RE: MD Them pesky pragmatists

From: Ron Winchester (phaedruswolff@hotmail.com)
Date: Wed Jan 26 2005 - 02:12:21 GMT

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    Matt;
    Both Paul and Wolff seem to suggest that I’ve stopped thinking. But where
    is the evidence for that?

    Wolff;
    May I ask how I "seem to suggest" this?

    If I have said something you disagree with, I will be more than happy to
    discuss it. If I have made false accusations against you, then I will be
    more than happy to make a public appology for doing so.

    I speak off of the top of my head, and whatever I say is generally pointed
    at something 'In general', and not an attack upon anyone in particular.
    BUT, since I also do not keep a running record of what I say, it is quite
    possible I did make a statement that may have been considered to be pointed
    toward you, and have forgotten it.

    Please bring it out so we can better understand what it was I said that made
    you feel this way.

    >From: "Matt Kundert" < >
    >Reply-To:
    >To:
    >Subject: RE: MD Them pesky pragmatists
    >Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 15:38:10 -0600
    >
    >Paul, Wolff, Marsha, all,
    >
    >Maybe I should apologize to everyone if I sounded like an elitist prick in
    >my recent (or all) posts. I don’t intend to. However, it is difficult to
    >make my point without risking it. I could feel the catcalls coming, and
    >they did, but people have, in general, missed what I’m saying and attacked
    >what they hear me saying. We all do it, and certainly anybody involved in
    >the political discussions at this site (or anywhere for that matter) know
    >what its like.
    >
    >So, I apologize if people think I’m belittling them or their philosophical
    >musings. That was never my intention. Nor was it what I said. I never
    >claimed to be an expert in Western philosophy. I never claimed to be an
    >expert in the history of World philosophies. When I was careful, I said I
    >had a certain familiarity with the Plato-Kant sequence. Though Paul thinks
    >I have a self-image as a “sophisticated academic philosopher,” I’ve really
    >only ever thought of myself as an “armchair dilettante.”
    >
    >Paul didn’t do a bad job of summing up some of my positions on how I think
    >the history of philosophical discussions work. It’s a little exaggerated
    >(as most polemical descriptions are), but more importantly, I don’t think
    >he did a good job of panning out what I take the moral to be. My paper,
    >“Philosophologology,” was intended to see how Pirsig needs his epithet
    >“philosophology” to hang together conceptually for it to gain the required
    >strength he grants it in numerous areas. It is less that I collapsed one
    >side of Pirsig’s distinction into the other than that I simply threw away
    >the distinction to achieve a richer understanding of the various ways in
    >which philosophy works. My conclusion is that he doesn’t have the
    >necessary conceptual resources to hold the distinction (based on his
    >pragmatism) and that his “philosophologist” is basically just another name
    >for an “intellectual historian.”
    >
    >My criticism, of course, is that rarely are the two confused, as he
    >suggests. There are bad teachers, there are bad professors, there are bad
    >philosophers, there are bad intellectual historians: but there is nothing
    >institutional about it. Contrary to what Wolff suggests, I say directly in
    >the paper that Pirsig is right: philosophy cannot be taught, it can only be
    >done. I say (and have said in many places) that philosophy isn’t something
    >we can pin down with any kind of accuracy, we can only pin it down for our
    >particular purposes and desires. _Never_ have I denied “the title of
    >philosophy to non-academic contemplation” as Paul suggested I have.
    >_Never_ have I suggested that the conversation is over at any particular
    >place (though I may want it to be, just as others wish it over at other
    >places, just in the opposite ways). Paul suggests many times that I have a
    >view on how “proper” philosophy is done. But I have no such view and never
    >have I intimated one. The love of wisdom comes in many forms, if for no
    >other reason than wisdom is something you have about your experiences and
    >there are a potentially infinite number of experiences. What I have
    >intimated is that a “proper” course of action only appears when you become
    >more specific, when you make narrow, specific theses like, “Has Pirsig
    >dissolved the philosophical problems of the West?” Where my paper comes to
    >the aid of the bad-mouthed, mild-mannered, egg-headed academics is in
    >saying, “Hey, these cats study philosophy all the time. Why shut them out
    >of the conversation if its possible they might have some wisdom in how to
    >maneuver?” And it seems to me that everybody agrees with this sentiment:
    >the professional philosophers _are_ invited to the conversation, knowing a
    >little of the history of philosophy _may_ be helpful. So, what’s the deal
    >with the animus towards me? Is it just my possibly prickly nature or
    >possibly inflated ego?
    >
    >Paul suggests that I’m the type of reader who, when confronted with
    >something, must “categorise it or identify it with something else,” and
    >that this is bad. But I ask you: if we agree with Pirsig that everything
    >is relational, if there is no thing-in-itself, then how can anybody not?
    >One set of relations for Pirsig is the history of Western philosophy, a
    >relation Pirsig is at pains to set up. Why can’t I explore how this pans
    >out? But _never_ have I said this is the only way. _Never_ have I
    >discouraged people from taking other paths. We all have our hobbyhorses,
    >particular ways of relating that are idiosyncratic to us. Our hobbyhorses
    >are what make us _us_. If we didn’t have them, we’d be somebody else.
    >
    >Paul suggests that my frustration is born of my inability to convince
    >anybody that Pirsig’s square peg fits into Plato/Kant’s round hole. But
    >that’s a non-starter; that sword cuts both ways. My frustration could just
    >as easily be described as being born out of other people’s inability to see
    >that Pirsig, unbeknownst to him or his most loyal followers, is using a
    >round peg some of the time. Blindness as an accusation is a last resort
    >because you can never really know at the time if the other guy is the blind
    >one, or you are.
    >
    >Paul also suggests that I claimed “that one would not even be aware of
    >central philosophical questions unless you had directly studied them” and
    >that this “seems a little supercilious.” That is a little exaggerated.
    >The point is that the common guy on the street doesn’t always see the point
    >of these philosophical questions, he isn’t scared by them. He gets along
    >fine ignoring them. You ask rhetorically whether “philosophy invent[ed]
    >the contemplation of experience or did the contemplation of experience
    >invent philosophy?” I think the question too muddy and freighted. I think
    >if we asked, “Did philosophy invent the language we contemplate with, or
    >did the language we contemplate with invent philosophy?”, we get much
    >closer to how I think we should see philosophy working. I think the idea
    >is that philosophy tries to see how we make our way conceptually around the
    >world, and then tries to make suggestions about different ways to change
    >those conceptions. The guy on the street, when push comes to shove, will
    >run up against some ancient or modern philosophical problems, but that’s
    >not because they are “natural.” It’s because he’s using the concepts
    >philosophers are currently analyzing and suggesting changes in. As culture
    >changes, so do the concepts people use. The problems of the Greeks are not
    >necessarily the problems of 21st-century Americans. To think there are
    >“natural problems of philosophy,” as Paul seems to suggest, is, I would
    >suggest, to be Platonic. It is to think “philosophy is a natural kind.”
    >
    >Both Paul and Wolff seem to suggest that I’ve stopped thinking. But where
    >is the evidence for that? And why can’t I suggest that its everybody else
    >that’s stopped thinking? I don’t think people have, so why would people
    >think it of me?
    >
    >Matt
    >
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