>
> So when you say things like, "A poetic joke, say, is at least as valid a
> contribution," I would say, "Yeah, sure, but not always." It depends on
> the conversation. When you say, "What I don't buy is the logical
> positivist / objective fundamentalist / hyper-rationalist idea that
> reasoned argumement depends only on logical rationale," I would say,
> "Yeah, sure, what pragmatist does? But what does that have to do with
> what we are talking about?" What did I say that would make you think I
> would like that? You say, "All I 'want' is the debate with other peoples
> opinions, what I don't want is a 'debate' with logic and numbers (which
> are objective - independent of people)," I would say, "Yeah, sure, but
> doesn't part of the blurring your doing by taking the emphasis off of
> logic, off of the "hyper-rationalist idea," mean that everything we
> discuss our people's opinions (on a continuum of more to less agreed
> upon)? That the word objective, as you just used it, is meaningless?"
>
> I guess the last note I have is on the notion of "pre-cognitive stuff."
> That would certainly be a "crux issue," and I would certainly deny you the
> mantle of "pragmatist" if you continued on with it. Pragmatists just have
> no idea what you could talk about, since talking is all post-cognitive.
>
> Matt
>
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