From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Fri Feb 04 2005 - 21:18:59 GMT
Matt,
(This is just a response to the Rorty part of your post, and is long enough,
so I'll post it as is, and get to the rest later.)
Matt said:
I was referring to your description of Rorty's motivation for pragmatism.
You've said on occasion that it has to do with his "materialism" whereas I
see it as connected to his concern with epistemology. In PMN, Rorty
comments in Jamesian fashion that, once we adopt a pragmatic attitude
towards philosophy, the see-saw between materialism and dualism, or
materialism and idealism, or materialism and religion, is pointless. I see
him as not trying to clear the way for materialism, but in trying to clear
the way for whatever vocabulary we need for our particular purposes. His
enemy is not whatever is opposed to materialism, but reductionism, hence his
later self-description as a "non-reductive physicalist." When we want to
predict and control our environment, we can be materialists. When we want
to give sense, meaning, and purpose to our lives, we can be other things
(religious, philosophical, literary, football fans, etc.).
Scott:
Perhaps "motivation" is too strong. But there are occasions where he says
that he sees pragmatism as a continuation of the Enlightenment project of
doing away with religious baggage. On getting off the see-saw between
materialism and idealism, I again see cases where he has gotten off on the
materialist side, and seems to assume that all of his audience has as well.
(By "materialism", I include any sort of naturalism, physicalism, etc.) For
example, in the introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism there is this:
"What really needs debate between the pragmatist and the intuitive realist
is *not* whether we have intuitions to the effect that "truth is more than
assertability" or "there is more to pains than brain-states",....*Of course*
we have such such intuitions. How could we escape having them? We have been
educated within an intellectual tradition built around such claims -- just
as we used to be educated within an intellectual tradition built around such
claims as "if God does not exist, then everything is permitted".... But it
begs the question between pragmatist and realist to say that we must find a
philosophical view which "captures" such intuitions. The pragmatist is
urging that we do our best to *stop having* such intuitions, that we develop
a *new* intellectual tradition."
Now here he is arguing against the Nagel's and Searles's, who also happen to
be materialists. So within this context, Rorty makes sense. But if the
reader (me) is not a materialist, then I can agree with Rorty that it is
good to get rid of the intuition that "truth is more than assertability" but
it is bad to get rid of the intuition that "there is more to pains than
brain-states". So overall, I consider this passage only makes sense if
wherever it says "pragmatist" it is understood that he is saying "pragmatist
who happens to be a materialist".
As I see it, the see-saw between materialism and immaterialism (by whatever
name) is still very much alive. I think Rorty does not, because
immaterialism is, in professional philosophy circles, very rare these days.
Here's another couple of examples, from the intro to Philosophy and Social
Hope:
"Pragmatists hope to break with the picture which, in Wittgenstein's words,
'holds us captive' -- the Cartesian-Lockean picture of a mind seeking to get
in touch with a reality outside itself. So they start with a Darwinian
account of human beings as animals doing their best to cope with the
environment -- doing their best to develop tools which will enable them to
enjoy more pleasure and less pain. Words are among the tools which these
clever animals have developed."
"As ... Dennett has argued, it is only this picture of a Cartesian Theatre
which makes us think that there is a big philosophical or scientific problem
about the nature of the origin of consciousness."
Now I also want to remove the captivity of the Cartesian-Lockean picture of
the mind, and the Cartesian Theater, but I also want to remove Darwinism as
an account of the origin of consciousness and language (I hold that
consciousness and language do not have a temporal origin. Rather, time is a
product of consciousness). So, again, Rorty is speaking as a pragmatist who
is also a materialist. So the big question in my mind is whether it is
possible to be an immaterialist pragmatist, since it seems that whenever I
want to state a disagreement I have with Rorty, I am saying something about
the ultimate nature of reality. Which, on the other hand, is why I would
claim that Rorty is himself saying something about the ultimate nature of
reality, for example, in his adoption of Darwinism. To steal from his
vocabulary, I fail to see how Darwinism makes any difference in how one
deals with any environment other than the philosophical one -- seeing it,
that is, as a reason to deny immaterialism.
Matt said:
For instance, you said, "the point (among others) of Rortian pragmatism
(more accurately, his materialism) is to get rid of the last traces of
religion in public discourse, and in particular, in philosophy." I would
maintain that, in philosophy, he wants to get rid of epistemological
controversy because, in his view, the only good thing lately to come out of
it is idea that it is pointless.
Scott:
As mentioned above, he does say in places (though I can't recall where right
now) that he is continuing the Enlightenment project, which can be viewed as
anti-religious. You mention getting rid of epistemological controversy, but
I think that he wishes to do so in order to confine religion to the private
sphere, that he sees religious as something to which we have a right, like
our choice of who we marry, which right "is limited only by others' rights
not to have their own pursuits of happiness interfered with". [PSH p. 154].
And he goes on:
"This right to happiness includes the rights to faith, hope and love --
intentional states which can rarely be justified, to our peers. Our
intellectual responsibilities are responsibilities to cooperate with others
on common projects designed to promote the general welfare (projects such as
constructing a unified science, or a uniform commercial code), and not to
interfere with private projects. For the latter -- projects such as getting
married or getting religion -- the question of intellectual responsibility
does not arise."
Given the history of what happens when religion is argued on the public
stage, e.g., the Thirty Years War, burning heretics, etc., one has to be
grateful to the Enlightenment for putting an end to it, or trying to. So on
a practical level, I agree with this. But on a philosophical level, I don't.
A bit earlier, he says, "On a pragmatist account, the only point of having
beliefs in the first place is to gratify desires." By which I assume, in the
case of religious beliefs, he is referring to desires to find meaning in
life. In saying this, though, he is presupposing an atheist viewpoint, the
view of religion as providing comfort in a perilous world. No doubt many, if
not most, religious people do use their religion as a security blanket. But
from a theological viewpoint, religion is about salvation, not comfort or
happiness, and (for at least some theologians -- the ones I agree with :-),
to the extent that one finds comfort in one's religion, one has taken one's
eye off the salvational ball. Moreover, in part thanks to the Enlightenment,
the question of intellectual responsibility very much does arise in
religion. I happen to think that religion and reason are entirely
compatible, that a religious outlook is more reasonable than a secular one,
and though it will take a long time, the One, True religion -- whatever it
turns out to be -- is something that should be a goal to work out publicly,
as a matter of intellectual responsibility. Our current pluralist state of
many religions living side by side is a temporary stage of human
development, that can be overcome through intellectual endeavor. Now I
consider it extremely unlikely that I can convince you or Rorty of this, so
he is right that it is a case of "intentional states which can rarely be
justified, to our peers". But this leaves open whether this is because of
the nature of religion or the state of our intellectual development.
Matt said:
In public discourse, however, his argument
is slightly different. He privatizes religion and philosophy, i.e. keeps it
out of policy battles on the Senate floor, because he doesn't see how people
of widely ranging and different religious and philosophical views would be
able to conduct an argument in an expedient manner using those kinds of
discourse. He doesn't want to _trvialize_ religion or philosophy, he wants
to make sure 1) we can get things done on the Senate floor and 2) that the
Senate stays out of the way when we decide how to give sense, meaning, and
purpose to our lives. Just one example is the "evolution controversy"
currently going on in various states in America. The government shouldn't
be legislating what science does (or what religion or philosophy or
literature does), but that is exactly what seems to be at stake.
Scott:
Again, I have to agree on a practical level. But, also again, I'll note that
seeing religion as something that "give[s] sense, meaning, and purpose to
our lives" is somewhat of a trivialization of religion.
- Scott
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